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ABSTRACT
BULGARIA: fflSTORY AND POSTCOMMUNIST TRANSITION
izgii, Adem
M.A., Department o f International Relations 
Supervisor: Asst. Prof. Dr. Nur Bilge Criss 
July 2005
This thesis analyses establishment and transition o f Bulgaria in chronological 
order, starting from the emergence o f an independent Bulgarian kingdom in the 
Balkans to modem Bulgaria, mainly elabor^ing changes in the social-political, 
economic and foreign policy dimensions. The thesis aims to give a general 
perspective o f today’s developing democratic Bulgaria, shedding light on critical 
turning points in history, the tragedies of Bulgaria in the conflictual environment o f the 
Balkans, and recent events, which flindamentally changed the direction, and nature o f 
the cotmtry. This study claims that the transition has been extraordinary and 
exemplary for many reasons including the absence o f ethnic unrest, rapid economic 
developments and peaceful active foreign policy. Moreover, the thesis points out the 
tolerant stmcture o f Ottoman governance, and the peaceful, acquiescent, and faithful 
character o f the Turkish minority, explaining their important role in the peaceful 
transition o f the country.
Keywords: Bulgaria, History, Social Transition, Political Transition, 
Minorities, Economic Transition, Foreign Policy Transition.
m
ÖZET
BULGARİSTAN: TARİHİ VE KOMÜNİZM SONRASI DEĞİŞİM
İzgü, Adem
Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Asst. Prof. Dr. Nur Bilge Criss 
Temmuz 2005
Bu tez, Balkanlar’da bağımsız bir Bulgar kraUığmm ortaya çıkmasmdan modem 
Bulgaristan’a kadar, temel olarak sosyal-politik, ekonomik ve dış politika boyutunu 
ele alarak Bulgaristan’m kuruluşu ve değişimini incelemektedir. Bu tez, tarihteki 
önemli dönüş noktalarına, çatışmak Balkan ortammdaki Bulgaristan’m trajedilerine 
ve yakm geçmişte ülkenin yönünü ve doğasım kökünden değiştiren olaylara ışık 
tutarak, bugünün gelişen demokratik Bulgaristan’ınm genel bir perspektifini vermeyi 
amaçlamaktadır. Bu çalışma, etnik çatışmanm olmaması, hızh ekonomik gelişme ve 
barışçı aktif politikası sebebiyle ülkenin dönüşümünün sıra dışı ve örnek bir nitelik 
taşıdığı tezini savunmaktadır. Ayrıca tez, Osmanh yönetiminin hoşgörülü yapısını, 
ülkenin banş içindeki değişimini açıklayarak Türk azınhğm banşçı, itaatkar ve sadık 
karakterini vurgulamaktadır.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Bulgaristan, Tarih, Sosyal Değişim, Politik Değişim, Ekonomik 
Değişim, Dış Politika Değişimi.
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INTRODUCTION
Bulgarians have been living in the north part o f  the Balkans for almost 13 
centuries. They have been the members o f the Balkan family o f nations for almost 
five centuries subjects o f the Ottoman Empire. When nationalism came to Balkans in 
the 18* century, Balkan nations, which had lived together for many years, underwent 
complicated and uneven processes o f nation building and transition. Bulgarians, 
being one o f them, founded the third Bulgarian principality in history, largely with 
the help o f ‘big brother’, Russia. Nevertheless, fi’om that very moment Bulgarians 
could not stay away firom struggles and defeat in late 19*** and through the 20*** 
century, again and again, until the end o f the second millennium. Thus, imtil 
recently, Bulgaria, as a country at the far end o f  the Balkans, had always been 
somewhat isolated firom Western Europe and was perceived as one o f the “others”.
With the fall o f the Berlin wall, Bulgaria began to give signals o f a rebirth. In 
fiict the process began at the beginning o f  the 1980s, but its image o f a faithful Soviet 
Union satellite tended to conceal this &ct under the seeming imtiK>bility o f com­
munism. However, this change has been far different fi-om those o f  the other 
nations. Bulgaria has neither been a paragon o f transition like the coxmtries o f 
Central Emope, nor has it experienced bloody nationalist conflicts like neighbouring 
Yugoslavia. Therefore, little attention has been paid to some o f  the intriguing 
aspects o f the Bulgarian transition. The early formation and long endurance o f a two- 
party system, survival o f democratic institutions through years o f political turmoil, 
successfiil integration o f  the main ethnic minorities in the democratic process, an
economic transition which, after a long experience of failure, has shown encouraging 
signs o f progress in recent years, and its foreign policy has established it as an island 
of stability in the Balkans.
Today, it seems that this victimised and forgotten country, has got rid o f 
many of its burdens and emerging as another international actor in the Balkans. At 
this point, this thesis discusses Bulgaria’s painful journey towards today’s modem, 
democratic, NATO, and prospective EU member eountry, mainly elaborating on 
changes in the social-political, economic and foreign policy dimensions.
A number of artieles and books have been pubUshed on specific aspects of 
Bulgarian politics, economics and foreign policy, but there have been only a few 
that provide a comprehensive analysis o f the transition process.’ This thesis aims to 
contribute to the field o f inquiry by bringing together former studies and aims to 
capture the multi-dimensionality o f transition.
The thesis consists of four chapters apart fi-om the introduction and 
conclusion parts. The first chapter gives a short history o f Bulgaria in chronological 
order^ until the last democratic changes in 1989, and points to its turning points. It 
draws a picture o f the Bulgarian society and its relations with regional states, 
highlighting widely used clichés against the Ottoman Empire and Turks. It examines 
Bulgaria’s struggle for the coveted lands of Macedonia, its deep roots in democratic
’ Among them are Vesselin Dimitrov’s Bulgaria: The Uneven Transition and Emil Giatzidis’s An 
Introduction to Post-Communist Bulgaria: Political, Economic and Social Transformations. 
However, Richard J. Crampton’s books; Bulgaria ¡878-1918: A History A Concise History o f 
Bulgaria, A Short History o f Bulgaria which analyse the history of the Bulgarian nation mainly in 
chronological order, form the most comprehensive studies on Bulgaria. J. F. Brown’s Bulgaria 
Under Communist Rule, which gives detailed analyses of the first twenty year of Bulgaria and 
Nurcan Özgür’s Etnik Sorunların Çözümünde Hak ve Özgürlükler Hareketi (Movement o f Rights and 
Freedom in Solution o f Ethnic Problem), which gives the early post communist transition of the 
country should also be mentioned as analytic studies drawing a wider perspective on the subject.
 ^The thesis mainly gives the transition periods up to the year 2000, but in order not to draw a false 
picture of the country at a time when enormous positive changes happened in economy and important 
decisions (e.g. NATO and EU enlargement) made for Bulgaria’s place in future Europe, latest 
developments were added at some necessary points. Moreover, to provide unity of such a wide 
ranging subject a chronology is given in the appendix section.
experience, but also its susceptibility to authoritarianism, relatively open social 
structure combined with intense individualism; negative effects caused by 
collectivisation during the communist era, and permanent tension between the pursuit 
o f national self-interest and dependence on great powers.
The second chapter aims at giving a general perspective o f the Bulgarian 
political and social transition along with inherited problems from the communist era. 
The chapter begins with presenting the political change which is largely connected 
with economic problems and follows with major problems; institutional inefficiency, 
absence o f civil society; Bulgaria’s minority policy and problems o f the minority 
groups the settlement o f which became indicators o f Bulgaria’s democratic 
enhancement. The chapter also highlights the significance of minority representation 
in the parliament and the positive contributions o f the Movement o f Rights and 
Freedoms party, which was formed by the Turkish minority.
The third chapter begins with a detailed exposure of communist transition of 
the economy and the Russian effect on the process, and examines the reasons for 
Bulgaria’s bad record in economic transition in the first seven years after 1989, and 
the relative improvement that has taken place after 1997. It analyses the impact of 
factors such as external shocks, the Bulgarian governments’ inability to formulate 
and implement coherent reform programmes, and tensions between macroeconomic 
stabilisation and structural transformation.
The fourth chapter, as in the former chapters, begins with the communist era 
and discusses Soviet influence on the country’s foreign policy and continues with the 
post communist era, analysing the ability of Bulgarian policy-makers to woric out new 
strategic priorities for the country’s foreign poUcy and progress on the road to European
 ^ Since understanding the conditions of the largest minority group in the Balkans, helps to understand 
the transition of Bulgaria the thesis gives a detailed picture of the Turkish minority in Bulgaria.
integration. The chapter handles the issue in two periods until 1997, the period in 
which the country could not draw a straight line and after, in which it achieved a 
fiandamental reorientation fi’om bloc alignment to enhanced regional cooperation, as 
well as disengagement from a predominantly bilateral approach to a more active 
engagement and gradual multilateralism in the Balkans.
The reasons which led the to the preference o f this subject was firstly the 
proximity o f Bulgaria, in terms o f geography, history and family connections, but 
remoteness in the minds o f Turkish citizens, and elite alike. Moreover, the Balkan 
region forms a gateway for Turkey and all the Middle Eastern countries, while 
Bulgaria embraces most o f the suitable routes for transportation with the rest o f 
Europe. Turkey and Bulgaria has stood side by side, but in different worlds, for 
almost a century and now they enjoy merits o f carrying out healthy relations for 
almost fifteen years as well as drawing the lesson that doubtlessly learning about 
fiiends makes people closer. The reader will find that the history o f Bulgaria, from 
the beginning to the end, cannot be thought without Turkey and the Turks. The 
second reason for choosing Bulgaria as a case study is that among the former Eastern 
Bloc countries, Bulgaria is one o f the most interesting, as it presents a set o f 
characteristics different from those observed elsewhere in Central and Eastern 
Europe, not only as a Warsaw Pact member, but also in the aftermath.
CHAPTER I
A SHORT HISTORY OF BULGARIA
1.1. Origins of Bulgarians
In order to understand today’s Bulgaria we should look at its history. Today 
Bulgaria has many positive and negative features that it has inherited from its 
historical experiences. To see how it fared, it is essential that we see the starting 
point.
By the fourth century, Roman power was weakening with internal problems 
when tribes from the Asiatic steppes came to northeast Balkans. They colonised 
areas o f the eastern Balkans, and in the seventh century other Slav tribes combined 
with the Proto-Bulgars to laimch a fresh assault into the Balkans. The Proto-Bulgars 
originated in the area between the Urals and Volga and were a pot-pourri o f various 
ethnic elements. Actually, they were a group o f Turkic origin and the name ‘Bulgar’ 
was derived from a Turkic verb Bulgamak (to mix).'^
In the second half o f the T*** century, Proto-Bulgars settled on the territory o f 
the present-day Northeast Bulgaria. They formed the Bulgarian State, in alliance with 
the Slavs, and this state was recognized by the Byzantine Empire in 681 AD. During 
the rule o f Prince Boris I Michail (852-889 AD), Bulgarians adopted Christianity as
For the origins of Bulgarians see. Will S. Monroe, Bulgaria and her People. (Boston: The Colonial 
Press, 1914), pp. 12-16; İlker Alp, Beige ve FotoSraflarla Bulgar Mezalimi (1878-19891 (Bulgarian 
Atrocities with Documents and PhotograDhsü878-1989B. (Ankara: Trakya Üniversitesi Yayınları, 
1990),pp.l0-12.
their official religion. This act abolished the ethnic differences between Proto- 
Bulgaricins and Slavs, and started building a unified Bulgarian nation. ^
In the second half o f the 9**' century the disciples o f the monks Cyril and 
Methodius, who created and disseminated the Cyrillic alphabet, came to Bulgaria and 
developed a rich educational and literary activity and the Cyrillic script spread to 
other Slavic lands as well - present-day Serbia and Russia. After the coxmtry reached 
its golden age with King Simeon I (893-927 AD), it began weakening by internal 
struggles at a time when Hermitism became an important system o f faith in the 
region.^ Hermitism came to Bulgaria towards the end o f the 10*** century. It obviously 
indicated a willingness to withdraw from the world and its problems, and a sense o f 
‘internal migration’ or dissociation from the tenporal world was further encouraged 
by the greatest and most lasting o f the heresies to enter Bulgaria: Bogomilism,’ and it 
may be one o f the main reasons o f Bulgarians apolitical Ufe style which was seen in 
the following years up to the 19* century when nationalism hit the region.
In 1018, Bulgaria was conquered by the Byzantine Empire. In 1186, the 
Second Bulgarian Kingdom was founded and during the reign o f King Ivan Assen II 
(1218 -1241) it established political hegemony in Southeast Europe.* Nevertheless, 
the strife among some o f the boyars resulted in the division o f Bulgaria into two 
kingdoms and this weakened the country and in the following period. Ini 396,
 ^R.J. Crampton, A Concise History of Bulgaria. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 
7-15; Vassil A. Vassilev, Bulgaria: 13 centuries of existence. (Sofia: Sofia Press, 1979), pp.7-14.
® Will S. Monroe, Bulgaria and her People. p.l5; Glenn E. Curtis (ed.), Bulgaria: a Country Study. 
(Washington: Library of Congress, 1993), p.6
’ The Bogomils argued that the entire visible world, including mankind, was the creation of Satan; 
only the human soul was created by God who sent his son, Christ, to show humanity the way to 
salvation. The Bogomils believed the gratification of all bodily pleasures to be an expression of the 
diabolic side of creation, and therefore they preached a formidable asceticism which enjoined poverty, 
celibacy, temperance and vegetarianism. The Bogomils also questioned the social order by preaching 
that man should live in communities where property was shared and individual ownership unknown, 
and in which all men would be levelled by an equal participation in agricultural labour. The Bogomils 
had no formal priesthood; there were loose links between different regions. See R.J. Crampton, A 
Concise History of Bulgaria, pp. 19-20.
* Glenn E. Curtis (ed.), Bulgaria: a Country Study, p.7; Vassil A. Vassilev, Bulgaria: 13 centuries of 
existence, p.53.
Ottomans conquered the region and for almost five centuries Bulgarian people 
became part o f the most developed governmental system o f the time. Some o f the 
historians use the term ‘Turkish yoke’ or ‘Ottoman yoke’ mostly for political reasons 
but as the subsequent events had shown and objective historians clearly put; it was at 
least a 400-year period o f peace and prosperity which the region had hardly seen in 
the past and after.^
Nevertheless, the Ottoman Empire entered an era o f decline with a series o f 
military defeats after the Vienna Campaign (1683-1699), while globalisation began 
to be felt in the whole country. Bulgarian trade extended beyond Ottoman State 
borders, agricultural goods were exported increasingly to Western Europe and 
modem manufacturing equipment, mainly textile machinery, was imported. Trade 
brought the idea o f achieving modernisation in Bulgarian life and culture, as more 
Bulgarians travelled to the West for business or for education.“*
Ottoman rule in the Balkans was essentially non-assimilative and multi­
national in spirit and the peoples o f the Balkans were able to retain their separate 
identities and cultures. There were no significant obstacles to the Ottomans if they 
sought to convert the entire Balkan population. On the contrary, because Islam as an 
institution maintained certain privileges for Muslims, mass conversion o f the 
population would have actually imdermined the political and economic power o f  the 
Ottoman Empire. As a result, the Bulgarian population remained within the Orthodox
’ Beside the well-known Turkish Ottoman historians, some others including N. Todorov, H. 
Şabanoviç, H. Hadjibegic, A.Suceska, D. Bojanic, M. Maxim, M. Guboglu, E. Zacharadou can be 
referred as the ones who left the pragmatic-doctrinaire approach, came to Turkey and carried out 
objective research in the archives. See Halil İnalcık, “Türkler ve Balkanlar (Turks and Balkans),” 
Balkanlar (Balkans). (Istanbul; Eren, 1993), p.l8; İlker Alp, Beige ve Fotoğraflarla Bulgar Mezalimi 
11878-19891.0.8.
Bogoslav Dobrin, Bulgarian Economic Development Since World War II. (New York, Washington 
DC and London: Praeger, 1973), p.4.
Church." If  there had been a Turkish yoke in the region then at least two important 
phenomena would remain, Turkish speaking Balkan Peninsula and wealthy Turks 
living in Anatolia, but none o f them exists.
1.2. Emei^ence of Nationalism and Liberation Efforts of Bulgarians
When nationalism came to the Balkans in the 1800s, Bulgarians’ struggle for 
independence and unity began not against the governing state but against ‘Greek 
yoke’ because o f Greek hegemony in the Orthodox Church and status within the 
Ottoman Empire.*^ The competition with Greeks eventually extended to Serbia as an 
Ottoman firman o f 1870 established the Bulgarian exarchate. The existence o f 
Bulgarian exarchate later set Greeks, Bulgarians, and Serbs at odds with one another 
as the settlers o f Macedonia were allowed to determine whether or not to join the 
exarchate according to a referendum, requiring the two-thirds majority o f inhabitants 
o f a district.'^ These acts clearly started a struggle over Macedonians to affect them, 
especially through means o f education. Bulgarians were largely successfiil as it can 
be seen even today, however the subsequent events caused the struggle to lead to 
military campaigns."
“ Margarita Assenova, “Islam in Bulgaria: Historical, Sociocultural, and Political Dimensions,” 
Briefing Notes on Islam. Society, and Politics Vol. 3, No 1, June 2000 
<http://www.ciaonet.org/pbei/csis/isp/isp200006/index.html>.
The millet system, used in the Ottoman Empire to give fi'eedom to the religious groups, recognized 
group leaders as heads of the community. Thus Bulgarians felt humiliated as the sultans recognised 
the Greek Patriarch of Constantinople as the exclusive representative of the Eastern Orthodox 
millet into which the Bulgarians were incorporated. Luan Troxel, “Bulgaria and the Balkans,” in 
Constantine P. Danopoulos and Kostas G. Messas (eds.). Crises in the Balkans Views firom the 
Participants (Oxford: Westview Press, 1997), pp.196-197; R.J. Crampton, A Ccmcise History of 
Bulgaria, pp.66-86.
Symeon A. Giannakos, “Bulgaria’s Macedonian Dilemma,” Journal of Southern Europe and the 
Balkans, Vol. 3, No. 2, (2001), p.l57; Orhan Koloğlu, “Osmanh Döneminde Balkanlar (Balkans in 
the Ottoman Era),” in Balkanlar. (Istanbul: Eren, 1993), pp. 83-88; Vesselin Dimitrov, Bulgaria: The 
Uneven Transition. (London and New York: Routledge, 2001), p.lO; Audrey Ivanov, The Balkans 
Divided: Nationalism. Minorities, and Security. (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1996), p.43.
Bulgarians spent a substantial amount of money on the schools in Macedonia to form a majority, 
and Macedonian language seems to be largely influenced by the Bulgarian language. In the 90“' 
aimiversary of the 1903 ilinden peasant uprising against the Ottoman authorities in Macedonia, the
The first significant and organized attempt in order to form a national 
Bulgarian state came with an uprising in April 1876. The uprising was reported with 
political passion in European newspapers and gave a chance for the great powers to 
interfere in the Ottoman Empire’s internal affairs.** Two years later, in 1878, as a 
result o f the Russian-Ottoman War (1877-1878), the Ayastefanos Treaty drew a new 
map o f Bulgaria. The lands foreseen stretched fi’om the Danube in the north to the 
Rhodopes in the south, and fi-om the Black Sea in the east to the Morava and Vardar 
valleys in the west; included some o f the Aegean coast, though not Salonika, and the 
inland cities o f Skopje, Ohrid, Bitolya and Seres. In territorial terms, this was as 
much as any Bulgarian nationalist could have hoped for or even dreamed o f  
Nevertheless, the great powers which had been worried with the foundation o f a 
Russian sateUite at the conjimction point o f  their interests succeeded at organizing an 
international congress, the Congress o f Berlin, which resulted in the Berlin Treaty 
(June-July 1878). With the Berlin Treaty, a new autonomous unit o f the Ottoman 
Empire known as Eastern Rumelia was formed. Macedonia was returned to Ottoman 
rule and the Morava valley in the northwest was given to Serbia. Consequently, the 
Bulgaria o f the treaty o f Berlin was about one-third (37.5%) o f the size o f its 
Ayastefanos variant.*^
The Bulgarian sense o f being imderprivileged exacerbated by the execution 
o f the Treaty o f Berlin. Bulgarians developed feelings o f ill will toward Greece,
Bulgarian president, Zhelyu Zhelev, noted at his commemorating speech that an old man from the 
Vardar r^ion  came up to him and requested that Bulgaria show greater understanding towards the 
population of the new sovereign state because “Macedonia is a child of Bulgaria”. See Symeon A. 
Giannakos, “Bulgaria’s Macedraiian Dilemma,” pp.154-155; In 1870 there were over 1500 schools 
in the region established by the Bulgarians See Vassil A. Vassilev, Bulgaria: 13 centuries of 
existence, p.77; Will S. Monroe, Bulgaria and her People. p.l22.
Many of the books write of the uprising to be brutally crushed but there were probably 
exaggerations of the number of Christian deaths, while nothing was mentioned of the Muslim deaths, 
which may have been greater. See for details, Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, History of the 
Ottoman Empire and Modem Turkey. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), Vol. 2, p. 162.
Luan Troxel, “Bulgaria and the Balkans,” p.l98; İlker Alp, Beige ve Fotoğraflarla Bulgar Mezalimi 
0878-19891. p.l; R.J. Cramoton. A Concise History of Bulgaria, p.85.
Serbia, Romania, and the great powers.*’ The intervention o f the western states, as 
always, had brought nothing but taken much. Bulgarians never forgot the lands lost 
in Berlin. Ayastefanos Treaty had served only to draw the borders oi^Lebensraum o f 
Bulgaria”.** Thus, “the new Bulgarian state was to enter into life with a ready-made 
programme for territorial expansion and a burning sense o f the injustice meted out to 
it by the great powers.”*’
During the next twenty-five years, large numbers o f Bulgarians fled 
Macedonia into the new Bulgaria, and secret liberation societies appeared in 
Macedonia and Thrace. One such group, the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary 
Organization (IMRO), continued terrorist activities in the Balkans into the 1930s.’°
In fact, the fight over the region, especially on Macedonia, mandated the 
permanent fragmentation or “balkanisation” o f the region, and thus produced the 
results that gave rise to the term.’ * Later the failure in unification, complete 
independence, gaining the coveted lands o f Macedonia and establishing a permanent 
territorial access to the Mediterranean Sea (referred to as White Sea in Bulgarian
'JOjust as in Turkish) or the north-south axis has been the most important points in 
Bulgaria’s foreign and domestic state policy.
The task o f building a nation state began under the direct guidance o f the 
temporary Russian administration, which mapped out the state institutions and called
J. F. Brown, Bulgaria Under Communist Rule. (New York, London: Praeger, 1970), p.266-268.
Bulgarians still celebrate the signing of the Treaty of San Stefano rather than the Treaty of Berlin as 
their national independence day.
R.J. Crampton, A Concise History of Bulgaria, p.85. Underlining one reality helps to understand 
Bulgaria’s perspective. Instead of Tumovo, which is more centrally located, Sofia was selected as the 
capital in 1860, since Bulgarians hoped to acquire much larger territories towards the west and thus 
Sofia would be located in the centre of the state. Symeon A. Giannakos, “Bulgaria’s Macedonian 
Dilemma,” pp. 15 5-156.
Glenn E. Curtis (ed.), Bulgaria: a Country Study, p.22.
Flamen Pantev, “The Balkans: Historical Origins and Present Dangers of Recurring Ethnic Conflict 
on the European Periphery, 1945-2002,” <http://www.ciaonet.org/casestudy/pap01/pap01.pdf>, 
(January 2003).
Symeon A. Giannakos, “Bulgaria’s Macedonian Dilemma,” p.l55.
10
a Constituent National Assembly in Turnovo, forming the first broad political 
forum o f the liberated Bulgarians.^^ On the other hand, in order to gain the favour o f 
the Bulgarian political elite, the great powers pursued such strategies as offering 
them educational opportunities abroad, and promoting their respective cultures in 
Bulgaria.^'* The years between 1878-1896 was a period o f relative peace and 
consolidation o f the state^^ but huge numbers o f Turks voluntarily left or were 
forcibly expelled to Thrace or Anatolia.^^ Statistics vary but in this period 1.5 million 
Turks left Bulgaria.^^
In 1885, the Bulgarian Prince o f German extraction, Alexander Battenberg , 
made an attempt to unite with Eastern Rumelia^^ but ‘big brother’ ®^, Russia was not 
happy with this decision. This action was foUowed by the attack o f the Serbs. 
Russian officers^' who were in commanding positions left Bulgaria immediately to 
guarantee a Serb victory, yet the Bulgarian Army was successful at defying the 
aggressor Serbian forces at Slivnitsa. The war helped people to weld into a nation.^^ 
However, the victorious Prince Alexander would not be able to stand long against 
Russian conspirators and had to abdicate.^^
Nikolai Todorov, A Short History of Bulgaria. (Sofia: Sofia Press, 1977), p.68.
For a detailed article on American influence in Bulgaria during state development see. Will S. 
Monroe, Bulgaria and her People, pp.323-340.
RJ. Crampton, A Concise History of Bulgaria, p.l 19.
For a detailed study on the Muslim population before and after the 1877-78 War see Halil İnalcık, 
“Türkler ve Balkanlar,” pp.29-32; and the massacres on the Muslim population see Bilal Şimşir, 
Rumeli’den Türk Göçleri (Turk Emigrations From Rumelia). Vols. 1-3, (Ankara: TTK, 1989).
Audrey Ivanov, The Balkans Divided: Nationalism. Minorities, and Security, p .l09,
Battenberg became the Prince of Bulgaria on 29 April 1879, at the age of twenty-two. He was a 
cousin of Tsar Alexander of Russia, and occupied a subordinate post in the German army. Will S. 
Monroe, Bulgaria and her People, p.51.
Symeon A. Giannakos, “Bulgaria’s Macedonian Dilemma,” p.l60; Audrey Ivanov, The Balkans 
Divided: Nationalism, Minorities, and Security, p.45.
Many historians mention Russia as Bulgaria’s big brother.
In the Bulgarian Army all of the high-ranking oflRcers (higher than captain) were sent fi-om the 
Russian Army.
R.J. Crampton, A Concise History of Bulgaria, p.l 02.
Symeon A. Giannakos, “Bulgaria’s Macedonian Dilemma,” p.l60; Audrey Ivanov, The Balkans 
Divided: Nationalism. Minorities, and Security, p.45; RJ. Crampton, A Concise History of Bulgaria, 
p.l 13-114.
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In 1908, a new era began in the Ottoman Empire as constitutional monarchy 
was declared for the second time, after the short-lived one in 1876. From the very 
beginning, the decisions o f the inexperienced Yoimg Turk government provided new 
opportunities for nationalist movements in the Balkans, and sped up Ottoman 
collapse. Ferdinand Saxe-Coburg Gotha, who was the Bulgarian Prince since 1887, 
took advantage o f the situation without any delay and proclaimed Bulgaria’s 
independence fi'om the Ottoman Empire in the same year, and became the first king 
o f the third Bulgarian State. '^*
Before the new government ratified the Churches and Schools Law, Bulgaria 
had to compete with the Serbian and Greek states in order to expand its territories in 
Macedonia as both o f them developed conflicting territorial interests with Bulgaria 
and both o f which were established as sovereign states before Bulgaria.^^ The 
Churches and Schools Law provided the conditions for Balkan countries to form 
alliances against the Ottoman Empire and obviously the aim was to drive Turks out 
o f Europe and share the inheritance o f ‘the sick man o f the Europe’.
1.3. The Balkan Wars
In 1912, after long negotiations, Serbia and Bulgaria reached temporary 
agreement on the disposition o f Macedonia, the chief issue that had divided them. 
Subsequent agreements by Greece with Serbia, Bulgaria, and Montenegro completed 
the Balkan League at a time when the Ottoman Empire was occupied with Italy’s 
campaign in Tripoli. With the First Balkan War, which began in October 1912 with
Prince Ferdinand was the son of Prince Augustus of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha and Princess Clementine 
of Bourbon- Orleans, a daughter of King Louis Philippe of France. Will S. Monroe, Bulgaria and her 
People, p.62.
Symeon A. Giannakos, “Bulgaria’s Macedonian Dilemma,” p.l56.
Before the Balkan Wars, the region formed 32.7 % of the Ottoman Empire’s total territory and there 
inhabited 20 % of its population. Edward J. Erickson, Ordered To Die: A History of the Ottoman 
Army in the First World War. (London; Greenwood Press, 2002), pp.2-3. See also Ibrahim Artuç, 
Balkan Savası (Balkan Wart. (Istanbul: Kastaş Yaymlari, 1988), p.70.
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Montenegrin attacks towards Macedonia,^^ the Bulgarian Army moved quickly 
towards Edime and Istanbul with 400.000-men power. But later, the fruitless attacks 
toward Istanbul caused them to gain much less than what they expected as the Serbs 
and Greeks occupied nearly whole Macedonia and the fragile alliance collapsed after 
the peace negotiations.
Disagreement about the disposition o f Macedonia quickly rearranged the 
alliances o f the First Balkan War and ignited a Second Balkan War in 1913. The 
Treaty o f London that had ended the first war stipulated only that the Balkan powers 
resolve existing claims among themselves. The Bulgarians, having had the greatest 
military success,^* demanded compensation on that basis; the Serbs and Greeks 
demanded adjustment o f the 1912 treaty o f alliance to ensure a balance o f Balkan 
powers; and the Romanians demanded territorial reward for their neutral position in 
the first war. Even before the First Balkan War ended, a strong faction in Bulgaria 
had demanded war against Serbia to preserve Bulgaria’s claim to Macedonia. 
Ferdinand sided with that faction in 1913, and Bulgaria attacked Serbia. Ottoman 
Empire, Greece, and Romania then declared war on Bulgaria and by mid-1913, 
Bulgaria was defeated. The Treaty o f Bucharest (10 August 1913) allowed Bulgaria 
to retain only very small parts o f  Macedonia and Thrace. This was a national 
catastrophe, but unfortunately was only formed just the first ring o f a chain o f 
subsequent ones.^®
Will S. Monroe, Bulgaria and her People. p.l06. 
Will S. Monroe, Bulgaria and her People. p.l07.
39 With the Balkan Wars, Ottoman Empire lost all its land in Thrace and Balkans to the line (west of 
Edime) which it regained in July 1913. Macedonia was divided and today this problem still exists. 
The largest portion of Macedonia -north and west parts- went to Serbia and now makes up the 
independent Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The eastern portion (known as Pirin 
Macedonia) went to Bulgaria and the remainder to Greece. Bulgaria, therefore, was left with only a 
portion of the Macedonia that it coveted. See Luan Troxel, “Bulgaria and the Balkans,” p.l98; See 
also Richard C. Hall, The Balkan Wars 1912-1913: Prelude to the First World War (London and New 
York: Routledge, 2002).
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The defeat further inflamed Biilgarian nationalism, especially when 
Bulgarians in Serbian and Greek shares o f Macedonia were subjected to extreme 
hardship after the new partition. At this point Russia, whose warnings Bulgaria had 
defied by attacking Serbia, shifted its support to the Serbs as its Balkan 
counterbalance against Austro-Hungarian claims.
1.4. World War I
The settlement o f the Second Balkan War had also inflamed Bosnian 
nationalism which later ignited a conflict between Austrians and Serbs that escalated 
into world war. Both warring sides invited Bulgaria to co-operate promising some 
lands in case o f alliance, but it was the Central Powers that could guarantee some 
territory. After a period o f hesitation, in 1915, Bulgaria joined Central Powers in 
exchange for military and diplomatic assistance in acquiring the remaining 
territories.'*^
Nevertheless, the Great War was the third adventure in which it gained 
nothing but pain. The war ended in 1918 in defeat, with the total capitulation o f the 
Bulgarian Army, and the Neuilly Peace Treaty o f 1919 imposed severe provisions on 
Bulgaria.'** The Neuilly Treaty would not settle historic claims, because it was 
pimitive and Bulgaria reacted naturally as Germany did against the Versailles Treaty.
Shortly, the outcome o f World War I left Bulgaria with the same view of 
being underprivileged, in competition with its neighbours, and historically slighted. 
The desire for retribution once again led Bulgaria to follow irredentist policies in the
^  Dimetoka, Karaağaç and half of Edime was agreed to be ceded to Bulgaria. See Audrey Pantev, 
“The Historic Road of Third Bulgarian State,” p.l4.
With its outlet on the Aegean Sea and Western Thrace lost to Greece, Southern Dobroudja was 
annexed to Romania, and the territories around Strumica, Bosilegrad, Zaribrod and villages around 
Kula were given to the Serbian-Croatian-Slovenian Kingdom.
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region.'*^ Thus, in the interwar period Bulgaria continued to have problems with all o f 
its neighbours and at every direction except the east where the Black Sea lies/^
The interwar decades were mainly spent overcoming the shocking effects o f 
the previous wars. The devastating sacrifices o f  the war and the failure to achieve 
the coimtry’s nationalist aspirations led to social and political turmoil just short o f a 
revolution. **
After the 1930s, ‘Peaceful revisionism’ through the League o f Nations 
became the main strategy for Bulgaria and King Boris rejected membership in the 
Balkan Entente."*^ The first objective o f the new strategy was getting economic 
access to the Aegean, but did not produce any results. Its revisionist western ally, 
Italy, began to move away from Bulgaria as the League o f Nations declined in 
effectiveness and Bulgarian policymakers began looking towards Yugoslavia as a 
means o f avoiding isolation. In January 1937, Bulgaria signed a pact o f friendship 
with Yugoslavia. This was o f little significance, but procured Yugoslav diplomatic 
backing and in July 1938, the Salónica agreements allowed Greece to remilitarise 
Thrace. This, in turn, led Bulgaria to abandon the arms limitation clauses o f the 
treaty o f Neuilly, which in fact it had been doing for some time.·*® By 1938, all 
European diplomacy was dominated by the German resurgence and Berlin was
Luan Troxel, “Bulgaria and the Balkans,” p. 199.
Macedonia was the main problem source which caused the Balkan wars (1912-1913). In the north, 
the Dobrudja issue has been a problem to date. İn the south the countries Greece and Turkey were for 
status quo but Bulgaria had problems with Greece on the Macedonia issue. At the time president 
Atatiirk’s peacefiil policies was the only effect cooling the temperature of the region yet Turkey was 
also suspicious about Bulgaria’s plans hence Ankara tried hard for the preparation of a Balkan Pact 
and succeeded in 1934.
Vesselin Dimitrov, Bulgaria: The Uneven Transition. p.l9.
The Balkan Entente was signed on 9 February 1934 by four Balkan countries; Turkey, Greece, 
Yugoslavia and Romania. According to the secret protocol annex which was made public in April 
1934, the entente was not against any great poww but against any aggression on the part of a Balkan 
state so the only country in the irredoitist group which could exist as an aggressor was Bulgaria -  
keeping in mind Albania’s geographic position and relative weakness and its relations with Italy at the 
time. See Oral Sander, Balkan Gelişmeleri ve Türkiye (1945-19651 (Balkan Developments and 
Turkey (1945-1965), (Ankara: Sevinç Matbaası, 1969), pp. 8-14 
^  R.J. Crampton, A Concise History of Bulgaria. p.l68.
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Bulgaria’s biggest trade partner, while the Soviet Union already claimed Bulgaria as 
‘a Soviet security zone’. At this point Bulgarian decision makers split into opposing 
camps.“*’ Bulgaria’s king, Boris, believed his country’s best interests would be 
provided by peace or, failing that, neutrality without commitment to any great power. 
His challenging situation was obvious in the words, “My army is pro-German, my 
wife is Italian, my people are pro-Russian. I alone am pro-Bulgarian.”“** Therefore 
when war did come in September 1939 with the German invasion o f Poland, he 
immediately declared Bulgaria’s neutrality, but this position was inevitably altered 
by great-power relationships. After the fall o f France, pressure fi’om Germany and 
Italy outweighed that from the west.
1.5. World War II
“The Nazi-Soviet alliance o f 1939 improved Bulgaria’s relations with the 
Soviet Union, which had remained cool, and yielded a Bulgarian-Soviet commercial 
treaty in 1940. Under pressure from Hitler, Romania ceded southern Dobrudja to 
Bulgaria by the Treaty o f Craiova in 1940. Needing Bulgaria to anchor its Balkan 
flank, Germany increased diplomatic and military pressure that year. The massing o f 
German troops in Romania prior to invading Greece removed all remaining 
flexibility, and in March 1940 German forces were allowed to cross Bulgaria en 
route to Greece. In March 1941, Bulgaria became a member of the Tripartite Pact“*’ 
and declared war on Britain and United States in December 1941.^®
The Germans attacked Yugoslavia and Greece in April 1941. In less than a
Emil Giatzidis, An Introduction to Post-Communist Bulgaria: Political, Economic and Social 
Transformations, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2002), p.l7.
R.J. Crampton, A Concise History of Bulgaria. p.l69.
Oral Sander, Balkan Gelişmeleri ve Türkiye (1945-1965). pp. 8-14; R.J. Crampton, A Concise 
History of Bulgaria, pp. 169-171.
J. F. Brown, Bulgaria Under Communist Rule, p.3.
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month, the Balkans was divided up between the Axis powers, and Bulgaria’s share 
was the western territories lost in 1918, western Thrace including the islands o f 
Samothrace and Thassos, and Serbian Macedonia except for an imdefined strip in the 
west under Italian rule. Yet, Bulgaria was not given fixll ownership o f its new 
territory lest it pocket its gains and leave the Axis.^*
Bulgaria, unlike Hungary and Romania, did not declare war on the Soviet 
Union or make its army available to Hitler for his eastern campaign. The country 
rendered economic aid and supplied Black Sea naval facilities to Germany, but its 
major war aim remained limited to the incorporation o f the Macedonian areas o f 
Greece and Yugoslavia as well as Greek Thrace. Although Sofia gained aU it wanted, 
Bulgaria could not withdraw fi'om German alliance and after Romania’s switch in 
August 1944, Bulgaria’s dilemma became acute. It began to search peace with the 
Western Allies as well as the royal Greek and Yugoslav govemments-in-exile. 
Nevertheless, on 5 September 1944 Germans left and Russian troops entered 
Bulgaria,^^ since Churchill’s ‘percentage agreement’^^  with the Soviet Union foresaw 
25% Allied, 75% Russian control over the cormtry. Later the government installed by 
the coup o f September 9, 1944, made the Bulgarian army available to Soviet 
command which utilized it in the remaining stages o f the war and thus impressed the 
Allies to elicit relatively light peace terms.
As a result, after a struggle o f almost sbrty years and having fought four wars, 
Bulgaria not only fell short o f its geographic aims, but also lost in the eyes o f all 
European entities together with time, money and people. However, despite the 
alliance with Nazi Germany, Bulgaria did not allow the deportation o f about 50,000
R.J. Crampton. A Concise History of Bulgaria, d.171.
R.J. Crampton, A Concise History of Bulgaria, pp. 180-183.
J. F. Brown, Bulgaria Under Communist Rule, p.6.
Joseph Rothshild. Communist Eastern Europe. (Columbia: Columbia University, 1964), p.48.
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Bulgarian Jews/^ This single event clarifies its perception o f minorities and the 
existence of respect for humanist values before and during the war. Yet, as soon as 
the communists came to power, and world politics re-polarized, Bulgaria became an 
agent to achieve Soviet policies in the region, and Turkish minority timied into an 
instrument to put pressme on Turkey, as the Soviets wanted to put pressure on 
Turkey, which had good relations with the west. Later, increasing the dosage 
Bulgaria tried to eradicate Turkish existence in Thrace completely and establish a 
homogenous-nation state, through denouncing minorities, name changing campaigns 
and expelling ethnic Turks, became Bulgaria’s state policy.
1.6. Communist Rule
Bulgaria had an indigenous communist movement and throughout the 20*'' 
century the Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP)^^ was considerably stronger than 
some other communist parties in Eastern Europe, perhaps because o f the country’s 
tradition o f peasant radicalism. At the end o f the Great War, the Bulgarian Agrarian 
National Union (BANU), under the leadership o f Alexander Stamboliski, formulated 
an ideology o f ‘Agrarianism’ as a third way between capitalism and Marxism. It 
was clear that an almost wholly agrarian economy like Bulgaria’s would be unable to 
support the classical Marxist approach, because q f the absence of a substantial ^ b a n  
proletariat. Nevertheless, Stamboliski was assassinated by Internal Macedonian
Glenn E. Curtis (ed.), Bulgaria: a Country Study, p.42.
Strict policies of Bulgaria against Turkish minority after WWII began in 1946 with nationalization 
of Turkish schools and continued with regulations of religious afibirs in 1949 and finally by the end of 
1951, 155,000 Bulgarian Turks were expelled. See Ali Eminov, “There are no Turks in Bulgaria: 
Rewriting History by Administrative Fiat” in Kemal R  Karpat (ed.). The Turks of Bulgaria: The 
History Culture and Political Fate of a Minority. (Istanbul: The ISIS Press, 1990), p.210.
For a detailed history of the Bulgarian Communist Party see, Joseph Rothshild, Communist Eastern 
Europe. p.l09.
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Revolutionary Organization (IMRO)^* agents in 1923, and a fascist military and 
authoritarian order was restored by Tsankov who outlawed the BCP in 1924.
The first response fi'om the BCP was the 1925 bombing o f the Sveta Natalia 
Cathedral in Sofia while the king was present. This attack brought new measures 
against communists, and leading party members fled to the USSR.^^ After the 
German invasion o f the Soviet Union, the Bulgarian communists were formally 
committed to a policy o f armed resistance, but this policy was never seriously 
implemented until after the Soviet victory at Stalingrad in 1943. Resistance did not 
gain full momentum until Soviet troops entered Romania, since the commimists were 
held in considerable suspicion by the bulk o f the population who did not support the 
resistance against Germans, as Yugoslavians did.^° Thus, towards the end o f the 
Second World War, the only well organized political force in the country was the 
BCP since King Boris III had died in 1943, leaving a three men regency for his nine 
year-old-son (King Simeon II). On 9 September 1944, Soviet troops entered the 
coimtry, in the absence o f opposition, with the full co-operation o f the police and 
army.^*
With the opening o f hostilities between Commmiists and British forces in 
Greece in December 1944, the Bulgarian Communists and their Soviet backers 
concluded that the pro-Western party leaders were too dangerous to be tolerated, apd 
launched a canqiaign o f vilification against them. Some o f them fled abroad while 
some resigned. Bulgarian communists, who received instructions straight fi'om 
Moscow acted as its local agents, and compensated for their unfavourable position in
This was a secret organisation that gained control of the Macedonian liberation movement inside 
Bulgaria and it staged widespread revolts until recently.
Glenn E. Curtis (ed.), Bulgaria: a Country Study, p.36.
“  J. F. Brown, Bulgaria Under Communist Rule, p.6.
Emil Giatzidis, An Introduction to Post-Communist Bulgaria: Political, Economic and Social 
TransfcOTnaticms, pp.20-21.
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Bulgarian society with mass t e r r o r . T h u s  Peasant and Socialist parties fell into the 
hands o f pro-Communists. Yet, the opposition wings remained strong as they 
received impressive American and British backing. This circumstance obliged the 
Communists to cancel the rigged elections which had been prepared for August 28, 
1945, evidently because they did not wish to antagonize the West before receiving
63diplomatic recognition and a peace treaty.
A plebiscite was held on September 8, 1946, whereby 92.32 per cent o f the 
Bulgarian people rejected the monarchy in favour o f a People’s Republic, leading to 
the immediate exile o f King Simeon At the time, the Communists merely waited 
for American ratification o f the Bulgarian Peace Treaty before eliminating the 
opposition. When this occurred on Jime 4,1947, the opposition Agrarian Union 
leader, Nikola Petkov was executed, thus the last obstacle to the Communists was 
removed.^^ Stalinisation took hold in Bulgaria. The pattern followed by the BCP in 
order to seize power was common throughout Eastern Europe. After the 
establishment o f communist dictatorship, a merciless killing o f people began both for 
Nazi collaborationists and innocent people. The so-called “people’s court” set a 
record number o f death sentences, perhaps the severest o f any in East Central 
European countries, much greater than that o f the Nazis sentenced in post-war 
Germany. Particularly worrying was the fact that even those who had sought to take 
Bulgaria out o f the war were imprisoned. Their offence was that they were pro- 
Westem rather than pro-Soviet.^^ The guiding principle was “those who are not with 
us, are against us,” and great emphasis was placed on the role o f rituals and
“  Qeorgi Fotev, “Total Crisis and the Reorganization of Society,” in Jacques Coenen-Huther (ed.), 
Bulgaria at the Crossroads. (New York; Nova Science Publishers, 1996), p.l4.
“  Joseph Rothshild, Communist Eastern Europe. p.51.
^  Joseph Rothshild, Communist Eastern Europe.p.52.
J. F. Brown, Bulgaria Under Communist Rule, pp. 12-13.
“  Georgi Fotev, “Total Crisis and the Reorganization of Society,” p.l5; Joseph Rothshild, Communist 
Eastern Europe, p.49.
20
symbols such as marches, stage-managed expressions o f goodwill for party leaders 
and so on. Thus, the totalitarian system led to the total degradation o f civil 
organisations into state-controlled entities and managed to destroy the values 
indispensable to democratic life: honesty, trust and responsibility.^^ Besides the 
Orthodox Church’s subordination to the state, the Catholic and Protestant 
Churches were destroyed because o f their suspected links with the West. Many o f 
their leaders were executed or sentenced to long terms o f imprisonment in a series 
o f show trials.^* The BCP gradually assumed total control and finally centralized the 
entire political system under communist power.^^ However, the major advantage 
enjoyed by Communists in their subsequent drive to total power was not local 
strength, but rather backing o f the Soviet Union.’® Actually, there has been no period 
in recent Bulgarian history in which its destiny had not been decided in an open and 
brutal way by one Great Power or another.
Unlike the interwar period, Bulgaria did not see great changes after the 1950s 
in political terms as the system remained mostly imtouched and inert. Bulgaria was 
indisputably faithfial to Moscow, and was impervious politically or ideologically to 
the upheavals in Hungary (1956), Czechoslovakia (1968) or the anti-communist 
movement in Poland (1980). Regardless o f political revenge and an oppressive mood 
imder police watch, there were less protests and minute evidence o f dissidence. The 
standard o f living was low, but with guaranteed full employment, fi’ee medical 
services, price controls, social benefits, even slackened work discipline, socialism
Thomas A. Meininger, and Detelina Radoeva, “Civil Society: The Current Situation and Problems” 
in lliana Zloch-Christy (ed.), Bulgaria in a Time of Change: Economic and Political Dimensions. 
(Singapore and Sydney: Avebury, 1996), p.55.
Vesselin Dimitrov, Bulgaria: The Uneven Transition, p.24; Galin Gomev and Pepka Boyadjieva, 
“Social Injustice and the Crisis of Legitimacy,” in Jacques Coenen-Huther (ed.), Bulgaria at the 
Crossroads. (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 1996), p.lOO.
R.J. Crampton, A Concise History of Bulgaria. p.l84; Emil Giatzidis, An Introduction To Post- 
Communist Bulgaria: Political. Economic and Social Transformations, pp.20-21; Georgi Fotev, “Total 
Crisis and the Reorganization of Society,” p.l5.
™ Joseph Rothshild, Communist Eastern Europe, p.49.
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had an appeal for the mass o f the population. Criticisms were only heard from 
idealist communist party members.^'
On the other hand, the communist regime brought an unprecedented social 
change. Formerly Bulgaria was predominantly an agrarian state. Immediately after 
the Communist Party took power, it declared industrialization as one o f the main 
political tasks. In 1946, the Communist Party leader, George Dimitrov, who had just 
returned from the USSR, announced to the Parliament: “The biggest and 
indispensable task is rapid industrialization o f the country!” Following the Soviet 
model, a few years after the nationalization o f enterprises in December 1947, large 
construction sites were opened. Mainly consisting o f plants with old technology 
plants, they caused irreversible ecological problems, which later led to mass protests. 
The forced process o f collectivisation o f the agriculture, gave rise to many years o f
79migration which changed the entire social and economic structure o f the country. 
(See Table)
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1946 1960 1970 1980 1985 1989
Cities & towns 
Villages
24.7%
75.3%
38.0%
62.0%
53.0%
47.0%
62.5%
37.5%
64.9%
35.1%
67.6%
32.4%
As Bulgaria was a predominantly agrarian country with small and medium­
sized farms, the forced total collectivisation involved mass repression against the 
rural population. Collectivisation became a metaphor for the communist 
transformation in general, emphasizing the political nature o f agriculture and 
radically severed the existing economic ethos o f the population. However, many
Andrey Pantev, “The Historic Road of Third Bulgarian State,” p.l9.
Ivan Tchalakov, “Industrial Development and Ecological Risks, 1945-1990,” in Jacques Coenen- 
Huther (ed.), Bulgaria at the Crossroads. (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 1996), p. 247; 
Vesselin Dimitrov, Bulgaria: The Uneven Transition, p.25.
People’s Republic of Bulgaria, A Short Statistical Yearbook. (Sofia: Central Statistical Office, 
1990), p.4.
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found a relatively better economic position in the system.^“* As a result o f free and 
compulsory primary education, illiteracy was abolished and broad masses enjoyed a 
better quality o f lifeJ^ Systematic brainwashing indoctrinated people with the 
“values” o f communist ideology.
The context in Bulgaria has always been very different from that o f Central 
Europe, since there had been no organised opposition to the regime and somewhat 
less social pressure for change. What Bulgaria became famous for was its rulers, their 
lack o f individuality and invariable servility to the Kremlin and to the Soviet Union. 
But the total supervision, control and fear o f repression do not provide complete and 
sufficient explanation.^^ Unlike the ruling parties o f other Eastern Bloc countries, 
Bulgaria’s Communist regime, throughout its long reign, was never challenged by 
dissident forces. Until the late 1970s, the Zhivkov regime was able to prevent the 
emergence o f any counter-elite that might have threatened the Communist Party. 
Repression, an accepted parochial political culture, limited national sovereignty, and 
the clientistic cooptation o f most intellectuals into the system barred the development 
o f dissident groups.^^ Besides, they did not hate the Russians as the Poles, Czechs or 
Slovaks did. On top o f all this, the Communist regime managed to carry out rapid 
industrialisation successfully in a coimtry, which had been one o f the most 
underdeveloped in Europe. Therefore, the Bulgarians on the whole felt rather more 
comfortable in the egalitarian reality o f a totalitarian society and in the conservative 
stability and order o f the totalitarian state. The illusion o f relative prosperity created 
by the regime made the Bulgarian citizen a mere observer o f an idle political reality.
However, during the last years o f the former regime, its legitimacy in the
Vesselin Dimitrov, Bulgaria: The Uneven Transition, p.4.
Georgi Fotev, “Total Crisis and the Reorganization of Society,” p.l6.
Georgi Fotev, “Total Crisis and the Reorganization of Society,” p.l5.
’’ Daniel N. Nelson, Balkan Imbroglio: Politics and Security in Southeastern Europe. (San Francisco, 
Oxford: Westview Press, 1991), p.l4.
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mass consciousness seems to be an illusion. There was a comparatively high 
dissatisfaction with the political system in Bulgaria, which was complemented by a 
widely shared rejection o f its basic principles and ideological postulates. The 
percentage o f Bulgarians expressing categorical dissatisfaction with the political
• 7 Äsystem was higher than many western and former socialist countries.
The challenge to the legitimacy o f  the totalitarian regime that had existed in 
Bulgaria until 1989 was not, however, synonymous with challenge to the socialist 
idea itself About 80% o f the people defended the need for strong state intervention 
in social policies and demanded that the government guarantee every individual 
employment and a minimum standard o f living.
Moreover, in the mid-1980s, Soviet leader Mikhail S. Gorbachev and 
Bulgarian leader Todor Zhivkov*® were on cool terms. Zhivkov’s dexterity and 
servility drew a blank and he was not able to find a common language with the 
Kremlin’s boss. Gorbachev did not trust Zhivkov to carry out the reforms and lead 
Bulgaria along the road o f perestroika}^ Indeed, it could be maintained that 
Zhivkov attempted to keep perestroika out o f Bulgaria, expecting perhaps reactionary 
Stalinist forces to take over in the Soviet Union.*^
The percentage of Bulgarians expressing categorical dissatisfaction with the political system in the 
country (43%) is significantly higher than the percentage of those citizens in Western societies who 
were dissatisfied with their political systems (7.5% in West Germany, 4.8% in Holland, 7.5% in the 
U.S., 16.5% in Great Britain). Moreover, it significantly exceeds the percentage of politically 
dissatisfied people in other former Socialist countries (12% in East Germany, 23.4% in Hungary, 
17.4% in Poland, 13.5% in Slovenia, 12.6% in Czechoslovakia). See Galin Gomev and Pqika 
Boyadjieva, “Social Injustice and the Crisis of Legitimacy,” p.lOO.
Galin Gomev and Pepka Boyadjieva, “Social Injustice and the Crisis of Legitimacy,” p.lOl.
Todor Zhivkov was secretary of the Communist party fi-om 1954, the country’s premier fiom 1964 
to 1971, and head of state fiOm 1971 to late 1989.
*' Russian word meaning “restmcturing,” applied in the late 1980s to the official Soviet program of 
revitalization of the communist party, economy, and society by adjusting economic, social, and 
political mechanisms. Identified with the tenure of Mikhail S. Gorbachev as leader of the Soviet 
Union (1985-91).
The statement made by Zhivkov at the 1987 Trade Union Congress is quite characteristic: “let us 
duck for cover, lie low and wait and see (until the turmoil of perestroika died away)”. See, Ivan 
Palchev, Balkan Politicians: Ahmed Doean And The Bulgarian Ethnic Model. (Sofia: National 
Museum of Bulgarian Books and Polygraphy, 2002).
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Zhivkov felt he must make an adjustm ent to the ‘new thinking’ that 
had begun to emerge from Moseow. It was apparent that the Soviet Union’s 
reformulated policy was posing a threefold challenge to Bulgaria. Firstly, it 
became clear that the Soviet Union was neither willing nor able to go on propping up 
the Bulgarian economy, in view o f its own desperate needs. Secondly, glasnost 
would mean allowing criticism, although Bulgarian intellectuals had hitherto been 
kept unusually docile. Thirdly, a Bulgarian perestroika would entail the grave 
political risk o f demanding real and sustained sacrifices from the Bulgarian people.*“* 
Again much different from those o f Central European Countries, the regime’s 
end came with the environmental movement that had managed to unite people from 
different backgrounds. This environmental activism later provided one o f the few 
avenues for political struggle against the totalitarian regime. It can be said that 
glasnost came to Bulgaria first as ecoglasnost}^ Civil society spread in the form of 
clubs, associations and other groups which operated outside the control o f local party 
officials and mostly illegally. But, above all, it was Zhivkov’s decision to enforce 
bulgarianisation o f the ethnic Turkish minority, replacing their names with Christian- 
Slavonie names restarted in the winter o f 1984-85 (the ‘Revival Process’). The Turks 
formed approximately 10 percent o f the population, but differential birth rates 
signalled that this proportion would grow rapidly. The regime was frightened o f this 
demographic trend, proposing that especially in case a minority group demanded 
autonomy, it would create difficulties in a conscript army. These, so-called, dangers 
would be decreased if the difference between Bulgarian and Turk were made to
Russian term, literally meaning “openness” applied beginning in the mid-1980s in the Soviet Union 
to official permission for public discussion of issues and access to information. Identified with the 
tenure of Mikhail S. Gorbachev as leader of the Soviet Union (1985-91).
Roger East, Revolutions in Eastern Europe, (London and New York: Pinter, 1992), p.23.
Ivan Tchalakov, “Industrial Development and Ecological Risks, 1945-1990,” pp. 245-258. In 1989, 
41% of the population lived in regions with poor air quality, with levels of pollution (sulphur oxides) 
reaching as much as 9 times the world average. United Nations Development Program (UNDP), “The 
Social Costs of Transition,” <http://www.undp.bg/en/pb_sust_human_development_perspective.php>.
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disappear.*^ Apparently, Zhivkov tried to stir up nationalism and believed that 
beating the nationalist drum would increase popular support or at least mask some o f 
the economic difiSculties encountered. The lack o f progress on the economic front 
and the bad image o f Bulgaria abroad were depressing to the population to some 
degree.*’
Assimilation campaigns began with name change, later newspapers were 
closed, radio broadcasts in Tiukish ceased, speaking Turkish,** traditional Muslim 
clothing, festive rituals, even Turkish music were banned. The Department o f Turkish 
Philology in Sofia University was closed. Muslim graveyards were destroyed, and even 
the names o f deceased parents and ancestors were changed in the local government 
records. All remnants o f religious symbols were subjected to annihilation and new, 
artificially created rituals were forcibly introduced. The entire propaganda machine o f 
the state was mobilised in a smear campaign against the Turks, accusing them o f 
being ‘terrorists’, a ‘fifth column’, and ‘Turkish agents’.*’
In response, the Turks rioted and demonstrated, and the police reacted by 
firing on the crowds. Dozens o f people were killed, provoking both a diplomatic 
crisis with Ankara and a potentially explosive situation within Bulgaria itself. In this 
critical situation, Zhivkov tried to solve the crisis by allowing the minority to 
emigrate to Turkey. This exodus developed into one o f  the biggest movement o f
“  R.J. Crampton, A Concise History of Bulgaria. p.210.
Constantine P. Danopoulos, “Turkey and the Balkans: Searching for Stability” in Constantine P. 
Danopoulos and Kostas G. Messas (eds.). Crises in the Balkans: Views From the Participants (Oxford: 
Westview Press, 1997), pp. 213; Kemal H. Karpat, “Bulgaria’s Method of Nation Building and the 
Turkish Minority,” in Kemal Karpat, (ed.). The Turks of Bulgaria: The History. Culture and Political 
Fate of a Minority (Istanbul: ISIS, 1990), p. 18; R.J. Crampt<Mi, A Concise History of Bulgaria, p. 210.
** R.J. Crampton, A Concise HistOTV of Bulgaria. p.209.
Antonina Zhelyaskova, “Bulgaria’s Muslim Minorities” in John. D. Bell (ed.), Bulgaria in 
Transition: Policies. Economy. Society and Culture after Communism (Oxford: Westview Press, 
1998), p.l69.
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peoples in modern Europe and Bulgaria earned negative publicity worldwide.
At the time symptoms of a deep ideological and cultural crisis in Bulgarian 
society were increasingly salient.’* Among those indigenous factors, except the 
Turkish national minority issue that created the original impetus were, the failure o f 
limited economic restructuring, and intra-party conflicts.
Thus, Zhivkov was turned into a symbol for the total stagnation o f society 
who had to be removed in order for events to take a normal course. A “palace coup” 
was performed by Petar Mladenov, the foreign minister for the previous seventeen 
years, on November 10, 1989.’  ^ Consequently, Bulgaria’s transition to democracy 
began not as a result o f internal evolution but rather as a part o f an attempt by 
some o f BCP members to save their power at a time when the communist bloc 
was collapsing around them.’“* Without any doubt, the communist party stiU 
expected to govern, but it would rely on persuasion rather than coercion. To 
symbohse that, the central committee decided to remove from the constitution 
Article 1, guaranteeing the communist party’s leading role at a session on 11-13 
December 1989,’  ^but the party would continue to govern imtil the elections.
To negotiate the transformation o f the system the ‘round table’ model which
^  Wolfgang Hopken, “From Religious identity to Ethnic Mobilisation: The Turks of Bulgaria Before 
Under and Since Communism,” in Hugh Poulton / Suja Taji-Farouki (eds.), Muslim Identity and the 
Balkan State. (London: Hurst & Company, 1997), p.55; R.J. Crampton, A Concise History of 
Bulgaria. p.218; Vesselin Dimitrov, Bulgaria: The Uneven Transition, p.38.
Georgi Fotev, “Total Crisis and the Reorganization of Society,” p.l8.
Daniel N. Nelson, Balkan Imbroglio: Politics and Security in Southeastern Europe, p.56.
John W. Handley, “Bulgarian Political Development 1989-2003,” American Diplomacy. Vol. VIII, 
No. 3, (2003), <http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/sites/ad.html>
^  For a detailed study on the transition of politics in Bulgaria see Anelia K. Dimitrova, “From 
Proletariat To People: Public Relations Metamorphosis of The Bulgarian Communist Party and its 
Political Tribune Before the First Free Multi-Party Elections in 1990,” East European Quarterly, Vol. 
32, Issue 2, (Jun 98), pp. 167-195. See also Juan J. Linz, and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic 
Transition and Consolidation (Baltimore MD and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 
p.336; Vesselin Dimitrov, Bulgaria: The Uneven Transition, p.34; Stefan Popov, “Political and 
Symbolical Elements at Earlier Stages of Bulgaria’s Transition,” Praxis International. Vol. 13, No. 3, 
(October 1993), pp. 268-84; Krassimir Kanev, “Bulgaria: The Romantic Period of the Opposition 
Continues,” Praxis International. Vol. 10. No. 3-4, (October 1990-January 1991), pp. 306-317; Petya 
Kabakchieva, “The New Political Actors and Their Strategies,” in Jacques Coenen-Huther (ed.), 
Bulgaria at the Crossroads. (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 1996), p.l 16.
Vesselin Dimitrov, Bulgaria: The Uneven Transition, p.37.
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had been used in Poland and Hungary was chosen. The emerging opposition group, 
The Union of Democratic Forces (UDF) Party became a negotiation partner o f the 
communist  p a r t y . T h e  round table functioned as a substitute parliament, made 
changes on the political system, economic system, basic rights and freedoms o f 
citizens, organisation of state power imder transition to parliamentary democracy, a 
responsible government, and a call for elections. Although the round table meetings 
did not include representatives o f the largest minority group that caused the ‘change’, 
it had a formative impact in transition to democracy and its most important role has 
been consolidation o f a two-party system.^’ However, the round table failed to solve 
the urgent economic problems and rehabilitated the former Communist Party as a 
significant factor in the coimtry’s political life.’* The two-party system which 
stabilised the new democracy would also be criticized for producing extreme 
polarisation in society, an imhealthy obsession with ideology and excessive 
politicisation o f policy-making.”
The fall o f the Berlin Wall not only became the symbol o f the period after 
events, which took place throughout the former communist countries, but also 
opened a new era for Bulgaria. The truth is that the country experienced too many 
changes within the very short time o f a few months without precedent in its history, 
and in a completely peaceful way.*”  These changes may be studied from many 
different aspects, yet the main titles in order to get a general picture o f the country 
should, at least, be social, economic and foreign policy transitions.
^  R.J. Crampton. A Concise History of Bulgaria. p.217.
Vesselin Dimitrov, Bulgaria: The Uneven Transition, p.39.
Emil Giatzidis, An IntroducticMi to Post-Communist Bulgaria: Political. Economic and Social 
Transformations. p.50.
^  Vesselin Dimitrov, Bulgaria: The Uneven Transition, p.35.
Andrei Pantev, “The historic road of the third Bulgarian state” in Iliana Zloch-Christy (ed.), 
Bulgaria in a Time of Change. EcCTumic and Political Eiimensions. (Singapore and Sydney: Avebury, 
1996), p.22.
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CHAPTER n
THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL TRANSITION OF BULGARIA
2.1.General
History has played a dominant role in the self-perception o f the Bulgarians. 
One may claim, “this is by no means a rarity in Eastern Europe,” but in the Bulgarian 
instance, contrasts between rise and fall have been extremely sharp, and provided the 
ground both for passionate self-congratulation and pathetic self-pity.*®*
From the very beginning o f modem Bulgarian political thought, the 
conceptual development o f the nation and nationality existed. Leading and influential 
ideologues o f the Bulgarian Revival movement -including Father Paissi,*®  ^ Father 
Neofit Bozveli, Vassil Aprilov, Georgy Rakovski, Ljuben Karavelov and Christo 
Botev emphasized the uniqueness o f the Bulgarian nation and the necessity o f its 
remaining tme to its particular traditions and history. Bulgarian spiritual leaders 
participated in the growth o f ideologies designed to enhance national consciousness 
and the establishment o f national institutions, and all this contributed finally to the 
process o f nation building.*®  ^ The legacy o f greatness has been both a blessing, 
sustaining Bulgarians in the darkest hours o f their history, but also an impediment, 
reinforcing the gap between grand vision and petty reality that has bedevilled modem
Vesselin Dimitrov, Bulgaria: The Uneven Transition, p.l.
As early as the mid-eighteenth century. Father Paissi wrote his famous Historia 
Slavianobolgarskaja, to serve what could now be called ‘nationalistic’ purposes. Ideas of a sovereign 
Bulgarian nation state, of proud and equal international treatment, together with the other Christian 
neighbours (the Serbs and the Greeks), defence of collective and individual rights and freedom - all 
these basic Bulgarian foreign policy ideas, were established for the first time in modem Bulgarian 
political thought and served as a programme for the following generations of politicians, up to the 
present day.
Dimitar Tzanev, “Bulgaria’s International Relations After 1989: Foreign Policy Between History 
and Reality, in Iliana Zloch-Christy (ed.), Bulgaria in a Time of Change: Economic and Political 
Dimensions. (Avebury: Aldershot 1996), p.181.
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Bulgarians.’^^
When massive propaganda campaign o f the Communist regime was 
combined with aU those experiences mentioned above, deep popular psychological 
fault lines were created. There is the feeling that the country has been cut off from its 
vital life-support sources, abandoned to its own fate, and betrayed by the world and 
the Great Powers. There is, also, the feeling that the country has been suffocated by 
intricate and endless conspiracies generated abroad, and there is a general feeling o f 
chauvinism and suspicion towards everything fo r e ig n .H o w e v e r ,  it also created a 
streamlined and efficient administration, enabled central authority to curb the excesses 
o f the local lords, and proved remarkably stable.**^
In Bulgaria domestic politics have always been subordinate to the aspirations 
o f territorial nationalism. When present, domestic political fragmentation has been a 
facilitator o f such subordination. Due to a prolonged national education policy that 
created fixed ideas about territorial rights, nationalism became easily the alternative 
means o f gaining legitimacy and, in turn, the political system became a hostage to 
national aspirations. The Bulgarian community followed those who seemed to revive 
King Ivan’s Great Bulgaria. Charismatic personalities who attempted to inject 
rationality into the political mentality or those who tried to apply a less-than- 
confrontational approach to the national aspirations were viewed as having betrayed 
the national cause and were either discredited and/or eliminated. On the opposite 
side, no blame or even responsibility was ever assigned to those political leaders who 
failed miserably in the process o f attempting to realize the territorial aspirations by
Vesselin Dimitrov, Bulgaria: The Uneven Transition, p.2.
Symeon A. Giannakos, “Bulgaria’s Macedonian Dilemma,” p.l61. 
Vesselin Dimitrov, Bulgaria: The Uneven Transition, p.3.
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military means.'”’
Today, there appears to be a conspicuous reluctance to become involved in 
any critical self-evaluation o f the past. Even the Communist regime has avoided 
scrutiny. There seems to be no widely accepted terminology describing the post-1989 
political situation. Bulgarians simply refer to the 1989 events as ‘the change’.
without clariB^ing the e p o c h . T o  describe the limits o f the change a wider look is
required. Thp plf^rtiong r\f Tnnp 1990, were the first democratic elections in nearly six 
decades tthe last free el i^ t^ionff had taken place in 193lV”  ^and for a high number o f
Bulgarian citizens, it was the first democratic government, which they ever saw.
'  ^  The new government. Union o f Democratic Forces (UDF) government, began 
with a reactive approach and it followed a programme o f ‘de-communisation’ which 
aimed to undo the effects o f the Bulgarian Communist Party’s domination o f 
personnel selection during its four decades in power. A blind opposition took place 
against all the remnants o f the communist era. Even the Orthodox Church hierarchy 
came under attack for their collaboration with the former regime, and when Patriarch 
Maxim refused to resign, an alternative synod was set up under Metropolitan Pimen 
o f Nevrokop to replace him ."” The split in the Bulgarian Orthodox Church has not 
yet been resolved. Currently the Bulgarian Orthodox Church has two legitimate
Examples for the first can be Prime Minister Stefan Stambolov, who was fiitally wounded in Sofia 
by VMRO (Supreme/Intemal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation-Union of Macedonian 
Associations), activists and supporters in 1895 as he had alienated nationalists by cracking down on 
militant approaches towards the realization of territorial aspiration and preferred political strategies 
such as convincing the great powers diplomatically to facilitate territorial concessions to the Bulgarian 
State. The second example involves Alexander Stamboliiski who was brutally tortured and executed 
in 1923. Having signed a rapprochement treaty with Serbia, Stamboliiski was lu l le d  a traitor. Before 
he was murdered, he had his arms cut off, evidently to punish the arm that treaty. On the
opposite side, no blame or responsibility has been assigned to Tsar F e rd in a n f i^ ||^ g e  of Bulgaria 
during the disastrous campaigns of the Second Balkan War and World War I, i 
World War 11. Symeon A. Giannakos, “Bulgaria’s Macedonian Dilemma,” pp.1 
Symeon A. Giannakos, “Bulgaria’s Macedonian Dilemma,” p.l6l.
Vesselin Dimitrov, Bulgaria: The Uneven Transition, pp.45-50.
Georgi Fotev, “Total Crisis and the Reorganization of Society,” p.26.
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Boris during
leaderships (synods) and two patriarchs.*^*
Similarly, a law was passed by the parliament in 1992 which barred from any 
position o f leadership in an academic institution anyone who has ever held a post in 
the RTP^^any -of kc—nr^qno r>f the security services. President Zheliu Zhelev 
considered the act to be discriminatory and appealed it to the Constitutional Court, 
but the court upheld its constitutionality.**^ The role o f the Constitutional Court in
similar cases (e.g. the verdict pronouncing the legitimacy o f Movement o f Rights and 
Freedoms Party) may be viewed as an indication o f growing respect for institutions 
in Bulgarian democracy.**^ Nevertheless, at the same time policies followed to 
discard the taboos o f the decade-long repressive regime took on the spontaneous 
nature o f ‘negative freedom’ especially at the level o f everyday life. For example, 
respect to religious institutions declined, the book market was flooded with 
pornography, occult literature, low quality products o f Western mass culture, while 
interest in serious works o f literature and art declined.**^
Like many other factors, the governments changed frequently as old problems 
remained with the inefficient policies o f the UDF government to realize a smooth 
transition. In parliamentary elections held in December 1994, the ex-Communist
party won and regained power. Though similar to the case o f former communist
parties in Poland and Hungary, this fact can hardly be explained in terms o f a general
theoretical framework without elaborating on the peculiarities o f the “Bulgarian 
case] ^ ^  Voters hoped the advent o f the communist party would bring back the 
former prosperity and equality but Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP)’s policies were
Bulgarian Helsinki Committee, “Religious Freedoms and Church-State Relations in Bulgaria," 
<http;//www.bghelsinki.org/special/en/relig.html >.
John. D. Bell, “Démocratisation and Political Participation in Postcommunist Bulgaria,” in Karen 
Dawisha & B. Parrott (eds.). Politics. Power and the Struggle for Democracy in South-East Euroné, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p379.
Vesselin Dimitrov, Bulgaria: The Uneven Transition, p.59.
Georgi Fotev, “Total Crisis and the Reorganization of Society,” p.25.
Georgi Fotev, “Total Crisis and the Reorganization of Society,” p.l2.
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often misconceived, and were rarely implemented. The country continued to plunge 
from one disaster to another.
Until the end o f 1997, the transition period was an absolute chaos and
characterised by political instability. There were four parliamentary elections and 
eigh^ h a n g e s  o f government, with the BSP and UDF altem atii^. The Socialist 
Party ruled Bulgaria for all but a few months from 1989 until 1997, mostly avoiding 
challenging economic reforms, which may have caused public discontent, while it 
allegedly stole state assets. At the time, the economy reached the verge o f collapse.
with 310-percent inflation, bread shortages, and mass impoverishment."’ (See 
Table)
Table.2. Chronology o f  Bulgarian Central Government
Prime M inister Foreign M inister
Andrei Lukanov (BSP) 
appointed by Parliament Boyko Dimitrov
Jan.- Aug. 1990
Andrei Lukanov (BSP) 
Sept.-Nov. 1990 Lyuben Gotzev
Dimitar Popov (coalition) 
Dec. 1990-Oct. 1991 Viktor Valkov
Filip Dimitrov (UDF) 
Nov. 1991- Dec 1992. Stoyan Ganev
Lyuben Berov (BSP 
dominated ‘expert’) 
Dec 1992- Oct 1994
Lyuben Berov 
Stanislav Daskalov
Reneta Injova (caretaker) 
Oct 1994- Jan 1995 Ivan Stanchev
/jpm Videnov (BSP) 
Ja«.f995-Jan 1997 Georgi Pirinski
Stefan Sofianski (caretaker) 
Feb. May. 1997 Stoyan Stalev
President
Petar Mladenov 
(BSP) appointed 
by Parliament 
Apr.- Jul. 1990
ZheUu Zhelev 
(UDF): 2 terms
Aug. 1990- 
Jan.1992 
(elected by 
Parliament)
Jan. 1992- Dec. 
1996
Petar Stoyanov 
(UDF)
Jan. 1997- Jan. 
2002
Emil Giatzidis, An Introduction to Post-Communist Bulgaria: Political. Economic and Social 
Transformations. p.63.
Colin Woodard, “Spirit of ‘89 Revolutions Rumbles in the Balkans,” Christian Science Monitor. 
Vol. 89, Issue 38, (21 Jan 1997).
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There appeared to be certain nostalgia for the Cold War period and an even 
near-resentment for its end. One is left with the impression that Bulgaria enjoyed a 
comfortable existence within the Soviet side o f the bi-polarity, and there seemed to 
be a subliminal notion o f regret that the country was jolted out o f it into an uncertain 
environment. Inside that uncertain environment, the country and the people found an 
emotional refuge. The breakdown o f the bipolar system and exposure to a new 
rmcertain environment were considered additional setbacks. Thus, the past appeared 
to be preferable to the uncertain fixture."*
beginning o f 1997?^^en the BSP and two nominal partners governed 
in a coalition, thousands o f people stood up for their rights with nationwide strikes and 
daily antigovemment protests, in January and early February. Probably that was the 
most vulnerable moment for the yoimg Bulgarian democracy. However, its 
institutions proved strong enough and the BSP-led government agreed in early 
February to hold early electio^  in April and ceded power to a non-party 
pnvprn^n t hy thf mayor o f Sofia, Stefan Sofianski. The UDF-led coalition 
won an absolute majority in elections find Ttnt? leader Ivan Kostoy was chosen Prime 
Minia r .  Actually· it wfxs fi CTMip ‘fir'm-bflow ’ The events established a turning point 
toward the evolution o f a civil society as the society voiced its demands for the first 
time and everyone saw what active citizens could realty achieve. The same year. 
Petar Stoyanov was elected as the new president and a second phase began in 
Bulgaria’s democratic transition.
But the coxmtry was in the worst economic and social situation, even when
compared vvdth the one in 1990. The Rostov government spent its tenure in the 
battle against long-standing problems, and did much to consolidate the stabilization
“ * Symeon A. Giannakos, “Bulgaria’s Macedonian Dilemma,” p.l62.
Emil Giatzidis, An Introduction to Post-Communist Bulgaria: Political. Economic and Social 
Transformations, p.69, 128; Vesselin Dimitrov, Bulgaria: The Uneven Transition., p.55-56.
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o f Bulgaria and later passed the flag to the former child-King today’s Prime 
Minister, Simeon Saxe-Coburg Gotha.
After the beginning o f the last transition period, which started roughly in 
1989, Bulgaria experienced many hardships and went a long way towards 
europeanization, but it seems that some problems still persist. These problems and 
their sources can be categorized as institutional inefficiency, the absence o f civil 
society and minority related problems.
2.2.Institutional Inefficiency
The post-Communist period has been marked by the absence and ineffec­
tiveness o f  the state and its institutions. As the Communist system was 
characterised by the subordination o f  the state to the party, dismantling o f the 
Communist regime was perceived as equivalent to dismantling o f the state. This 
resulted in a situation where state administration was exploited by different ‘mafia’
structures. Apparently Bulgarian society is still lacking an importmirglcmcnt for the
construction o f civil society and democratic consolidation: tm stTC itizens-do^t trust
~ ~  -------------- -—-------------------------------
the government and its institutions, the government does not trust its citizens, and 
everyone in their everyday concerns is suspicious o f everyone else.
Institutional inefficiency is most visible in the management o f the crime 
wave. By penetrating government circles through bribery and blackmail, the criminal 
clique has corrupted them and drawn them into their service away from servicing the
As a child-king in the mid-1940s, he was forced to flee by the Soviets and Bulgarian communists. 
Saxe-Coburg lived as a modestly successfiil businessman in Madrid, Spain. His party, created only a 
scant few months before the 2001 elections, soared to first place in the polls, and kept that position, 
gaining 43 percent of the popular vote. With unclear policies, but many economic and social promises, 
Simeon offered to Bulgarian voters an alternative to “politics as usual”. Daniel N. Nelson, “Armies, 
Security, and Democracy in Southeastern Europe,” Armed Forces &Society, Vol. 28, Issue 3, (March 
2002), pp. 444-445.
Emil Giatzidis, An Introduction to Post-Communist Bulgaria: Political. Economic and Social 
Transformations, p.64.
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public interest. The operation o f semi-criminal networks, acting together with 
strategically placed executive officials, have done much to destabihse and destroy 
the financial, organisational, structural and moral foimdations o f the state.
The social crime intensifies fear in society, breaks the connection between 
society and state structures and aggravates social erosion. The demoralisation o f the 
entire society has been the result o f the absence o f accountability and control, since 
4he very line between legal and illegal, between those who enforce law and those 
who trespass it, has become dangerously blurred and flu id .WheiTthe~aKence o f 
civil society coincided with all these the situation gets even more complicated.
2.3.The Absence of Civil Society
In the transition period civil society barely existed and was in no position to 
challenge the regime, but later democracy signalled the resurrection o f civil society, 
which had to take place under unique historical circumstances o f political and 
economic transformation. The failure o f political institutions to handle the reform 
process along with the shock o f economic transformation caused severe effects on the 
behaviour and the mentahty o f the Bulgarian people, who, once again, survived a 
declining economy, lower Kving standards, high unemployment and inflation.
In Bulgaria prior to Communism there was a tradition in self-help 
initiatives and charitable activities, which can be traced back to the Ottoman 
Empire. The chitalishte (literally, reading room) that had all the characteristics o f  
civil associations preserved the culture, national identity and religion.*^'* After 
1878, despite the establishment o f civic organisations such as trade unions, chambers
Roumen Daskalov, “A Democracy Bom in Pain” in John D. Bell (ed.), Bulgaria in Transition. 
Politics. Economy. Society and Culture after Communism. (Oxford: Westview Press, 1998), p.26.
Emil Giatzidis, An Introduction to Post-Communist Bulgaria: Political. Economic and Social 
Transformations, pp.110-115.
Dimitr Mishew, The Bulgarians in the Past. (New York: Amo Press, 1971), p.365.
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of trade and industry, civil society remained ineffective since these organisations
never eluded the indirect control o f the state and their efforts were never meant to win
autonomy from respective state institutions. The trend o f centralisation reached its
peak during the Communist period that followed, and hence whatever tradition these
organisations had was destroyed after 1944. The loss o f  the tradition o f  civic initiative
and voluntary civic participation emerged as the most serious problem o f the
transition from totalitarian regime to democratic society. Reviving the pre-war civic
1
traditions has perhaps been the greatest challenge for post-Communist Bulgaria.
The formation o f the NGO sector commenced in 1989, immediately after the 
fall o f Zhivkov regime, but the society was not ready for such a radical change and 
the vacuum opened the way for corruption and organized crime. Doubtlessly, this 
sitiiation left a negative imprint on further development o f the NGOs. By 1993, the 
Bulgarian people had realised that not everything about democracy is ideal; in 
particular the high social cost that accompanied démocratisation discouraged 
involvement and any commitment to fiarther change. The reforms introduced 
inequality to a society that had felt rather comfortable with the egalitarianism o f  the 
Communist era. As a result, the historical legacy o f alienation along with political 
instability and the economic hardships o f the post-Communist period drove the 
Bulgarian people away from political participatioa*^^
2.4. Majority-Minority Relations and Problems
The entire struggle to form an independent, wealthy and prosperous Bulgaria 
for almost 120 years somewhat consisted o f nation building and revolved around the
Emil Giatzidis, An Introduction to Post-Cwnmunist Bulgaria: Political. Economic and Social 
Transformations, p. 116.
Emil Giatzidis, An Introduction to Post-Communist Bulgaria: Political. Ecmiomic and Social 
Transformations, p.116-117.
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minority problem. Minority groups were a reality o f  the cotmtry as in other Balkan
nations, and were the object o f animosity for xenophobic Bulgarian nationalists. 127
Name changing, restriction o f human rights and ousting have been standard forms o f
assimilation and means o f  controlling minority groups. There are too many figures 
on the number o f population transfers and the majority elaborate Turkish emigrations 
fi-om the Balkans. Reliable studies demonstrate that well over 2 million Turks have
left Bulgaria since the 1877-78 Russian-Ottoman War.*^* Only when the total
population o f the region is taken into consideration the magnitude o f the issue may 
be appreciated.*^’
After the fall o f communism, nationalism quickly assumed its traditional
forms with abundant input fi’om the old communist cadre, wliich to o k -^ a r tjn jh e  
campaign. For the most part, the backlash against the expansion o f political 
democracy and human rights was inspired by nationalism. Therefore, the situaiiSirt>f
at least during the first years, the main 
indicator o f democratic development.’ *^* Moreover, as can be seen in the following 
chapters, this issue has been one o f the main focus o f the Turkish-Bulgarian bilateral 
relations. The presence o f Macedonians. Turks. Pomaks and others in Bulgaria, 
raises the essential question o f who a Bulgarian is. Nationality may be defined by 
common citizenship or in terms-of- shared charar teristirs such as lanpnagfi and
religion. I f  the former criterion is used, then all citizens o f  Bulgaria may be regarded
Bilal N. Simsir, The Turks of Bulgaria (1878-19851. (London: K. Rustem & Brother Publishers, 
1988), p. 208.
İlker Alp, Beige ve Fotoğraflarla Bulear Mezalimi (1878-1989). pp.334-335.
In 1878 the total population living on the lands that formed Bulgaria (namely Rusçuk, Vidin 
Timova, Tulça, Varna, Sofya, Islimiye and Filibe) was 3.309.000 and the numbe»* of the Muslim 
Turks was 1.800.954. See İlker Alp, Beige ve FotoSraflarla Bulgar Mezalimi (1878-1989). pp. 3-7. 
See also Kemal H. Karpat, “Introduction: Bulgarian way of Nation Building and The Turkish 
Minority” in Kemal H. Karpat (ed.). The Turks of Bulgaria: The History. Culture and Political Fate of 
a Minority (Istanbul: The ISIS Press, 1990), pp. 1-22.
Krassimir Kanev, “From Totalitarianism to a Constitutional State,” in Jacques Coenai-Huther 
(ed.), Bulgaria at the Crossroads. (New York, Nova Science Publishers, 1996), p. 68.
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131as Bulgarian; if the latter, only those who have the “proper” language and religioa
The 1992 census was the first since the 1960s to allow respondents to indicate 
an ethnic identity. Eighty five percent o f the population identified themselves as 
Bulgarian, 9.7% as Turks, 3.4% as Roma and 1.1% as others. In terms o f mother 
tongue, 86.7% spoke BuleariaiL 9.8% Turkish and 3% Roma. In terms o f religious 
identity, 87% were Christian and 12.7% Muslim. According to the 2001 census.
popidation o f ethnic Bulgarians and ethnic Turks decreased to 83.9% and 9.4% 
respectively and ethnic-Roma citizen were estimated ofiScially to comprise 4.7
percent o f  the population; however, their actual share is likely between 6 and 7 
percent since a substantial number hide their ethnicjdentitv. Pomaks, constitutes 2 to 
3 percent o f the population.
The numbers o f minorities never reached alarming levels after the 
establishment o f autonomous Bulgarian Principality in 1878, but disproportional 
population increases has always been a national concern in Bulgaria. The numbers o f 
minorities has always increased when the ethnic Bulgarians’ remained constant or 
decreased. Especially between 1989 and 1996, Bulgaria’s population declined fi'om 
8.99 million to 8.34 million, a loss o f more than seven percent in many years. Such a 
loss o f population in peacetime had occurred very rare in the modem history o f 
Europe. This decline can be attributed to forced migration o f ethnic Turks, but ethnic 
Bulgarians have also emigrated mostly because o f economic reasons. Another 
important contributor to the decline o f population has been the drastic fall in the birth
Vesselin Dimitrov, Bulgaria: The Uneven Transition, p.6.
The numbers may differ between different writers. See Nurcan Özgür, Etnik Sorunlarm 
Çözümünde Hak ve özgürlükler Hareketi fMovement of Rights and Freedom in Solution of Ethnic 
Problem). (İstanbul: Der Yayınları, 1999), p.43; Wolfgang Höpken, “From Religious identity to 
Ethnic Mobilisation: The Turks of Bulgaria Before Under and Since Communism,” pp.55-56. 
National Statistical Institute (NSI): Statistics, <http://www.nsi.bg /Census/Ethnos-final-n.htm>.
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rate. The rate fell from 12.5 per thousand in 1989 to 8.6 in 1996.'^'* Its level o f births 
was equal to or even slightly higher than the European average, one o f the lowest not 
only in Europe, but also in the world, so the birth rate was insufficient even to 
replace the population lost by death.
Numbers taken from military statistics, which is largely based on conscripts, 
shows the situation clearly. As o f the 1990s, instead o f constituting the expected 13- 
15% o f draft-age young men, the Turk/Pomak element was about 30% o f the 
conscript pool.*^^
At times o f crises both domestically and with neighbouring countries, and 
minorities found themselves as targets o f populist policies and Turks being the 
largest group, reminiscent o f the pre-independent era, became the number one object 
of assimilation campaigns. _____
2.4.1. Ethnic Turks in Bulgaria
As mentioned above Turks were forming almost half o f the population in the 
Ottoman era. But today, Turks mainly inhabit two territories in Bulgaria— t^he
regions around Kardjali in the Rhodopa Mountains and around Razgrad 136
Emigration o f Bulgarian Turks mainly began in 1878 with a deliberate ethnic 
cleansing effort during the Russian-Ottoman War and has been a permanent process 
which went through frequent oscillations, determined by political and social 
conditions o f the Turkish minority and various international circumstances.'^’
Dimiter Philipov, “A Demographic Forecast of the Bulgarian Population for the 1995-2020 
Period,” Economic Thought. Vol. 1, No. 3 (1998), pp. 84-85. See also Christina Christova,
“Bulgaria,” The speech given at The Second World Assembly on Ageing in Madrid, Spain, (8-12 
April 2002), <http;//www.un.org/ageing/coverage/bulgariaE.htm>.
Daniel N. Nelson, Balkan Imbroglio: Politics and Security in Southeastern Europe, p.59.
Audrey Ivanov. The Balkans Divided: Nationalism. Minorities, and Security. p.l08; İlker Alp, 
Beige ve Fotoğraflarla Bulgar Mezalimi (1878-1989). pp.2-4.
Ivan Palchev, Balkan Politicians: Ahmed Etogan and the Bulgarian Ethnic Model. p.lO,
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Until the first attempt was made to regulate the emigration problem in 
October 1925, Bulgaria followed policies to wipe out the all reminiscences o f the 
Ottoman era and to form a pure Bulgarian nation.’ *^ While not strictly, Bulgaria 
continued to exert restrictive policies on its minorities in the following years. It 
closed Turkish schools and did not allow the mention o f a Turkish minority, which was
described in bilateral and international agreements, but only acknowledged a Muslim 
minority. The advent o f  dictatorship in 1934 brought bans on the use o f the new Latin
script to dissuade mother-tongue expression and to hinder links with Turkey, ^ ^ c h  
was preoecupied with nation-building within the new state.
The post-World War II period saw a change in Bulgarian minority policy. 
The 1947 constitution recognized the existence o f national minorities in Bulgaria. 
Following the example o f the USSR and in the context o f the idea o f a Balkan 
Federation modelled at the time, minorities received their rights (The 1947 
Constitution o f People’s Republic o f Bulgaria- Article 79). New Turkish schools
were opened, special radio broadcasts in Turkish began, and newspapers were
published. There were Turkish theatres and cultural activities and even special quotas
for Turks at universities.*^* However, it did no last long. The new administration
levied heavy taxes on farmers by pressuring them to give a substantial portion o f
That year, Turkey and Bulgaria signed a treaty of friendship and concluded a convention of 
settlement, which allowed for a voluntary exchange of populations, although it was very much a one­
sided problem, involving more than six hundred thousand ethnic Turks. Four years later, Turkey and 
Bulgaria signed a treaty of neutrality and conciliation, which called for remaining disputes to be 
referred to arbitration. Michael B. Bishku, “Turkish-Bulgarian Relations: From Conflict and Distrust 
to Cooperation,” Mediterranean Quarterly. (Spring 2003), pp.80-81. The fiill text of the friendship 
treaty can be seen in Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü, Belgelerle Mustafa Kemal Atatürk ve Türk 
Bulgar İlişkileri (Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and Turkish-Bulgarian Relations through Documents). 
(Ankara: Başbakanlık Basımevi, 2002), p.51-67.
Hugh Poulton, ‘Turkey as a Kin-State: Turkish Foreign Policy towards Turkish and Muslim 
Communities in the Balkans,” in Hugh Poulton, / Suja Taji-Farouki (eds.), Muslim Identity and the 
Balkan State. (Londim: Hurst & Company, 1997), p.207.
Bilal N. Simsir, The Turks of Bulgaria: 1878-1985. p. 208.
Ivan Palchev, Balkan Politicians: Ahmed Dogan And The Bulgarian Ethnic Model. p.21; Marin 
Pundeff, “Bulgaria,” in Joseph Held (ed.). The Columbia History of Eastern Europe in the Twentieth 
Century (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), p. 103.
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their harvest to the state and later farmlands were confiscated and turned into
cooperative property in 1949, Turkish youths were drafted into military labour camps
(Tnidovak) together with all sorts o f other people identified as class-enemies, and 
exploited as free workers by the g o v e rn m e n t .T h e  same was the fate o f all minority 
youths fi~om Turkish. Pomak. or Gvpsy origin, and the practice was only terminated
in 1997 when the democratic government disbanded military labour camps 143
Bulgaria had declared to allow the emigration o f Bulgarian Turks. Although, 
Bulgaria’s decision to expel ethnic Turks was a deliberate violation o f Tmkey’s 1925 
treaty with Bulgaria concerning the volimtary exchange o f p o p u l a t i o n s , Turkey 
admitted 162,000 people before closing the border in 1952. Most o f the expatriates 
came fi-om the richest arable area o f Bulgaria, Dobrudja, which Prime Minister 
Vulko Chervenkov wanted to collectivise fastest.*'*^
After the first expulsion attempt, Bulgaria continued to apply different ways
of assimilation campaigns. The communist regime fabricated histories, m which 
Bulgarian Turks played, paradoxically, the dual role o f victim and perpetrator o f 
Ottoman “historical injustices” against the Bulgarian nation. Theories claimed, “the 
Bulgarian Turks were actually Slavs who had been forced to convert imder Ottoman
rule” .^ '*^  Later, government oflRdals were ordered to change Islamic/Turkic names o f 
Gypsies, Pomaks, and Turks to Slavic/Christian ones for several times in different
İlker Alp, Beige ve Fotoğraflarla Bulgar Mezalimi 11878-1989). pp.12-13; For more information 
on labour camps <http://www.osa.ceu.hu/files/rip/08.htm>; R.K.Carlton (ed.). Forced Labor in the 
‘People’s Democracies’. (New York: Mid-European Studies Center, 1955).
Margarita Assenova, “Islam in Bulgaria: Historical, Sociocultural, and Political Dimensions,” 
Briefing Notes on Islam. Society, and Politics. Vol. 3, No 1, (June 2000), pp. 4-8,
< http://www.csis.org/islam/BriefNotes%5Cv3n 1 .pdf >.
Özer Sokan, 21nci Yüzyıl Baslarında Balkanlar ve Türkiye (Turkey and the Balkans at the 
Beginning of the 21 ” Century). (Istanbul: Harp Akadranileri Komutanlığı Yayınları, 2001), p. 189-191.
Oral Sander, Balkan Gelişmeleri ye Türkiye (1945-19651. pp.69-81; R. J. Crampton, A Concise 
History of Bulgaria. p.l95; Michael B. Bishku, “Turkish-Bulgarian Relations: From Conflict and 
Distrust to Cooperation,” pp.85.
Mary Neuburger, “Bulgaro-Turkish Encounters and the Re-Imaging of the Bulgarian Nation 
(1878-1995),” East European Quarterly, Vol. 31, Issue 1, (March 1997), pp.1-20.
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regions at different times,"*’ and even, the children bom o f mixed_ marriages were 
given naiiics.''*^ IIowcvec,-_the regime’s petition on name
changing was because they were convinced that emigration was not the way to solve
the problem given the large number o f the Turks in the coimtry.
In 1968, Bulgaria and Turkey signed an agreement allowing for the 
reunification o f famihes separated by the exodus o f the early 1950s. In the ten years 
during which the agreem^ent remained in force some 130,000 Turks left Bulgaria.*'*’ 
Then, the adoption o f a new sociahst constitution in 1971 marked the beginning o f
another period o f cultural intolerance and assimilation o f the Turks, and the term 
“national minorities” was replaced by the term “non-Bulgarian.” But ironically.
myths o f  ethnic origin remained 150
The Cypms issue, motivated by the rights o f the Turkish minority on the 
island which resulted in Turkey’s intervention (1974) was connected with the 
Muslim minority in Bulgaria, and interpreted as foreboding a new Islamic aggression 
on the Balkans. The thesis was unrealistic since at that time Bulgaria and Turkey 
were members o f two opposing mihtary alliances and any conflict between the two 
would not remain limited to the two,'^* but only served the policies o f the Bulgarian 
Communist Party.
Similarly, the years 1984-85 were the beginning o f a new period used by
Zhivkov to stay in power bv using nationahsm disguised as ‘revival process’. It was
There were some Bulgarian Turks who received a Bulgarian name and returned to his/her original 
names seven times.
Ivan Palchev, Balkan Politicians: Ahmed Doean and the Bulaarian Ethnic Model, p.22.
R.J. Crampton, A Concise History of Bulgaria. p.203.
Bilal N. Simsir, The Turks of Bulgaria /1878-19851. p. 208.
Ivan Palchev, Balkan Politicians: Ahmed Doean and the Bulgarian Ethnic Model, p.22. For 
discussions on the Cyprus intervention and Bulgaria’s Turkish Minority see Hugh Poulton, “Ethnic 
Turks and Muslims in the Balkans and Cyprus: Turkey as a ‘kin-state’ in the Eastern Mediterranean,” 
Mediterranean Politics Vol.2. nOOSk pp. 105-117.
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the seventh major name change campaign. From 1984 to 1989, ethnic Turks were
subjected to govemment-sp)onsored Bulgarianization o f family names together with
limitations placed on Turkish symbols such as language, name, and religious rituals. 
In two months, the names of  almost 850.000 people were c h a n g e d .N u m b e r s  o f 
killed between 1984—1985^_pf4jeople who resisted the campaign is estimated around
2,500. In 1989, as international pressure increased on Bulgaria, it permitted voluntary 
emigration. Nearly all o f Jhe  ethnic Turks attempted to leave the country and an 
estimated 350,000 came to Turkey by the time Ankara closed the border.
Following the overthrow o f Zhivkov in November 1989, the ruling Bulgarian 
Communist Party renounced assimilation and released most o f the restrictions and 
further allowed to establish political, social, and cultural organizations and estimated 
half o f the émigrés subsequently returned. Many o f the policies and procedures 
followed were reversed in less than two months after the coup executed against 
Zhivkov.
On the other side, hard-line communists were trying to mobilize ethnic unrest 
to discredit the reformist mood by using the underlying fears o f “giving the Turks 
too much,” problems o f ethnic crisis, ethnic conflict, and ethnic tension which came 
to be debated only after 1989. Plans by the post-Zhivkov government to rescind all o f 
the former minority policies officially, and to create statutory guarantees for 
linguistic, religious and cultural practices generated public protests m January 1990.
The decision was taken at the BCP Central Committee plenum (meeting) in February 1984 and 
became operative in November 1984. İlker Alp, Beige ve Fotoğraflarla Bulgar Mezalimi, p.226; 
^ d re y  Ivanov, The Balkans Divided: Nationalism. Minorities, and Security, p. 109
Palchev, Balkan Politicians: Ahmed Dogan and the Bulgarian Ethnic Model, p.23.
. Helsinki Watch Committee, Destroying Ethnic Identity: The Expulsion of the Bulgarian 
TurkSj/rNew York, Washington, 1989), p. 54; Bilal N. Simsir, The Turks ofBulgaria (1878-1985). p.
Consequently, an estimated 120,000 to 180,000 Turks returned to Bulgaria. Hugh Poulton, “Turkey 
as Kin-State: Turkish Foreign Policy Towards Turkish and Muslim Communities in the Balkans,” pp. 
208.
Krassimir Kanev, “From Totalitarianism to a Constitutional State,” pp.53-54.
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Demands for the deportation o f all Turks, and against provisions for enhanced civil 
liberties for minorities, were heard frequently during early 1990.*^’ At that time the 
differentiation o f the social space into two separate worlds o f values and aims 
became most obvious. There were the Bulgarian Turks on one side, supported by the 
main opposition powers and by prominent Bulgarian intellectuals, and embarrassed 
Bulgarians from regions with mixed population, on the other, who interpreted the act 
for reintroducing Turkish names as a threat to their security.
Fvuthermore, anti-Turk sentiment remained an important part o f post- 
Communist politics. The Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP), the successor to the
Bulgarian Communist Party, has been particularly prone to capitalize on incipient
anti-Turkish sentiment for electoral eain.*^^ In 1991, the UDF leader and Prime
Minister, Dimitur Popov, remarked that Turks represented a threat to the Bulgarian
nation, in the regions o f Bulgaria inhabited by ethnic Turks. Slavic Bulgarians were 
threatened with d e a t h . H e  also warned against “Muslim aggression,” and “in some
way it must be blocked so that it does not invade Europe
Many Bulgarians stiU regard the ethnic Turkish minority as a potential Trojan 
horse and a Turkish “fifth column” on Bulgarian territory, a sentiment that is most 
powerfixl in the southeastern region o f the country. In a 1991 Gallup poll, 48 percent 
o f the respondents regarded Turkey as a threat to Bulgarian national s e c u r i t y . I n  a 
similar poll conducted in 1992, 46 percent o f the respondents perceived ethnic 
groups and minorities as a serious threat to the nation’s security.
“Slavic Nationalists Continue Protests in Bulgaria,” Washington Post (7 January 1990).
Tanya Nedelcheva, “Will the Ethnic Crisis be Overcome in Bulgaria?” in: J. Coenen-Huther (ed.) 
Bulgaria at the crossroads. (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 1996), p. 148.
Kjell Engelbrekt, “The Movement for Rights and Freedoms,” RFE/RL Report on Eastern Europe. 
Vol. 2, No. 48, (1991), p. 5.
Bulgarian authorities claimed that Turkish minority applied pressure on Muslim groups to declare 
themselves as Turks, especially on Pomaks.
John T. Ishiyama and Marijke Breuning, Ethnopolitics in the New Europe. (Boulder CO: Lynne 
Rienno- Publishers, 1998).
Bulgarian Telegraphic Agency (BTA), (23 September 1991).
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On the other side, Bulgarian Turks seem to have been part o f the society they 
lived for centuries. The MRF leader Ahmed Doğan says that Bulgarians and Turks in
the country have never quarrelled and they don’t have to be reconciliated. It was the 
communist regime and its acts that provoked mistrust and conflicts. At the beginning
o f his political career, he declared, “Being a representative o f a given ethnos does not
imply that you are deprived »f  thp: cr>n«triQMsnnaa n f being n citizen o f ^  country.
1Bulgaria is ‘our motherlancfand our national self-consciousness is Bulgarian.’
2.4.2.Pomaks in Bulgaria
Another minority group are Pomaks though Bulgarians do not recognize them 
as a minority. In feet, Pomaks form the best example challenging the question o f 
“Who is a Bulgarian?” Bulgarians and some historians say that Pomaks are o f 
Bulgarian origin, and try to prove their language to be a Bulgarian dialect and depict 
them as “Muslim Bulgarians”. Some historians provide important evidences o f just 
the opposite, giving percentages o f Pomak lexicon and call them as “Bulgarian 
speaking Turks” and some simply “Bulgaria’s Muslim community,” while Greeks 
claim their own Pomaks to be o f Greek origin.’^  However, it is not the origins but 
perceptions, which indicates the reality. Some Pomaks call themselves Txjrks and 
some Bulgarians with the need to belong to one main group.
In fact, Pomaks’ origin was not so important for Biilgaria and Greece. They 
originally inhabited in the militarised mountainous southern and south-western 
frontier region with a population aroxmd 150.000, and they were perceived as a threat 
by both Bulgaria and Greece. Bulgaria, regardless o f their origin, ousted them several
Ivan Palchev, Balkan Politicians: Ahmed Etogan and the Bulgarian Ethnic Model, p.28.
The name ‘Pomak’ comes from the Slavic origin word ‘pomaga’ and literally means collaborator 
and their dialect consist of 30% Slavic words, 25% Kuman-Kipchak words, 20% Oğuz Turkish words, 
15% Nogay words and 10% Arabic words. İlker Alp, Beige ve Fotoğraflarla Bulgar Mezalimi (1878- 
1989). pp.8-9; Glenn E. Curtis (ed.), Bulgaria: a Country Study, p.84.
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times to Turkey or resettled them in the inner parts o f the country or followed the 
same assimilationist policies and the name changing campaigns. The name changing 
campaign o f 1964 was particularly directed to Pomaks.*^^ This shows that despite 
their claims, the communist era governments saw them as ‘others’ and today the 
continuing discussions show continuation o f the pre-1989 perception.'^
Pomaks continued to live in the way o f pre-modem traditional societies, 
where the modem notion o f belonging to a national group is less dominant than that 
o f belonging to a religious group. Since the end o f the Cold War, however this has 
been changing. Early in 1990, the Turkish embassy in Sofia was giving out some 
6,000 visas a month. The criterion for obtaining a visa was the ability to speak 
Turkish. Thus, many Pomaks came to Turkey. This indicates that Pomaks feels 
themselves as Turks or Turkey as a better place to Kve in. Today this figure 
continues and if a Pomak wants to move fi'om a village to a town he/she prefers to 
move to cities in Turkey rather than Bulgarian ones.**^
2.4.3. Gypsies in B ufaría
The Roma or the Gypsy population in Bulgaria are the second largest ethnic 
minority according to the 2001 census, numbering 370,908 and comprising 4.7% o f 
the population.'^* A survey indicated that at home, 67% o f them spoke Roma, 51% 
Bulgarian and 34% Turkish. The percentages exceed 100% because a number o f
Lilia Petkova, “The Ethnic Turks in Bulgaria: Social Integration and Impact on Bulgarian - Turkish 
Relations, 1947-2000,” p.45.
For a detailed reading on Pomaks see Hüseyin Memişoğlu, Pages of the History of Pomac Turks, 
(Ankara: Şafak Matbaası, 1991); Yulian Konstantinov, “Strategies for Sustaining a Vulnerable 
Identity: The Case of Bulgarian Pomaks,” in Hugh Poulton / Suja Taji-Farouki (eds.), Muslim Identity 
and the Balkan State. (London: Hurst & Company, 1997), pp. 33-53.
Hugh Poulton, “Turkey as Kin-State: Turkish Foreign Policy Towards Turkish and Muslim 
Commimities in the Balkans,” p.209
'** Glenn E. Curtis, Bulgaria: a Country Study, p.86. However, some sources claim the numbers to be 
10.3% of the total population totalling a number around 803.400. See Martin Kovats, “The European 
Roma Question.” Briefing Paper. New Series No. 31, (March 2002), <www.riia.org>.
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respondents spoke more than one language. In terms o f religion, more than half o f 
them are Muslim and the rest Orthodox Christian. The division between self- 
identified and non-self-identified Roma is usually based on religion and formal 
education: those who are Orthodox Christians and have received higher education 
think o f themselves as ethnic Bulgarians, and speak Bulgarian; those who are 
Muslims maintain that they are ethnic Turks and speak Turkish.
Gypsies were one o f Bulgaria’s most disadvantaged and maligned 
nationalities and the focus o f every official name-changing campaign. Government 
programs to improve the lot of the Gypsies usually meant construction o f new, 
separate Gypsy neighbourhoods rather than integration into Bulgarian society. They 
were primarily nomadic until 1958, when the Communist regime launched a 
campaign o f forced assimilation compelling the Roma population to abandon its 
transient lifestyle and settle down.’ ®^ In 1974, many were coerced into giving up their 
Roma names and adopt instead Christian-Slavic names.
Soon after the regime change, the Democratic Romany Union, claiming to 
represent over 50.000 Roma, was formed. Nevertheless, the Constitutional Court 
prevented the party and other early Roma organizations fi'om participation in 
elections, on the groimds that this would violate the constitutional prohibition on 
parties (Article 11.4) on a racial, ethnic, or religious basis. Thus, Bulgaria became the 
only coimtry in Eastern Europe in which the Roma could not participate in national 
elections through their own political parties and this prompted the Council o f Europe 
to criticize the new Bulgarian Constitution. Later, Bulgarian courts ignored the
Luan Troxel, “Bulgaria’s Rc»na: Numerically Strong, Politically Weak,” RFE/RL Research Report. 
Vol.l, No. 10 (6 March 1992), pp.58-61.
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controversial constitutional limitation and allowed their registration and several 
Roma organi2ations were able to compete for the first time in local elections o f late 
1 9 9 9  172 ensure the protection o f the constitutionally guaranteed rights and 
fi'eedoms o f Bulgarian Roma, the UDF-led government approved a Framework 
Program for Equal Integration o f Roma in Bulgarian society in April 1999, and in 
September 2003, the National Assembly passed a new law outlawing all forms o f 
discrimination based on gender, ethnicity, race, religion, age, education, property, 
and sexual orientation.
However, without a doubt, their rights continue to be ignored and is infi'inged 
upon by the central and local authorities. They remained an oppressed ethnic class, 
suffering fi’om widespread unemployment, misery, prejudice, and persecution.’ “^*
Official statistics dealing with the lot o f the Roma are rarely published, but 
according to the Democratic Romany Union, 92% o f working-age Roma living in 
Bulgarian cities were unemployed in 1998; they also constituted 90% o f all prison 
inmates.’^ * It is estimated that 90-95% o f Bulgarian Roma are chronically 
imemployed due to illiteracy and lack o f training as well as anti-Roma prejudice and 
Bulgaria’s severe economic slump.'™
About 70% o f Roma children have either never attended school or dropped 
out o f the overcrowded ‘Gypsy schools’ in the early grades. As a result, over 80% o f 
Bulgarian Roma have only the most rudimentary education or are practically
Rossen Vassilev, “The Roma of Bulgaria; A Pariah Minority,” The Global Review of 
Ethnopolitics. Vol. 3, no. 2 (January 2004), pp.44-45.
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illiterate.*^’
Even as Bulgarian Roma keep growing in number -both in absolute figures 
and relative to the Slavic majority- the prospect for their integration into the 
mainstream remains remote and uncertain.*’*
On the other hand, when it comes to state policies, although insignificant at 
some points, the minority policies o f Bulgaria seem to have changed greatly, when 
compared to the communist era and early 1990s. Today, the country is shown as an 
example o f one which foimd peaceful solutions to long lasting minority problems.*’’ 
Yet, it is not only the state institutions, but also the indispensable civil organizations 
which contributed to this image. One o f them, the Movement o f Rights and 
Freedoms Party, which played a very important role in the fate o f the country 
providing necessary circiunstances for a smooth democratic transition, should be 
elaborated in order to better understand today’s Bulgaria.
2.4.4.MRF and its Contributions to Democracy in Bulgaria
The MRF was created as a secret organization in Dobrich in the spring o f
1985 under the name o f “Turkish National Liberation Movement in Bulgaria” 
(TNLMB) and was lead by Ahmed Doğan, a Ph.D. student o f  philosophy. The aim o f 
the organisation was to unite and regulate the efforts o f the victims (the minorities)
and the creed o f  the organization was formulated as “war without weapons”.180
In 1986, the organization was eliminated and its leaders along with 18 o f the 
members were arrested. Ahined Doğan was sentenced to 10 years in prison. After
Matilda Nahabedian, “All Ethnic Problems Solved?” Central Europe Review, Vol.2, No.41, (27 
November 2000).
Rossen Vassilev, “The Roma of Bulgaria: A Pariah Minority,” p.41.
Andrey Ivanov addresses two models in the Balkans: one is the Yugoslav approach, secessionist- 
oriented self-determination, and the other is the Bulgarian approach, non-secessionist self- 
determination with limits to minority rights. See Andrey Ivanov, The Balkans Divided: Nationalism. 
Minorities, and Security. p.l3.
Ivan Palchev, Balkan Politicians: Ahmed Doean and the Bulgarian Ethnic Model, pp.23-24.
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three and a half years, -in December 1989- he was freed. Then the so-called “May 
events” began in Bulgaria and the protests o f the Bulgarian Turks raised tension in
the country to the highest possible degree and soon with the regime change MRF was
formally foimded as a political party in the city o f Shumen on February 25,1990 18)
The MRF had not been included in the round table, both because the 
participants feared a nationalist backlash and because the UDF thought o f itself as 
representing all groups that had suffered under communism. Furthermore, the round 
table decided to ban the formation o f parties on an ethnic basis on the grounds that it
could lead to the incitement o f ethnic hatred and compromise the national integrity o f 
Bulgaria -clearly addressing the MRF.**^ In fact, the ban proved to be a dead letter, 
as both the UDF and the BSP recognized the reality o f the situation and sought to
derive electoral benefits from it. 183
The existence o f the MRF was welcomed by BSP, because it would split the 
UDF’s votes and would show it as cooperating with ‘anti-Bulgarian’ forces. The two
main parties thus had purely pragmatic reasons for complying with the presence o f
the MRF on the Bulgarian political arena, but once made, the decision had
momentoxis consequences in terms o f integrating the hitherto alienated Turkish
minority in the democratic process and stabilising Bulgaria’s new democracy.'*"*
Just then, the MRF was accused o f being an ethnic based party; fortunately
-—  --------- - --------- - -------------------------- -
the accusation was soon nullified bv a decision o f the Constitutional Court, in April
1992. The decision declared J jaaM he-existence o f the MRF did not contravene the
constitutional ban o f parties haseH on-ethnicity bv pointing to the fact that the party
Kjell Engelbrekt, “The Movement for Rights and Freedoms,” p. 5.
Alexander Andreev, “The Political Changes and Political Parties” in Iliana Zloch-Christy 
(ed.), Bulgaria in a Time of Change: Economic and Political Dimensions. (Avebury: Aldershot, 1996), 
p.35.
Vesselin Dimitrov, Bulgaria: The Uneven Transition, p.43-44.
Vesselin Dimitrov, Bulgaria: The Uneven Transition, p.43-44; Alexander Andreev, “The Political 
Changes and Political Parties,” pp.35-36; Ivan Palchev, Balkan Politicians: Ahmed Dogan and the 
Bulgarian Ethnic Model, pp.91-100.
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did not limit its membership to a particular ethnic group nor defined its aims solely in
terms o f defending the interests o f that group. This effectively put an end to  the
dispute on the legality o fth e  MRF, which had been running since the party’screation 
and ensured its place in Bulgarian politics.'*^
Although the early party program focused largely on demands for the banned 
freedoms o f the minorities, the^^ty^ter~ teoadO T edlts'goals“aid'TH ^hasized that it
was a party o f all national minorities opposed to any national chauvinism, revenge.
Islamic fundamentalism and religious fanaticism. The party argued that its efforts 
were designed to contribute to “the unity o f ^ e  Bulgarian people and to the full and 
unequivocal compliance vyith the rights o f freedoms o f mankind and o f all ethnic, 
religious and cu ltoal communities in Bulgaria.”**’ Further, the party called for the 
promotion o f measures designed to alleviate the economic problems facing minority 
populations in Bulgaria.
As the UDF and the BSP received almost equal number o f seats in most o f 
the parliamentary elections and needed MRF’s backing, the latter has been an 
important agent in politics.*** For example, the UDF-MRF government was formed 
after the 1990 elections, and ended when the UDF displayed imwillingness to take 
MRF’s wishes into account in the making o f government policy and especially about 
subsidies on agricultural products to which MRF’s political constituency needed 
most in the hard days o f the economy.**^ Thus, in one way or another, the position o f 
MRF as the political force nominating the Prime Minister caused the leading parties
Antonina Zhelyaskova, “Bulgaria’s Muslim Minorities,” p.l78; Vesselin Dimitrov, Bulgaria: The 
Uneven Transition. p.50.
'** Jtrfih D. Bell, “Démocratisation and Political Participation in Postcommunist Bulgaria,” p379.
Kjell Engelbrekt, “The Movement for Rights and Freedoms,” pp. 5-6.
*** Hugh Poulton, “Turkey as Kin-State: Turkish Foreign Policy Towards Turkish and Muslim 
Communities in the Balkans,” p.209.
Vesselin Dimitrov, Bulgaria: The Uneven Transition, p.52-53; R.J. Crampton, A Concise History 
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to follow cautious policies and brought fiirther progress in guaranteeing the rights o f 
all minorities.
The conditions o f the minorities improved incessantly. For example, in the 
1991-1992 school year, optional Turkish language education was introduced m
public schools. Optional classes in Romany in the public school have been available 
since September 1993. Bulgarian National Radio started broadcasting programmes in
Turkish for several hours each week. The National Television Network also started
for Turkish-language broadcasts and today, except the Roma, there is not any 
significant p r o b l e m . D r .  Ahmed Doğan and the MRF practically introduced
something entirely new and unknown so far in the general theoretical discussions and 
approaches to the resolution o f ethnic conflicts. Considering the examples o f Croatia,
Bosnia and Kosovo it can be easily said that the model has been Quite successful. I9 t
However we cannot say that MRF is fulfy backed by all minority groups. 
Despite MRF’s influential position in local and national politics, there is an 
increasing criticism o f the party fi’om both within the ethnic-Turkish population and 
from political commentators for portraying itself as the only guarantor o f ethnic 
peace and stability, and is blamed for corruption and intimidation to maintain its 
powerful p o s i t i o n . A n y h o w ,  despite its controversial record, the MRF still 
continues to be a major contributor to the marked improvement o f the minority 
situation. Now, the Turkish minority is fully integrated and represented in political life. 
The MRF, therefore, played the role o f a political and social stabiliser through the
Krassimir Kanev, “From Totalitarianism to a Constitutional State,” p. 65.
Antonina Zhelyazkova, “The Bulgarian Ethnic Model,” East European Constitutional Review. Vol. 
10, No. 4 (Fall 2001); Lyudmil Georgiev, “Dr. Ahmed Dogan or Philosophy in Politics,” in Ivan 
Palchev, Balkan Politicians: Ahmed Dogan and the Bulgarian Ethnic Model, p.8-9.
See Bulgarian Parliament official web page at <http://www.parliament.bg/>
The Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, “Bulgaria: Country Reports on Human Rights 
Practices - 2004,” (Febnuay 28, 2005), <http://www.state.gOv/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/
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influence it exercised over the whole natioa 193
2.5.Political and Social Situation Today
Today, Bulgaria is a parliamentary republic ruled by a democratically elected 
government headed by Prime Minister Simeon Saxe-Coburg Gotha. The government 
took oflSce in 2001, following the victory o f his National Movement Simeon II 
(NMSS) party in parliamentary elections. Following presidential elections in 2001, 
Georgi Purvanov, former leader o f the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP), began his 5- 
year term  in 2002.
There are no legal restrictions on the participation o f minorities in politics, 
despite the constitutional prohibition, because the constitutional court many times 
judged for the legality o f ethnic parties. Currently, there are 24 minority members o f 
parliament (M.P.s) including two Romani and two ethnic-Armenian M .P.s in the 
National Assembly in the 240-seat National Assembly and 2 ethnic-Turkish 
ministers in the Cabinet.*’  ^ Nevertheless, a substantial part o f Bulgarian society stiU 
finds the reality o f an ethnically and politically self-confident Turkish minority hard 
to accept. Fortunately, there has not been any substantial violence between Turks and 
Bulgarians. This is a genuine success story in the endeavour to cope with ethnic 
tensions in post-Communist Eastern Europe, when compared not only with former 
Yugoslavia but also with Romania. Yet, there lingers the dormant danger posed by 
Bulgarian nationalism which resides in some groups who want to play the anti-
Emil Giatzidis, An Introduction to Post-Communist Bulgaria: Political. Economic and Social 
Transformations, p.63.
The Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, “Bulgaria: Country Reports on Human 
Rights Practices -2004”.
The Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, “Bulgaria: Country Reports on Human 
Rights Practices - 2004”; Human Rights Watch, “World Report 2002,”
<http://www.hrw.org/wr2k2/europe6.html>.
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Turkish card as a means o f electoral cam paign.'’  ^ Although there were a few 
problems in several areas and the Roma minority seems to be victim o f ethnic 
discrimination, governments generally respect human rights o f the citizens.
There is an independent judiciary, but the judiciary suffers from corruption 
and wide-ranging systemic problems as some committees and working groups keep 
on fighting against this disease decisively.*^*
The social and democratic transition process o f Bulgaria seems to be 
improving. The state-owned news agency, radio (BNR) is often one o f the most 
outspoken critics o f the government and its policies. The state-owned Bulgarian 
National Television (BNT) broadcast Turkish-language newscasts, and local 
affiliates o f BNR broadcast limited Turkish-language programming in regions with 
ethnic-Turkish populations. The state-owned Radio Bulgaria increased its Turkish- 
language broadcasting from 30 minutes to 3 hours per day and introduced an hour o f 
Roma-language programming per week.*’’
Further advance o f democracy depends, to a large extent, on people’s 
understanding o f democratic principles and on participation and engagement o f 
citizens in political life. Indeed, since the mid-1990s, Bulgarians seem to be leaving 
their passivity and indiflference behind, and are becoming increasingly aware o f their 
citizenship. However, the interaction o f civic associations and state institutions is not 
taking place on an equal basis. The state authorities usually see NGOs as a nuisance.
Wolfgang Hopken, “From Religious identity to Ethnic Mobilisation: The Turks of Bulgaria Before 
Under and Since Communism,” pp.77-78.
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as amateurs or even as organisations carrying out anti-govemmental actions, as being 
in an inferior position in a power hierarchy with no legitimate right o f participation 
in policy debates. On the other hand, civic associations tend to perceive the state and 
its institutions as distant and hostile, as well as a source o f potential privileges, and as 
a result tend to act in an antagonistic fashion. As the coimtry iurther becomes a part 
o f Europe, and reaches a better level in economic terms, social and political condition 
o f the country will certainly be better off.
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CHAPTER III
THE ECONOMIC TRANSITION OF BULGARIA
From the very beginning, the next major issue to the minority problem, which 
dominated the modem history o f Bulgaria, has been the incessant economic 
modemi2ation stmggle and still awaits solution. Some authors and historians 
accuse the Ottoman rule for the problems o f social and political underdevelopment o f 
modem Bulgaria Similar^, the O ttom an economic system is criticized for reducing 
the incentives to improve production methods, and for inhibiting emergence o f the 
market economy. However, it should not be forgotten that when the Turks left the 
Balkans, Bulgaria was one o f the richest provinces e>qx)rting textile and agricultural 
products and had the best equipped army. The results o f the Battle o f Slivnitsa (1885) 
and the Balkan War (1912-1913) clearly show that it had a good economic condition 
and self-confidence since we know that “Armies walk on their stomach”. Actually, a 
major culprit is the continual six-year war economy (1912-1918) together with total 
destm ction and reparations, which changed the total picture and subjected the 
country to abject poverty.
3.1. The In terw ar Period
The inter-war period brought very few changes in the social and economic 
stm cture. On the eve o f the Second World War, Bulgaria was still a primarily 
agricultural country, and the size o f industrial units remained small. The share o f 
industrial production was not more than 5.6 percent in 1938 (the lowest proportion
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in South-eastern Europe, Albania excepted), not much different from the 5.1 percent
ofl926.^"®
Major characteristic o f the economy was over-dependence on exports o f 
agricultural products (particularly tobacco), while Bulgaria was drawn into the 
German economic orbit. The links that had been forged in the First World War were 
maintained in the 1920s, when Germany took a quarter o f all Bulgaria’s exports. 
When the 1929 economic crisis came, Bulgaria found itself internationally isolated, 
confined and imbalanced, unable to react flexibly and adequately to  changing 
economic conditions, as trade with the West and the Balkan countries atrophied. 
Hence, Bulgaria was forced into close co-operation with Nazi Germany in economic 
as well as in diplomatic terms.
Bulgaria benefited to a great extent from the relationship with Germany 
including know-how, industrial installations, and credit that flowed in from 
Germany in return for agricultural goods. In 1939, exports and imports to and from 
Germany reached 71.1 % and 69.5% o f the total figure.^®' Thousands o f Bulgarians 
began working in Germany and gained experience, and money returned to the 
country. Construction, chemical, machine building industries, and metallurgy made 
significant advances, though the main advance was in food processing.^^^ 
Unfortunately, within two years these economic recovery efforts were replaced by 
war economy conditions once more, and at the end o f the war, communists were in 
charge to make the country a part o f the emerging eastern bloc.
R. J. Crampton, A Short History of Modem Bulgaria, p. 141.
Emil Giatzidis, An Introduction To Post-Communist Bulgaria: Political, Economic and Social 
TransfcMmaticxis, p. 17.
Bogoslav Dobrin, Bulgarian Economic Development since World War II. p.9.
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3.2.Bulgaria Under Communist Rule
Many o f the current problems o f Bulgaria are the result o f the legacy 
bequeathed by the ill-conceived economic policies o f the previous Communist 
regime.^ ®  ^ The post-W W II economic modernization followed in the next decades 
was, more or less, a standard realization o f the Soviet model introduced vvith the 
assistance o f Soviet experts and managers in the coirntry.^®“* Particular stress was 
placed on the development o f heavy industry since, according to the communist 
dogmas, this was the only way for the country to break the cycle o f self-perpetuating 
underdevelopment. At that period some o f the eminent economists o f the covmtry 
opposed imposed development, as the country possessed insufficient natural 
resources for rapid industrialization so they would not be competitive.^®^ But the 
Communist Party accused them o f condemning the country to be an agrarian and 
underdeveloped country.^ ®^
Bulgaria embarked on the road to rapid and forced industrialisation with 
collectivisation. The goal for Bulgaria was to acquire a strong industrial base for the 
fiiture and the driving motto was “the present should be sacrificed to the future”. 
Soviet development strategy was rapid growth o f heavy industry to be achieved 
through concentrated investment fi-om the state budget and a labour force enlarged 
by peasants. A minor rural labour force would be left on the mechanized collective 
farms to feed a growing urban population.^®’
In order to create a strong industry and social welfare and class equality, state
John R. Lampe, The Bulgarian Economy in the Twentieth Century. (New York: St, Martin’s, 
1986), pp. 139-155.
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Ivan Tchalakov, “Industrial Development and Ecological Risks, 1945-1990,” in Jacques Coenen- 
Huther (ed.), Bulgaria at the Crossroads. (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 1996), p. 247. 
“^’ Audrey Pantev, “The Historic Road of Third Bulgarian State,” p.l8; John R. Lampe, The Bulgarian 
Economy in the Twentieth Century, p. 139.
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planners subordinated every aspect o f the national economy to the Soviet camp. By 
spring 1948, Bulgaria had signed treaties o f friendship and co-operation with all the 
states o f Eastern Europe, and in 1949 was a founding member o f the Council o f 
Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA),^®* and o f the Warsaw Pact in 1955.^ ®’
A few years after the nationalization o f enterprises in December 1947, large 
construction sites were opened. Consumer industries, services and especially small 
class o f private industrial entrepreneurs were regularly sacrificed to the goal o f ‘high 
level o f industrial growth’ and the average citizen was forced to accept a low stan­
dard o f living. The peasant producer carried much o f the burden o f the economic 
revolution while there was a steady flow o f labour displaced from the land to service 
the industrial sector.^’® The new industrial enterprises, massive in scale, employing 
mostly outdated Soviet technologies, econonucally inefficient, and using cheap 
energy and raw materials available in CMEA countries, required enormous state 
subsidies and caused environmental damage.^*’
The country entered a period o f planned economic development era in 1949. 
ActuaUy, there was a two-year plan (1947-48), which was taken up by the Fatherland 
Front government, before the communists gained fiall control, and prefigured the 
direction o f Bulgarian economy by allocating fimds away from agriculture. Then 
came first with the First Five-year Plan (1949-53), which created the institutional 
apparatus for long term  industrial planning. Substantial material and technical 
support came from the Soviet Union, but in return Bulgaria had to sell products at 
below-market prices and bear Soviet advisers’ arrogance. The Second Five-year Plan
A multilateral economic alliance headquartered in Moscow until it disbanded in 1991. Members in 
1991 were: Bulgaria, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, the Soviet Union 
and Vietnam. Also known as СЕМА, Comecon, or the Council.
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Communist Bulgaria: Political. Economic and Social Transformations, pp.24-25.
Barbara Jelavich, History of the Balkans. (London and New York, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1983), p.346.
A ndr^ Pantev, “The Historic Road of Third Bulgarian State,” p.l8.
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(1953-57) and the Third Five-year Plan followed the first plan smoothly and the 
country became an industrial/agrarian coimtry.^*^ Whereas in 1948 the ratio between 
agricultme and industry in terms o f contribution to the national income stood at 30 ; 
70, in fevour o f agriculture, by 1956 it had swung to 67 : 32 to the advantage o f industry. 
Likewise, in 1957, Bulgarian industrial production was eight times higher than what it 
was in 1939.^ ^  ^Yet, in the Seventh Party Congress o f the BCP (1959), the party declared 
that, the country was second after Soviet Union which had succeeded in collectivisation 
of agriculture and a new period named ‘Great Leap Forward’ would begin. The reason 
was to work the economy to fiill capacity, since in 1958 there were at least 350.000 
people out o f work. Moreover the country had to yield agricultural goods for other 
CMEA countries as well. Thus, targets declared in the third plan were revised and fimds 
allocated for agricirlture was doubled. State Planning Commission claimed that the third 
plan had been fiilfilled in December 1960, two years ahead o f schedule with an annual 
increase o f 10.9 % in agriculture.^''* (See Table)
Table.3. Structrrre o f gross domestic product and national income
GDP 1946 1960 1970 1980 1985 1989
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Industry 30.3% 57% 62.4% 63,9% 69.1% 69.6%
Agriculture 45.5% 23.6% 16.0% 12.4% 11.0% 10.5%
Construction 8.5% 8.9% 9% 9.2% 8.6% 7.8%
Other branches 15.7% 9.6% 12.6% 14.5% 11.3% 12.1%
Nevertheless, industrialization and extensive economic development had
Josqih Rothshild, Communist Eastern Europe, p.54.
J. F. Brown, Bulgaria Under Communist Rule, pp.18-19, 46-48; Glenn E. Curtis, Bulgaria: a 
Cotmtrv Study, pp. 128-129.
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Study, pp. 129-130;
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1990), p.21.
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limits and soon it became evident that the command and planned economy was 
showed no progress, and it was no longer possible to conceal its inefBciency and 
slowdown, as shortages had not been eradicated. In the 1960s and 1970s, the 
centrally planned command economy was in need o f reform. However, when thought 
o f Bulgaria in the early 1950s, the industrialization process was highly successful. 
There were much less instances o f tensions in the Bulgarian society than in Poland, 
Czechoslovakia and Hungary and those that existed remained under control. Thus, 
economic integration within the framework o f the CMEA was o f relatively greater 
benefit to Bulgaria when compared to other Warsaw Pact coimtries. (See Table) 
Table.4. Annual average growth, 1953-60 to 1986-89
Period Official data W estern calculation
1953-60 9.40 -
1961-65 6.70 6.6
1966-70 8.75 4.7
1971-75 7.80 4.5
1976-80 6.10 1.2
1981-85 3.70 0.9
1986-89 3.10 -1.8
Towards the end o f the 1970s, as just like in other Eastern European states, a 
more general problem became clear in Bulgaria since the transfer from extensive to 
intensive economic growth was not accomplished as easily or as rapidly as 
planned.^'* The scientific-technological revolution dream proved disappointing, 
because the country could not keep pace \vith the rapid changes in computer sciences 
and fibre optics, and the import o f western technology was difficult because o f
Georgi Fotev, “Total Crisis and the Reorganization of Society,” p.l7.
Michael L. Wyzan, “Stabilisation and Anti-inflationary Policy” in Iliana Zloch-Christv (ed.), 
Bulgaria in a Time of Change: Economic and Political Dimensions. (Aldershot, Singapore and 
Sydney: Avebury, 1996), p.80.
Extensive growth is based upon the mobilization of new inputs to the economy in the form of 
higher savings rates, increased labour force participation, opening new land to cultivation and 
increased exploitation of natural resources. Intensive development, by contrast, rests upon the 
discovery and implementation of methods for producing continuing rising output from static inputs. 
While extensive development suffers from clear limits, intensive development can, in principle, 
proceed indefinitely.
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relatively high prices and the trade restrictions imposed on eastern bloc countries by 
the U.S. President Ronald Reagan. The only high-quality exports, Bulgaria could 
offer were agricultural goods and the EEC was determined to exclude that category. 
Bulgaria could not find alternative markets, and to meet foreign debt obligations had 
to export more. Slowing growth rates made the regime introduce New Economic 
Mechanism (NEM) introduced in 1979 and applied by 1982. In order to raise 
productivity, to improve the quality o f Bulgarian goods and services, and thereby 
secure export needed to eliminate existing trade deficits and hard currency debts.^*’ 
Nevertheless, it had little real impact. The quality o f production showed no sign o f 
improvement.
Small enterprises did well and grew throughout the 1980s, but could not 
change the general picture. When the decline in the Soviet subsidies and reduction in 
deliveries o f Soviet oil coincided with very poor agricultural production (owing to a 
severe w inter followed by extrem e and sustained draught in 1984-85), the 
country began experiencing severe energy and food shortages. Nineteen eighty five 
was the w orst year o f the entire commimist period for overall economic 
performance.^^® Bulgaria could not find an alternative solution other than borrowing 
money. Injecting the economy with loans fi'om W estern private banks resulted in the 
acciunulation o f an enormous foreign debt, the size o f which became known to the 
public only after the fall o f the totalitarian regime.
NEM was based on five principles. Decentralization, democracy by the of officials in a new system 
of ‘mobilisation fi-om below’, competition at all levels of production, market forces were to be 
allowed into the economy, self-sufficiency was to be applied to all plants which could no longer 
automatically count on government subsidies. See Glenn E. Curtis, Bulgaria: a Country Study. 
pp.134-135; R.J. Crampton, A Concise History of Bulgaria, pp.198-207; Daniel N. Nelson, Balkan 
Imbroglio: Politics and Security in Southeastern Europe, pp.60-61
Robert I. McIntyre, Bulgaria: Politics. Economics and Society. (London and New York: Pinter, 
1988), p. 115.
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3.3.The End of Communist Regime
The severe balance o f payments problem since the mid-1980s, which had led 
to the accumulation o f more than $9 billion o f foreign debt combined with poor 
harvest in 1989 and 1990 as a result o f the exodus o f ethnic Turks^^* made Bulgaria’s 
position at the start o f the post-communist economic transition, arguably, less 
favourable than that o f any other Eastern European country. There was euphoria over 
the expected and possible changes in the autumn o f 1989, but it gradually gave way to 
sober disappointment. The transition from centrally planned to market economy 
proved much more complicated than it seemed, took much longer than assumed, and 
extracted a high economic and social cost.
Bulgaria’s economic structure was based on large industrial enterprises, and 
activities were narrowly focused and badly integrated. The ageing o f the industrial 
base was evident. In the 1990s more than 70 per cent o f industrial equipment had 
been operating longer than twenty years.^^^ M oreover, in that critical transition 
period, the Gulf crisis put an imbearable burden to the economy.
The Bulgarian communist regime had no experience in decision-making 
responsibility o f individual enterprises, that is, they were not ready for market 
competition. The coimtry also lacked a significant private sector which could provide 
the main engine o f economic growth. Growing inflation, low labour efficiency and 
productivity, large hidden unemployment, a limited centuries-old work ethic and lax 
labour discipline, energy shortages, isolation from competitive world markets, and a 
heavy burden o f debt were the other problems. Finally, the Bulgarian economy was 
integrated with that o f the Soviet Union to a degree unmatched by any other Eastern 
European country, with nearly sixty percent o f its foreign trade directed towards the
R.J. Crampton, A Concise History of Bulgaria. p.220.
Emil Giatzidis, An Introduction To Post-Conummist Bulgaria: Political. Economic and Social 
T ransformations. p.83.
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Soviet Union. Owing to the rigidity o f price and trade regulations, as well as state 
monopoly o f foreign trade, the influx o f foreign capital was limited.^^^
With regime change, liberalization o f the economy has been the number one 
issue. One o f the most difficult dilemmas confronting the ex-communist party in 
Bulgaria was the incompatibility o f the expectations o f its proletarian basis and those 
o f the former privileged class. During the long period o f state ownership in a non­
functional totalitarian state, there had been large-scale hidden privatisation beside 
illegal redistribution o f national wealth. All this could not remain hidden from view, 
and became a deep moral crisis in Bulgarian society.^^“*
The demise o f the eastern block also brought the disintegration o f the CMEA 
which meant that Bulgarian industries lost the main markets for export products 
which had purchased over 80 % o f the coimtry’s exports, and the main suppliers o f 
oil and raw materials, which made up 75.9 % o f the country’s imports, leaving the 
country with intolerably expensive export products. The USSR alone accoimted for 
56.5 % o f imports and 64.4 % o f exports. The total impact o f the trade shock has 
been estimated at some 15% o f the GDP.^^^
The collapse o f foreign trade also meant that Bulgaria lost whatever chance it 
may have had o f continuing the repayment o f its foreign debt. Thus, Bulgaria had no 
choice but to declare a foreign debt moratorium both on principal repayments and on 
interest obligations. The first post communist era government, led by Lukanov (Jan- 
Nov 1990), failed to take any serious measures to prevent the situation from 
deteriorating further. Bulgaria found itself isolated from international credit markets
Vesselin Dimitrov, Bulgaria: The Uneven Transition, p.69-70; Emil Giatzidis, An Introduction To 
Post-Communist Bulgaria: Political. Economic and Social Transformations, dp.80-84.
Georgi Fotev, “Total Crisis and the Reorganization of Society,” p.24.
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Bulgaria: An Economic 
Assessment. (Paris: OECD, 1992), pp. 99-101 ; Iliana Zloch-Christy. “External Balance and External 
Debt,” in Iliana Zloch-Christy (ed.), Bulgaria in a Time of Change: Economic and Political 
Dimensions. (Avebury: Aldershot, 1996), p. 137.
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and that brought the government’s resignation. Dimitar Popov formed an interim 
government and became the leader who pioneered economic reform process with a 
delay o f fifteen months after the breakdown o f the Communist regime.^^^ The period 
lasted until the end o f the Berov government, in October 1994, which were “the 
years o f liberalisation without permanent stabilization”.
3.4. Liberalisation Without Permanent Stabilisation (1991-1994)
The period was the first years o f de-communisation in which the people were 
subjected to shocking effects o f economic transition. It was so steep a decline that in 
1994 the real average income per person was 55,5 % below the level o f 1990.
Under communism, imemployment did not officially exist, and indeed in the 
1980s there was a persistent shortage o f labour. With the rapid decrease in subsidies, 
xmprofitable enterprises were closed and large-scale imemployment became a novel 
phenomenon for Bulgaria. The rate o f unemployment increased from 1.9% in 
January 1991 to 15.2% in December 1992.^ ^* When the 1989 level is taken as a base, 
the real income index per capita had the following values: In 1990 increased to 
106.1%, but in 1991 and 1992 fell to 67.1%, and 64.3% levels, respectively.^^’
The policies followed during the period were a kind o f shock therapy 
approach, which foresaw liberalisation at once. After the first elections, a brave step 
toward economic reform was taken and the prices were liberalised in 1991. In fact, it 
could not be postponed any longer since the shortage o f essential commodities was
R.J. Crampton, A Concise History of Bulgaria. p.221; Emil Giatzidis, An Introduction To Post- 
Communist Bulgaria: Political. Economic and Social Transformations, p.84; Iliana Zloch-Christy, 
“External Balance and External Debt: An Overview,” pp. 133-143.
Vesselin Dimitrov, Bulgaria: The Uneven Transition, p.69-70.
Ivan Tchalakov, “Industrial Development and Ecological Risks, 1945-1990,” pp. 254-255; 
Vesselin Dimitrov, Bulgaria: The Uneven Transition, p.30-31.
Atañas Atanassov, Sasha Todorova and Valentina Zlatanova, “Socially Vulnerable Groups During 
the Transition to a Market Economy,” in Jacques Coenen-Huther (ed.), Bulgaria at the Crossroads. 
(New York: Nova Science Publishers, 1996), p.l92
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catastrophic. The country was suffering increasing shortages o f even basic 
consumer goods. The lengthening bread queues left decision makers with no 
alternative but to fi*ee prices. The state system o f price-formation was replaced by 
the mechanism o f market pricing. In a very short time the population foimd many 
more commodities in the shops, but at much higher prices than before. Price 
increases exceeded even the most pessimistic scenarios, 122.9% in February alone 
and 339% for the year as a whole. However, they endured it with notable resilience 
and imderstanding.^^®
The inability o f Bulgarian governments to find an effective solution to the 
problems further deteriorated the situation. Bulgaria followed neither the 
Czechoslovak or Russian model o f early and comprehensive privatisation, nor the 
Polish model which placed emphasis on restructuring the enterprises before selling 
them off. Successive governments were unable to make any serious progress on 
asserting control over state enterprises or on privatisation. Lack o f expertise or 
unwillingness to develop serious policy programmes made the role o f the IMF much 
more important than in other Eastern European countries where bold reformers were 
able to develop their own versions o f economic transition. In Bulgaria, the IMF not 
only suggested policy preferences, but also largely produced the actual programmes. 
M oreover, Bulgarian governments used IMF in order to justify painful measures to 
the voters.^^'
There was a suitable legal base for many revolutionary policies, but most o f 
those could not be put into use or applied. For example, in 1991 the Bulgarian 
Parliament passed the Ownership and Use o f Farm Land Act, its Enforcement Act,
Georgi Fotev, “Total Crisis and the Reorganization of Society,” p.23. For the statistics see Gerard 
Caprio and Ross Levine, “Reforming Finance in Transitional Socialist Economies,” World Bank 
Research Observer Vol. 9 No. 1 (1994), pp. 1-24 .
Vesselin Dimitrov, Bulgaria: The Uneven Transition, pp. 70-72.
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and the Cooperatives Act, which provided the legal basis for agrarian reform^^^ or 
the ratification o f the Foreign Investment Act (FIA) creating some o f the most liberal 
conditions for foreign investment in Central and Eastern Europe. Even so, the war in 
Yugoslavia and the UN embargo on Belgrade for forty-three months served to 
fiirther isolate Bulgaria fi’om international markets at the very time it attempted to 
restructure its economy, and diminished all chances o f attracting foreign direct 
investment (FDI). M oreover, Bulgaria suffered from the rebirth o f the Balkan image 
as a dark and savage place, too distant and dangerous for investment, trade, travel, 
and communication.^^^ Nonetheless, the distribution o f foreign investments by 
coxmtry o f origin was quite dynamic, contrary to the other countries o f Central and 
Eastern Europe. While German investments ranked highest in number and size in 
1990-92, the great part o f investments came from neighbouring coimtries, mainly 
Greece and Turkey in 1993-95. The Greek government encouraged its entrepreneurs 
for investment in Bulgaria not only for its geographic proximity, but also by the 
numerous EU programmes in the country.^^'*
The struggle o f the government to establish a better economic model was 
generally successful, but the monetary policies proved to be wrong. When prices 
were set free in February 1991, the floating exchange rate fluctuated in the range o f 
BGL 16.9 to 21.7 per one US dollar. From 1992 imtil end o f 1993, the nominal value 
o f the lev fell from BGL 23.6 to about 32 levs per one US dollar at the end o f the 
period. But the government seems to have supported it covertly, until a foreign- 
exchange crisis erupted in May 1994 and the exchange rate fell to BGL 55.6 levs per
Maya Keliya, “The Transformation of Agriculture,” in Jacques Coenen-Huther (ed.), Bulgaria at 
the Crossroads. (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 1996), pp. 233-244.
R.J. Crampton, A Concise History of Bulgaria, pp. 230-231.
Daniela Bobeva and Alexander Bozhkov, “Foreign Investments in Bulgarian Economy” in lliana 
Zloch-Christy (ed.), Bulgaria in a Time of Change: Economic and Political Dimensions. (Avebury: 
Aldershot, 1996), p. 130.
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one US dollar?^^ Consequently, the government’s passivity in combating economic 
drift pushed the electorate towards a reviving socialist party whose expressions about 
easing the pain o f transition was comforting to the majority o f voters and brought an 
electoral victory for BSP in the 1994 elections.
3.5.Partial Reversal With the Socialist Government (1995-1996)
The socialist government, which came to power in early 1995, inherited an 
economy which was just beginning to come off the bottom after five years o f decline. 
The tough policies o f the former government (Lyuben Berov 1992-94) had stabilised 
the economy. The drastic devaluation o f the B ulgarian national currency (BGL) 
had restored the conpetitive position o f Bulgarian ejqxsrts. In 1995, trade was at its best 
level since the start o f transition. Thus, the new government had a chance to deal with 
the long-postponed structural problems o f the econonoy.
The positive effects o f the former government’s deferring the debts for 20-30 
years was evident, as it signed an agreement with the Paris Club o f government 
creditors^^’ in April 1994, and another one with the London Club o f commercial 
creditors^^* in June 1994.^^’ In 1994, the GDP grew by 1.8%, with industrial output 
juirqiing by 7.8% '^**’ and inflation was on a downward slope. GDP growth in 1995
Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affeirs, “The financial sector in Bulgaria,” 
European Commission Enlargement Papers. No. 18, (September 2003), p.20,
<http;//europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance>.
R.J. Crampton, A Concise History of Bulgaria, p.232.
Debts owed by developing countries are usually rescheduled in the London Club or the Paris Club. 
London Club rescheduling involves debts owed to commercial banks while Paris Club rescheduling 
concerns debts owed to official creditors. The Paris Club is an informal group of official creditors 
whose role is to find co-ordinated and sustainable solutions to the payment difficulties experienced by 
debtor nations.
The London Club is an ad-hoc grouping of commercial banks exposed to third world debts. In 
contrast to the Paris Club, it is not a formal body with fixed memb^ship and there is no formal 
fi-amework for restructuring commercial bank loans.
Iliana Zfoch-Christy. “External Balance and External Debt,” p. 140; See also in Emil Giatzidis, An 
Introduction To Post-Communist Bulgaria: Political. Economic and Social Transformations, p.88.
IMF, Republic of Bulgaria: Recent Economic Developments, p.l; European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, “Transition Report,” 1999.
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exceeded forecasts and reached 2.9%. The share o f the private sector in GDP rose to
40% at the end o f 1995. (See Table)
Table.5. Annual growth o f GDP, 1989-94 '^*^_______________
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
-0.6%  -9.3%  -1.7% -7.3%  -2.4%  1.8% 2.9%
The socialist government took on board the idea o f stimulating the economy, 
but ignored the warning signs despite the existence o f decision makers educated in 
prestigious foreign institutions. With their economic policies Prime Minister Zhan 
Videnov and his colleagues returned to some methods o f the command economy and 
coveted restoration o f the social welfare characteristic o f the old regime. Perhaps 
most disastrously, the socialist government believed that it had discovered a 
Bulgarian way for recovery o f the economy and denounced the necessity o f the 
intervention o f outsiders such as the
In its first year, the socialist government seemed to be well on the way 
towards achieving its objectives. However, it was not a continuation o f the economic 
recovery that had begun in 1994, but, on the contrary, the result o f a return to price 
controls. The resultant slowdown o f inflation was merely artificial, and accumulated 
problems for the fiiture. In early 1996, all the symptoms o f an economic collapse 
were evident and kept on increasing to a seemingly unstoppable level. 
Unemployment began to increase again with the closure o f inefficient industrial 
enterprises, and in early 2000 reached its highest level since the start o f transition.^“*"^ 
In fact, problems started with agriculture. The tremendous idéologisation in decision­
making hindered teamwork and de-communisation efforts caused early liquidation o f
Given the slow pace of privatisaticsi, this was largely due to new-businesses. See, Emil Giatzidis, An 
Introduction To Post-Communist Bulgaria: Political. Economic and Social Transformations, p.89.
International Monetary Fund (IMF), Republic of Bulgaria: Recent Economic Developments. 
(Washington DC: IMF, 1995), p.l.
Vesselin Dimitrov, Bulgaria: The Uneven Transition, pp. 81-82.
Vesselin Dimitrov, Bulgaria: The Uneven Transition, p.62.
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all existing collective farm units. When the new co-operatives proved unable to 
secme the minimurn grain harvest needed, the 1996 harvest was lower than that o f 
1936, and the situation deteriorated as an excessive volume o f grain was 
exported.^'*^
However, the main issue for agricultural policy in the transition period was 
land reform. The process o f returning the land to its pre-communist owners was 
delayed. As late as the end o f 1998, only 24% o f land was in secure legal ownership. 
Agricultural output had no firm upward trend, since after an increase o f 30% in 1997, 
output declined by 6.2% in 1998. This meant that one o f the most inportant sectors o f 
the Bulgarian economy, accounting for 21.1 o f GDP and enploying 24.7% o f the 
working population, and one o f the few in which the country could enjoy a conpetitive 
advantage, was still not on a sustainable growth track.^ '^ ^
Reforms were accepted and applied almost mechanically regardless o f their 
specific conditions.^'*^ M ost importantly, however, the government failed to generate 
enough resources to begin the repayment o f Bulgaria’s foreign debt under the 1994 
agreement, and underestimated the problems o f the deeply corrupt banking system. 
In 1996, the currency went into a fi*eefell, most o f the banks went bankrupt and 
stagnation prevailed.^'**
By the end o f 1996, Bulgaria had become the top contender for the title o f 
‘worst-managed country in Europe’. During that year, |q |^ tio n  hit the 300 percent 
mark and GDP declined 10 percent thus making^  ^ B ubfcia an exception to the
Emil Giatzidis, An Introduction To Post-Communist Bulgafia: Political. Economic and Social 
Transformations. p.91.
European Commission, Regular Report on Progress Towards Accession: Bulgaria. (Brussels, 
October 1999).
Emil Giatzidis, An Introduction To Post-Communist Bulgaria: Political. Economic and Social 
Transformations, pp. 99-100.
The lev fell to 119.5 levs to the dollar by May 1996. In early 1997 the lev devaluated from BGL 
500 to over BGL 3,000 per one US dollar. Markets collapsed coupled by almost complete 
dollarization of payments. Directorate G ^eral for Economic and Financial Affairs, “The linancial 
sector in Bulgaria,” p.20; Vesselin Dimitrov, Bulgaria: The Uneven Transition, p.55-56.
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regional trend o f stabilisation and growth. Between January 1996 and January 1997, 
the average monthly salary fell almost tenfold, from $110 to $12. Bulgaria actually 
sank below the economic level o f conflict - damaged Bosnia and Albania.^^’
Bulgarians were becoming not only poorer but also more imequal. The Gird 
coefficient, the most widely accepted measure o f inequality, increased from 0.217 in 
1989, one o f the lowest in the world, to 0.378 in 1995 which was higher than in any 
other Eastern Emopean c o u n t r y . M o r e  than 30% o f the nation in 1997 were living 
below the poverty line as defined by the United Nations Development Program.^^'
The economic crisis, sustained and intensified by the slow pace o f the 
economic reforms, reinforced the inherited negative features o f the demographic 
structure o f the population. This, in turn, led to a steady decline in the birth rate. 
There were over 2 million pensioners out o f the aging population o f 9 million 
total. '^^
The prime minister resigned in December 1996, but the political turmoil led 
to an even greater fell in the exchange rate and triggered off hyperinflation, which 
marked the end o f the second period o f macroeconondc stabilization as the lowest 
point reached by Bulgaria during its liberalization process. (See table)
Table.6. Key economic indicators, 1994-99^^^
Indicator 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
GDP growth (%) 1.8 2.9 -10.1 -6.9 3.5 2.4
Inflation (CPI) 121.9 32.9 310.8 578.6 0.96 6.2
Unemffloyment (%) 12.8 14.7 13.7 15.0 16.0 17.0
Fiscal balance (% of GDP) -5.6 -6.6 -16.6 -2.9 1.3 -0.9
Cunent account (% of GDP) -0.3 -02 0.2 4.2 -1.8 -5.3
Venelin I. Ganev, “Bulgaria’s Symphony of Hope,” Journal of Democracy. Vol. 8, No. 4 (1997), 
p.131.
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, “Transition Report 1997,” (London, 1997). 
United Nations Development Program, Human Development Report (New York, 1997).
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Georgi Fotev, “Total Crisis and the Reorganization of Society,” p.28. 
Sources: OECD, IMF.
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By the end o f 1996, the extent o f the crisis was such that the IMF proposed 
the introduction o f a currency board system. That represented the ultimate 
recognition o f the inability o f the government to control monetary pohcy.^ '^*
3.6. L iberalisation and Unexpected Stabilisation (1997-1999)
The introduction o f the currency board marked the beginning o f the third, and 
so far successful, attempt at macroeconomic stabilisation. The hyperinflation o f early 
1997 finally persuaded the politicians and the population that inflation is the greatest 
evil, and made it possible to introduce the currency board. The political parties 
finally managed to reach an agreement on 4 February 1997, through which the BSP 
ceded power to a above-party expert government, led by the mayor o f Sofia Stefan 
Sofianski, which later concluded a stabilisation agreement with the IMF.
After the elections, Ivan Rostov formed a new government and reversed the 
anti-liberalisation measures imposed during Videnov government and the lev was 
pegged to the DM at Lvl.OOO : DM1 in July 1997.^^^ The country also managed to 
limit spending, producing the first budget surplus o f the Bulgarian transition in 1998, 
and the spiral o f inflatiorraiy e^qrectations was finally broken, setting the foundations for 
a stable macroeconomic environment. Thus, the annual rate o f inflation fell to a 
negligible level, interest rates eased rapidly to single-digit levels, foreign currency 
reserves increased, and domestic state debt reduced substantially.
The same period was also the years o f first serious measures about enterprise 
reform. In its Bulgaria 2001 programme, the government committed itself to creating
Stoydin Savov, “The Bulgarian Economy imder the Curroicy Board (State and Tendencies),” 
Economic Thought. 13 (1998), p. 22.
Vesselin Dimitrov, Bulgaria: The Uneven Transition, pp.85-86.
It was repegged to the euro at Lvl,955.83.TEuro in January 1999 and subsequently according to 
the Law on redenomination of the Bulgarian lev, in July 1999, 1000 BGL were replaced by 1 BGN. 
See Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs, “The financial sector in Bulgaria”; The 
Economist Intelligence Unit Limited, “Country Profile: Bulgaria-Basic data,” (2005),
<www.eiu.com>
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the conditions necessary for encouraging the development and competitiveness o f 
large-scale enterprises, as well as facilitating the growth o f the small and medium 
sector. The government passed new legislation, especially on competition, and 
committed itself to investing in infrastructure (roads, transport, energy) and 
telecommunications. The recovery o f the economy was strongly supported by the 
international community^^^ indicating the increasingly important role o f the EU in 
Bulgaria’s foreign trade towards the end o f millennium.^^*
However, despite the success in stabilisation, major concerns continued to be 
raised by the dynamics o f several key economic indicators GDP recovery re­
decelerated in 1999, exports declined, expected inflows o f foreign direct investment 
failed to show up, while the process o f privatisation and industrial restructuring 
showed signs o f losing impetus. The total industrial output was down 12.7 percent 
and 12.5 percent in 1998 and in 1999, respectively as the trade balances shifted from 
the positive to large imexpected deficits, and this trend continued in 2000, largely on 
account o f high oil prices.^^^
3 .7 .0n  the W ay to EU (2000 -)
The fourth and last stage in economic transition covers negotiations with EU 
in the acquis communautaire and the medium term  future process o f integration with 
the EU. At that stage, structural reform and institutional reform was o f primary 
importance, although the maintenance o f stability continued to be an imperative.
There were a lot to reach EU-average on almost all matters. The EU 
commission estimated Bulgaria’s GDP at ECU 4,600 (with Purchasing Power Parity) or
Emil Giatzidis, An Introduction To Post-Communist Bulgaria: Political. Economic and Social 
Transformations, p.92.
Vesselin Dimitrov, Bulgaria: The Uneven Transition, pp.85-86.
Emil Giatzidis, An Introduction To Post-Communist Bulgaria: Political. Economic and Social 
Transformations, p.93.
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about 25% o f the EU average in 2000. This overall figure reflected a number o f 
structural weaknesses o f the Bulgarian economy like the weakness o f the country’s 
private sector, slow progress on privatisation, and little interest on the part o f foreign 
investors who represented the main long-tum hope o f enabling the Bulgarian economy 
to reach European standards o f eflficiency.^ ^®
According to 2003 figures, Bulgaria ranked last in average pension and wage 
list among prospective EU member states. For monthly wages, Bulgaria’s average 
was $131 - over seven times less than that o f Slovenia, the top ranked country with a 
rate o f $980, but also well behind the wages o f Romania ($165), Latvia ($280), 
Slovakia ($298), Lithuania ($304), Hungary ($475), the Czech Republic ($480), and 
Poland ($523). Over 2.3 million people, almost 30% o f the coimtry’s total 
population, were retired and lived on pensions that averaged $45 a month -again the 
worst. Per capita consumption o f meat and milk by Bulgarians was over two times 
lower than that o f citizens in other countries, while the consumption o f bread was 
almost twice as high, which signed a potential malnutrition. The same study also 
found that almost 40% o f Bulgarians lived under the poverty line and the ratio o f 
total income o f this group to those earning an average o f $300 a month was 
roughlyl:14, and the income gap seemed to be steadily widening.^^* This appeared 
also in village town divergence; 80% o f those living in the countryside were deprived 
o f essentials.^^^
Even though the economic indicators are not satisfactory today, the macro 
economic figures o f the Bulgarian economy have been improving notably since
Vesselin Dimitrov, Bulgaria: The Uneven Transition, p.87.
According to the findings of a joint study by the Institute of Social and Trade Unionist Studies and 
the Confederation of Independent Trade Unions in Bulgaria (KNSB). See, “Bulgaria Dead Last in 
Average Pension and Wage Among Future EU Accession States,” Mediterranean Agenda. October 
15, 2003, <www.meditagenda.com>,
Istanbul Ticaret Odası, Bulgaristan Ülke Etüdü ve Türk Yatırımları (Bulgaria Country Study and 
Turkish Investments^. Yaym No:2003-I8, (Istanbul, 2003), p.39.
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2000. Just since the beginning o f the Simeon Saxe-Coburg government’s mandate, in 
June 2001, Bulgaria’s credit rating has risen 15 times.^^^ Another indication o f 
improvement was foreign direct investment that the country attracted after the EU 
accession date was given. Relative freedom on the sale o f the immovables, the low 
level o f prices for raw materials and for active firms, the application o f Special 
Accession Programme for Agriculture and Rural Development (SAPARD) program^*^“* 
and the existence o f an atmosphere suitable for investment have been the foremost 
reasons for foreign investors to prefer Bulgaria.^^^ After 2000, foreign direct 
investment totals began to double in a few years. The result achieved in the year 
2000 was 1 billion US dollars and during the years 2000-2002 Bulgaria has managed 
to attract about 3 billion US dollars, which is nearly one-half from all investments in 
the former eleven years. In 2003, it reached 1,4 billion leva level and more 
importantly the larger part o f direct investments were made for new production 
lines.^ ^^ *^
The country has a market-based economy that was primarily service based 
and a population o f approximately 7.8 million. At the year’s end, gross domestic 
product growth was estimated at 5.3%, and cumulative inflation was 6.1%. While 
official unemployment in November was 11.9%, down 1.6 percentage points from 
the beginning o f the year, the National Statistical Institute (NSI) reported that long-
Bulgarian Government, “15 Times International Agencies Have Increased the Country’s Credit 
Rating for the Last Three Years,” (29 December 2004), 
<http://www.govemment.bg/English/2050.html>
The SAPARD programme, which started in 2000, supports agricultural and rural development 
measures. SAPARD is a decentralised programme under which the Bulgarian authorities themselves 
select projects consistent with the agreed programming framework. Bulgaria’s allocations from 
SAPARD are about €60million annually, <http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/candidate.htm>.
Istanbul Ticaret Odası, Bulgaristan Ülke Etüdü ve Türk Yatırımları, p.27; see also Bulgarian 
Foreign investment Agency, Food Processing Sector, 2002.
Bulgarian Government, “Record increase of the direct foreign investments in 2003,” (03 December 
2003), <http://www.govemment.bg/English/Priorities/Economy/2003-12-03/1849.html>.
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term  unemployed persons accounted for over 60% o f total xmemployment.^^’
The year 2004 was called “2004 The Year o f Bulgaria” pointing to the 
records met in economy^^* and FDI amounted to $ 2,5 billion which was equal to % 
o f the total amount o f investments in Bulgaria for the former 13 years. Minister o f 
Economy, Milko Kovachev, pointed out that 1/5 o f the Greenfield investment 
(investment in a new area) in Bulgaria for the previous 13 years were made in 2004, 
and privatisation revenues amoimted to 37% o f all privatisation revenues in the 
country. M oreover, 63% o f all investments in Bulgaria had been made during the last 
four years.^^^
According to preliminary figures, the FDI in Bulgaria are 9,2% o f the GDP, 
which is the highest level compared to other Central and Eastern European countries 
(Romania-5,6%, the Czech Republic-4,4%). In 2004, Bulgaria attracted $2,5 billion 
out o f the $25 billion foreign invesments in the region, which is a double rise on the 
last she years. In 2000, it was $1 billion FDI out o f the $22 billion in the region 
among the she coimtries namely, the Czech Republic, Hungary, the Slovak Republic, 
Romania, and Bulgaria.^’*^
On the other hand, investments by native entrepreneurs increased with 
stabilization which came after the Rostov government. When import products are 
taken into accoimt, the concentration on machinery and spare parts can be observed 
and this foretells an increase for the fiiture production amoimts.^^’
Consequently, the economic transition process o f Bulgaria may both be 
judged as a success or as a failure. When compared with the other former eastern
The Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, “Bulgaria: Country Reports on Human 
Rights Practices - 2004”.
See the official web page of Bulgarian government at <http://www.govemment.bg/English/>. 
Bulgarian Government, “2004 -  Record Year for Attracting FDI in Bulgaria,” (8 March 2005), 
<http://www.govemment.bg/English/Priorities/Privatization/2005-03-08/2335.html>.
Bulgarian Government, “2004 -  Record Year for Attracting FDI in Bulgaria”.
Istanbul Ticaret Odası. Bulgaristan ÜUce Etüdü ve Türk Yatırımları, p.26.
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bloc countries, it can be rated as a failure, since it delayed most o f the necessary 
reforms and economic figures are far behind. But, when thought o f the conditions at 
the outset which were much less favourable than most o f them, the process should be 
rated as a success. Regional conflicts in neighbouring former Yugoslavia messed up 
economic activities and caused EU to act slower on the eastern enlargement policy. 
Even so, the point that the country reached after the catastrophic seven decade (1989- 
99) gives promising signals. Today EDI figures are fer ahead o f Central European 
countries such as, Hungary or Czech Republic. Given its geographical distance and the 
absence o f any pre-1989 links with Western Europe, the country seems also to have 
done well on foreign policy issues. (See Table)
Table.7. Economic Indicators o f 2000 and 2004^^^
In 2000 In 2004
Actual growth o f GDP 5,8 5,7
GDP (levs) 25 453 649 000 (BG N )27 688 116
GDP per capita (USD) 1459 2216,7
Unemployment rate (%) 16,4 11,8
Inflation rate (%) 11,4 4.0
Export (min. USD) 4 824 629 9 888.0
Import (min. USD) 6 000 152 13 257.1
Commercial balance (USD) -1 175 522 3 369.1
See at Bulgarian government official web page at 
<http://www.govemment.bg/English/Bulgaria/Economy/>.
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CHAPTER IV
REGIONAL POLICIES AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS OF BULGARIA
4.1.Generai
Foreign policy sources o f a country are divided into two categories as 
enduring, and transient. Geography and geo-political realities are considered to he 
the enduring sources, while national perceptions, the national character, and domestic 
politics may be considered as transient ones. The two are clearly related, because the 
latter develop in the framework o f the former. Also, in the long run, enduring factors 
might become transient. They are only considered enduring in the framework o f the 
existing international system. When it comes to Bulgaria, the most important 
enduring source o f Bulgaria’s foreign policy seems to be the geographic location o f 
the state and its current borders. It is located close to two important commercial and 
communication routes^’  ^ and the country is almost a land-locked state, despite being 
in the middle o f the most inportant crossroeids in the world, it is insulated and 
isolated in that peninsula’s north-east c o m e r . E v e n  though Bulgaria has access to 
the south-north axis through the Istanbul-Plovdiv-Sofia-Nish-Belgrade route, the 
endpoints, Turkey and Serbia, both can bypass Bulgaria, but Bulgaria cannot bypass
The first is the north-south axis which connects the Central European planes with the 
Mediterranean Sea through the Vardar Valley and the port of Salónica. The second is the east-west 
axis, which connects Asia with Europe through the Istanbul-Salonica-Igoumenitsa line, and the Black 
Sea with the Atlantic through the Aegean and Mediterranean Seas. The importance of these two links 
can be illustrated by the ongoing effort by Turkey, Bulgaria, Macedonia, and Albania to construct a 
link between the Albanian port of Dürres and the Bulgarian Black Sea ports by rail and motor route 
through Macedonia. See Symeon A. Giannakos, “Bulgaria’s Macedonian Dilemma,” p.l55.
Symeon A. Giannakos, “Bulgaria’s Macedonian Dilemma,” p.l55.
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them. This produces Bulgarian dependence on each o f them and it is somewhat 
bound to Russia by way o f the Black Sea with its two ports, Varna and Burgas.^’^
Consequently, if interruptions and inveisions o f the great powers are taken 
into consideration, it can be easily said that Bulgarian foreign pohcy, and even 
national perceptions had been bound to a set o f geographic necessities, and Bulgaria 
tried to eliminate these geopolitical hindrances by way o f politics or military means 
until the end o f WWII. After that, the USSR invaded the country and the foreign 
policy approach began to be reshaped.
4.2. Foreign Policy Approach and International Relations During the 
Communist Era
Towards the end o f the war Soviet imperialist policies were evident that it 
assumed the entire Balkans as its own backyard. Although its allies had conceded 
Bulgaria to M oscow in a secret agreement o f June 1944, the USSR was suspicious o f 
direct Bulgarian-W estern contacts and invaded the country. The peace arrangement 
established a Soviet dominated Allied Control Commission to run Bulgaria until 
conclusion o f a peace treaty. Subsequently, Bulgaria’s activities were constrained 
to the extent that it could no longer go on seeking retribution from its neighbours. 
M oreover, given the Soviet influence and communist domination o f Yugoslavia, 
Romania, Bulgaria, and Albania, it would hardly be seemly to insist on territorial 
claims between these states.
With the armistice signed by Bulgaria and the Soviet Union in October 1944, 
Bulgaria surrendered all wartime territorial gains, but during the immediate post-war 
heyday o f intra-Communist sohdarity and friendship and Russian influence, Bulgaria
Symeon A. Giannakos, “Bulgaria’s Macedonian Dilemma,” p.l56. 
Glenn E. Curtis (ed.), Bulgaria: a Coimtrv Study, p.43.
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was permitted to retain Southern Dobrudja. Likewise, Bulgaria’s $25 million 
reparations debt to Yugoslavia was cancelled by Tito and the Soviet Union, in 
contrast with its policy toward Germany, Hungary, and Romania, demanded no 
reparations.^^^ Nevertheless, this optimism provided by the Balkan Federation 
Project, which sought to provide a communist settlement to the sensitive Macedonian 
issue, ended in the late 1940s due to the rift between Stalin and Tito.^^*
With the creation o f the C ouncil for M utual Econom ic A ssistance 
(CMEA) and Warsaw Pact (WP) connection, Bulgaria was at last a member o f a 
femily, but Europe was divided into two blocs, and the Balkan region became the 
dividing line between the W estern Bloc and Eastern Bloc. While most o f the Eastern 
European coimtries became a Soviet satellite and members o f the Warsaw Pact; 
Turkey and Greece were made part o f the W estern bloc or NATO. Only Yugoslavia 
remained outside the immediate Soviet sphere and followed its own path to 
socialism.^^^ This division o f the Balkans reduced the role o f individual Balkan states 
in regional politics and in many cases the foreign policies o f the blocs also became 
that o f member countries.
In such an atmosphere, relations between Bulgaria and its northern 
neighbour, Romania, remained calmly and friendly for decades. Links between the
Joseph Rothshild, Communist Eastern Europe, p.49. For that reason, many scholars argue that the 
conflicts which have emerged in the post communist period were those suppressed in the communist 
era. See Luan Troxel, “Bulgaria and the Balkans,” in Constantine P. Danopoulos and Kostas G. 
Messas (eds.). Crises in the Balkans Views from the Participants (Oxford: Westview Press, 1997), 
pp. 199-200.
The first attempt for a Balkan Federation was Balkan Entente (1934). This short-lived military 
cooperation was between Greece, Romania, Tiukey, and Yugoslavia. Bulgaria had remained out of it 
because of its irredentist policies, which turned the pact against it. See, J. F. Brown, Bulgaria Under 
Communist Rule, pp.276-278.
For detailed reading, see George S. Harris, Troubled Alliance (Washington: AEI-Hoover Policy 
Studies, 1972), pp. 9-48.
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two countries under communism were relatively intensive, and only dipped briefly 
towards the end o f the period because o f environmental concerns.
On the other hand, Bulgarian policies towards Yugoslavia became largely 
dependent on the ebbs and flows o f relations between Yugoslavia and USSR. From 
StaUn’s death until the late 1970s tensions sparked by Soviet policies in Eastern 
Europe were closely associated with episodes regarding the volatile Macedonian 
issue in Bulgarian-Yugoslav relations.^**
Bulgaria’s relations with the other countries o f the region were generally 
business as usual, while the USSR played an important role in the region and became 
the guiding light o f Bulgaria’s foreign policy. During the period Bulgaria had an 
extremely cautious ^proach  to multilateral cooperation and preferred the strategy o f 
bilateral relations in order not to jeopardize its ‘special relationship’ with Moscow. 
Zhivkov’s declaration o f September 1973 that Bulgaria and the Soviet Union would 
“act as single body, breathing with the same lungs and nourished by the same 
bloodstream” *^^  clearly illustrated its subservience. Daniel N. Nelson nominates 
Bulgaria as the only “Total Warsaw Pact” country, the military doctrine and defence 
economy o f which were entirely absorbed into the coalitional warfare policies o f the 
Warsaw Pact for several decades.^*'* However, several fectors rationalized this 
subordinatioa First o f all, the Bulgarian economy could survive only and only with 
Soviet backing which meant 70 percent o f Bulgaria’s strategic imports and exports.
Vesselin Dimitrov, Bulgaria: The Uneven Transition, p. 112.
Plamen S. Tzvetkov, “The Politics of Transition in Bulgaria: Back to the Future?” Problems of 
Communism. (May-June 1992), p.41;
Stephen Ashley, “Bulgaria: Between Loyalty and Nationalism,” in Jmathan Eyal (ed.). The Warsaw 
Pact and the Balkans: Moscow’s Southmi Flank. (London: Macmillan, 1989), p.l43.
R.J. Crampton, A Concise History of Bulgaria. p.l99.
Daniel N. Nelson, Balkan Imbroglio: Politics and Security in Southeastern Europe, p.25. Other 
categories were as follows; “Nominal Warsaw Pact” coimtry: Romania; “Peripheral Warsaw Pact” - 
Himgary, “Non-Warsaw Pact Autonomous Territorial Defence” - Yugoslavia (and Albania post 
1978), “Non-Warsaw Pact Externally Dependent Territorial Defence” - Albania, early 1960s through 
1978.
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Secondly, Bulgaria’s security arrangement was anchored in its membership in the 
Warsaw Pact. Thirdly, for a small and vulnerable country Uke Bulgaria, located at a 
historically troubled region, integration into the Soviet bloc was an iron barrier 
against Balkanisation,^®^ in other words, Bulgaria had no alternative.
Time to time, Bulgaria sought ways o f following, if not independent, an 
autonomous foreign policy, however, its economic weakness did not permit Sofia to 
go far.^*^ A popular joke fi^ om Bulgaria’s communist period summarizes the 
Bulgarian-Russian relations during the communist era: A young boy asked his father, 
“Dad, why do they always say that the Russians are our brothers? Why don’t they 
just call them our fiiends?” The father replied, “Because, my son, firiends are fi-iends 
by choice.” ®^’
This situation lasted until détente o f the 1970s, and finalfy the rise of Mikhail 
Gorbachev to power in 1985 led to meaningful transformations in Moscow’s foreign 
policies, and consequently, Bulgaria was fi*eed to follow a more coherent foreign policy. 
Thus, the late Zhivkov period was characterized by meaningful deviations fi'om the 
previous model in Bulgarian political development.
However, the conflicts between the two blocs were mostly felt in USSR’s 
policies against Turkey and Greece. Bulgaria’s relations with the two NATO 
members, Turkey and Greece, were antagonistic and served as a supplement to 
USSR’s policies in the region. Turkey and Greece worked together for stability imtil 
the beginning o f the 1960s.^ ®® In search o f stability they proposed the Balkan Pact o f
Emil Giatzidis, An Introduction To Post-Commimist Bulgaria: Political. Economic and Social 
Transformations, pp.130-133; Georgi Fotev, “Total Crisis and the Reorganization of Society,” p.l6.
It was estimated that between 1948 and 1962, Soviet loans to Bulgaria totalled the equivalent of 
one billion dollars. Almost 100 percent of energy and 60 percent of machines was imported from the 
Soviet Union. See, J. F. Brown, Bulgaria Under Communist Rule, pp.297-298.
Ognyan Minchev, “Bulgaria and Russia,” in Ognyan Minchev, Valeri Ratchev, Marin Lessenski 
(eds.), Bulgaria for NATO: 2002. (Sofia: Institute for Regional and International Studies, 2002), 
pp.119-129.
Oral Sander, Balkan Gelişmeleri ve Türkiye (1945-19651. pp.69-81.
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1954,^*’ which was one o f the foremost attempts to form a Balkan Union and to 
perform regional stability without the intrusion o f great powers.^’” But Bulgaria 
fought against the continuation o f the pact with “peace attacks” aiming to prevent the 
pact from turning into an alliance against the Eastern Bloc, mostly with Soviet 
encouragement.^’* On the other hand, Bulgaria would hastily accept the Rapacki Plan 
and Stoica Plans, as the plans served the aims o f the Soviet Union in the region.^’^
The major problem between Bulgaria and Turkey, as mentioned before, was 
Bulgaria’s assimilationist and cruel policies against the Turkish minority, which had 
lasted throughout the communist era. When it comes to Greek- Bulgarian relations 
the problem was the payment o f Bulgaria’s war reparations debt to Greece. The debt 
was fixed at 45 million dollars by the Paris peace treaties o f 1947, and after several 
talks on the issue Bulgaria agreed to pay a sum o f 7 million dollars in goods, in July 
1964.^’  ^ However, there was an important reason for the softening o f Greece’s 
policies after almost 20-years struggle: Turkey and Greece were not in good terms 
because o f the Cyprus conflict, which began with Greek uprisings against the British 
in April 1955.^’'* M oreover, the détente o f the 1960s had decreased tension in the 
Balkans, and Greece was in search o f a means o f balancing Turkey in the Balkans. 
After solving the war reparations problem, the same year, Bulgaria and Greece
On the way to form the pact, The Friendship and Cooperation Treaty was signed between Greece 
Turkey and Yugoslavia on 28 February 1953, in Ankara, and military alliance agreement was signed 
in Bled, Yugoslavia on 9 August 1954. See, Oral Sander, Balkan Gelişmeleri ve Türkiye 0945-19651. 
pp. 107-112.
Daniel N. Nelson, Balkan Imbroglio: Politics and Security in Southeastern Europe, p. 17.
This peace attack or peace offensive was a serial attempt including Bulgaria’s declarations inviting 
to solve continuing territorial problems and later declarations claiming the non-existence of any 
problem between Bulgaria and the members of the Pact, namely Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia. See, 
Oral Sander, Balkan Gelişmeleri ve Türkiye (1945-1965). pp. 102-104.
The Rapacki Plan was named after Polish Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki in 1957. Stoica Plans 
were named after Romania Prime Minister Chivu Stoica. The first was proposed on 17 September 
1957 and the second one in June 1959. The common points were that they foresaw nuclear-fi’ee- 
Balkan region. See, J. F. Brown, Bulgaria Under Communist Rule, p.269-271; Oral Sander, Balkan 
Gelişmeleri ve Türkiye (1945-1965). pp.148-158.
J. F. Brown, Bulgaria Under Communist Rule, p.273-175.
Michael B. Bishku, “Turkish-Bulgarian Relations: From Conflict and Distrust to Cooperation,” 
p.85.
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signed agreements on trade, cultural cooperation, eind improvement o f 
communication a g r e e m e n t s . T h e  same year, Turkey was forced to a 
rapprochement with the Soviet Union as the U.S. President Lyndon Johnson sent a 
letter to Turkish Prime M inister Ismet Inonu to prevent the intervention on Cyprus.^’  ^
Thus, 1964 became a turning point, as both Turkey and Greece had reasons for 
rapprochement with the Eastern Bloc.
After the 1974 Turkish military intervention in Cyprus, Bulgaria designed 
closer relations with Greece and Turkey, but separately. Between 1972 and 1976, 
Turkish-Bulgarian trade increased almost four times, and in December 1975 Turkey 
and Bulgaria signed a Declaration o f Principles o f Good-Neighbourliness and 
Cooperation, which included pledges o f non-aggression and respect for their 
common frontier, assurances similar to the ones Bulgaria had given Greece a few
months earlier 297
Nevertheless, the diversity o f cultural traditions, socio-economic systems and 
above all, political alignments in the region were not conducive to effective regional 
cooperation and the strains carised by the cold war remained until the 1980s.
4.3. Dramatic Changes of the 1980s and Collapse of Communism
The dramatic events at the end o f the 1980s shattered earlier patterns, brought 
an end to the division o f Europe, and the bipolar security order that had characterised 
East-W est p>olitics for the previous forty years. Communism and Cold War 
polarisation had imposed an artificial and unusual stability in the region but without
Kyriakos D. Kentrotis, “Greece and Bulgaria: From the Experiences of the Past to the Challenges 
of the Future” Journal of Modem Helloiian. No. 15, (1998), p. 31; J. F. Brown, Bulgaria Under 
Communist Rule, p.275.
Michael B. Bishku, “Turkish-Bulgarian Relations: From Conflict and Distrust to Cooperation,” 
p.85.
Michael B. Bishku, “Turkish-Bulgarian Relations: From Conflict and Distrust to Cooperation,”
p.88.
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eliminating or settling the differences among regional ethnic groups and 
communities. The end o f the Cold War order brought a resurgence o f nationalism, 
ethnic conflict, enmity and economic depression, and the Balkans became a region o f 
daunting problems. Similarly, nationalism became an issue in Bulgaria too, but the 
latitude for Bulgarian foreign policy widened somewhat after 1985. The key 
development, in this respect, was the regime’s campaign for bulgarizing o f the large 
Turkish minority between 1984-1989. Speculations about a Cyprus scenario 
constituted a companion piece to the legitimating strategy, but Turkey did not want a 
military conflict with Bulgaria and requested M oscow’s intervention to mitigate the 
nationalist policies o f Sofia.^’*
Bulgaria’s policy brought rapid rapprochement with Greece that resulted in 
the establishment o f Sofia-Athens ‘axis’ with Declaration o f Friendship and Good 
Neighbourliness, in September 1986. With the declaration, both sides agreed to help 
each other combat externally sponsored agitation or action that might imperil their 
stability, with a reference to so-called fears o f Macedonian and Turkish irredentism
in both states 299
In February 1988, after some initial caution, Bulgaria participated in the 
Balkan foreign ministers’ conference. At the meeting, Bulgarian positions evinced 
further movement away fi*om strict isolation within the Warsaw Pact, without 
signalling any basic changes in Bulgarian foreign policy.^”® The end o f the Cold War, 
break-up o f the Soviet Union, dissolution o f the CMEA and the Warsaw Pact meant
Daniel N. Nelson, Balkan Imbroglio: Politico, and Security in Southeastern Europe, p. 100. 
Significantly, the accord was agreed upon after the PASOK government in Greece had adopted a 
new defence doctrine in January 1985 which, in fact, identified Turkey as Greece’s chief threat. Kjell 
Engelbrekt, “Greek-Bulgarian Relations: A Disharmonious Friendship” in RFE/RL Research Report. 
(9 July 1993), p. 29; Daniel N. Nelson, Balkan Imbroglio: Politico, and Security in Southeastern 
Europe. p.l9; Vesselin Dimitrov, Bulgaria: The Uneven Transition, p. 112.
Stephen Ashley, “Bulgaria and the Balkan Foreign Ministers’ Conference,” RFE/RL Research 
Report. (11 March 1988).
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that Bulgaria had to seek a new identity, and presented a totally new situation with
'in  1unfamiliar opportunities, challenges and problems.
Now, the agenda o f Bulgarian post-Communist foreign policy was 
determined by the need to find solutions to the main issues connected with the 
irreversible political changes that occurred in international relations as well as in the 
field o f security in Europe. The main goals o f foreign policy were to establish the 
most favourable conditions for the country’s economic development and the 
reinforcement o f its national security.^”^  Thus, it began searching for an active 
dialogue with all the Balkan coimtries with the aim o f equal treatment and political 
dialogue.
When examined carefully, the foreign policy transition shows a clear 
similarity to domestic political transition. Accordingly, the post communist foreign 
policy transition o f Bulgaria is divided into two periods. First period is the 
reorganization stage (1990-1996); differentiation between reformers and conservatives 
concentrated around the BSP and among the anti-communist elite around the UDF. 
Second period is the pragmatic stage (after 1996); diminishing o f radical elites, and 
control o f the newer generation who designed their political views during the transition 
years and subsequently adoption o f the European model as a unique example.
4.4.A Fundamental Modification of Foreign Policy: The 1990-1996
Period
The new institutional fi*amework o f Bulgarian foreign policy was endorsed 
with the Constitution o f July 1991. The principle o f political pluralism  was
Emil Giatzidis, An Introduction To Post-Communist Bulgaria: Political. Economic and Social 
Transformations, pp. 130-133.
Emil Giatzidis, An Introduction To Post-Communist Bulgaria: Political. Economic and Social 
Transformations, dd.134-135.
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substituted for the Communist Party’s constitutional monopoly on foreign policy 
making through interest groups, political organizations and elected government 
bodies. The previous ideological and class based foreign policy were renounced in 
favour o f a nation-oriented, pragm atic and internationally responsible foreign 
policy. Regional policy was thus freed from the ideological constraints o f Soviet 
bloc allegiance and was now influenced by the process o f political consensus­
building on the concepts o f national security and national interest.
More importantly, the National Round Table o f early 1990 had established a 
tough bipolar model o f party politics marginalizing non-participants. Thus, two main 
organizations came to control Bulgarian politics and government, the Bulgarian 
Socialist Party (BSP) and the Union o f Democratic Forces (UDF), while the specific 
balancing role o f the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF) caused analysts to 
call the formation a “two-and-a-half party system”.^ ®^ In other words, the existence o f 
two equal-power poles in the National Assembfy caused the multiplication o f power 
centres and segmentation o f interests.
The leading role in the approval o f a new face for Bulgarian foreign policy 
after 1989 was played by the one-year, fixlly democratic, first non-communist 
government o f UDF, under the leadership o f Filip Dimitrov,^”’* and the first directly- 
elected president, Zheliu Zhelev. The existence o f a president served as a balancer in 
foreign policy issues. Bulgarian governments, despite not always in good standing 
with the president, remained in tune with the president on the Yugoslav conflict.
The total change in Bulgaria’s foreign policy and the realities o f the Post- 
Cold War international arena can be found in the words o f Nikolai Slatinski, 
Chairman o f the Parliamentary Commission on Security in the National Assembly:
Ivan Krastev, “Party Structure and Party Perspectives in Bulgaria,” Journal of Communist Studies 
and Transition Politics. Vol.13, No.l, (March 1997), p. 94.
304 Established as a result of the parliamentary elections on 13 October 1991.
88
...even after the collapse of the Berlin Wall the course of history continues to be 
based on memories of the past. International affairs remain dominated by faits 
accomplis and double standards. It is of the utmost importance that Bulgaria does not 
ignore the objective realities. In this sense, it would be very dangerous to change the 
existing boundaries in the Balkans. These boundaries are historically settled and - 
historically speaking -this happened only yesterday. Geographically, Bulgaria is in 
the Balkans, but it is Bulgaria’s natural aim not to remain in the Balkans politically. 
Bulgarians live in a European country; their goal is to be integrated with the 
European and North Atlantic structures, and this goal is a result of a clear and 
conscious identification of Bulgarian society with the common European 
purposes.^®^
Thus, Bulgaria has consciously avoided the temptation to exploit existing 
conflicts in the Balkans, and tried not to get involved. That is why Bulgarian foreign 
policy makers, powerful organizations and authoritative negotiators were adamantly 
opposed to direct participation in Former Yugoslavian conflicts.^®^ In addition, 
Bulgaria tried to demonstrate its commitment to international norms by closely 
adhering to UN sanctions against the Former Republic o f Yugoslavia and Iraq. 
However, with sanctions on Yugoslavia, Bulgaria did not only face in the potential o f 
getting caught in the war, but also suffered in economic terms; it had lost its main 
trading partner and it had lost its main trading routes. When Bulgaria’s main 
transport route towards Central Europe was cut, it also caused the biggest problem 
between Bulgaria and Romania after environmental problems o f the early 1990s. They 
were eager to create an alternative transport route, bypassing Serbia but could not 
agree on the location o f the bridge and the project was delayed for year s .A ga in ,  the 
embargo on Iraq meant foregoing shipments o f more than one billion dollars worth 
o f oil, which Iraq owed Bulgaria.^ ®*
Dimitar Tzanev, “Bulgaria’s International Relations After 1989: Foreign Policy Between History 
and Reality,” p.l83.
Ekaterina Nikova, “Bulgaria in the Balkans,” p. 295; Dimitar Tzanev, “Bulgaria’s International 
Relations After 1989: Foreign Policy Between History and Reality,” p.l86.
Vesselin Dimitrov, Bulgaria: The Uneven Transition, p.l 13.
Estimates in December 1994 were as high as 6 billion, see BTA, (5 December 1994); Luan Troxel, 
“Bulgaria and the Balkans,” pp. 204-205; Ekaterina Nikova, “Bulgaria in the Balkans,” p. 296.
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During the period, contrary to former policies in the region, Bulgaria drew 
calm and quiet coimtry model. The only exception was Bulgaria’s initiative to 
include recognition o f Bosnia-Her2egovina, and Macedonia instead o f quietly 
following the European Community’s decision to recognize only Slovenia and 
Croatia as independent states. The Bulgarian government was the first to recognize 
the Republic o f Macedonia as sovereign and independent, on 6 January 1992. 
Throughout the following years, Bulgaria was carefitl to assist Macedonia without 
raising fears o f irredentist tendencies and did not accept the sanctions against 
Macedonia applied by Greece.^ ®  ^ When negative perceptions o f Greece reached a 
level o f intrusion into domestic politics o f Bulgaria, Sofia’s relations with Athens 
deteriorated.^
Some analysts interpreted the recognition o f Macedonia as a hidden agenda 
for a fiiture annexatioa^'* Actually, this was impossible given the country’s economic 
and military problems, and efforts to defuse mutual suspicion by advocating military 
contacts and transparency with military exchanges, which were virtually nonexistent 
prior to 1991.^ *^
In fact, there were two main concerns conditioning the reassessment o f 
Bulgarian regional policy. The perception o f security loss created by disbanding o f 
the Warsaw Pact (WP), and the demise o f CMEA that caused the country begin to 
search for institutionalised bilateral and collective security guarantees coupled with 
the demand o f economic and political reforms for a reorientation to the EU space.
K. Engelbrekt, “Bulgaria: The Weakening of Postcommunist Illusions,” RFE/RL Research Report. 
Vol. 2, No. 1, (1 January 1993), p. 82.
Greece saw the MRF as a potential cause of an ethnic unrest among Greece’s Turk minority since 
the UDF government was dependent on the parliamentary support of the MRF. Nurcan Özgür. Etnik 
Sorunlarm Çözümünde Hak ve Özgürlükler Hareketi, p.375; Kyriakos D. Kentrotis, “Greece and 
Bulgaria: From the Experiences of the Past to the Challenges of the Future,” pp. 34-35.
'^ '  See for example, George Prevelakis, “The Return of the Macedonian Question,” in F. W. Carter and H.T. 
Morris teds.l The Changing Shape of the Balkans. (London: UCL Press. 1996),p.l48.
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Thus, during the period, aiming mainly at EU membership, Bulgaria became a hill 
member o f the Council o f Europe, took an active part in the Conference for Security 
and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and regional organizations like the Black Sea 
Economic Cooperation (BSEC). Oriented especially towards the development o f 
relations with the US, Canada and W estern Europe, Bulgaria wanted to attract 
foreign private investment, capital, technology and management expertise.
Actually, Bulgaria had a number o f advantages. The existence o f democracy 
in the country, unequivocal rejection o f violence, clear orientation to a market 
economy and highly-qualified and inexpensive labour force distinguished Bulgaria 
fi'om a number o f countries in Eastern Europe. Geographical proximity o f the 
country to the enormous natural resources o f Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia 
gave Bulgaria a strategic opportrmity to be a springboard.^*^
Despite the fact that Bulgaria had signed the Trade and Co-operation 
Agreement on 8 May 1990,^ *^ * and joined the Phare programme (Polish and 
Hungarian Assistance for the R econstruction o f Europe) the same year, the 
euphoria over the expected and possible changes gradually gave way to sober 
disappointment. The challenge in the Balkans continued to revolve around evolving 
historical perceptions o f the Balkans in the eyes o f those residing outside South-eastern 
Europe. Moreover, the west had other problems, such as the Gulf War. Even the 
ethnic cleansing that was taking place at the heart o f Europe, in Bosnia, was not a 
matter o f priority. Additionally, the problems o f Central European Countries, which
S. Pashovski, “Statement [on Bulgarian Foreign Policy],” US World Journal. Vol. XIX, No. 11, 
(November 1993), p. 3.
Ilko Ezkenazi and Krasimir Nikolov “Relations with the European Union; Developments to date 
and prospects,” in Iliana Zloch-Christy (ed.), Bulgaria in a Time of Change: Economic and Political 
Dimensions. (Avebury: Aldershot, 1996), p.l89; Vesselin Dimitrov, Bulgaria: The Uneven Transition. 
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have Catholic populations and better economic conditions, would admittedly come 
before Bulgaria.
After Jan Videnov’s election victory at the end o f 1994, many argued that 
Bulgaria would turn toward a more Russian oriented foreign policy for ideological 
reasons, Videnov being former communist party (BSP) leader, and for more personal 
reasons, such as having been educated in the USSR. While Videnov showed respect 
for Russia, he consistently called for a continuation o f Bulgaria’s European 
orientation and for a balance in its relations between Russia and the West.
While a good number o f the parties approved o f better relations with all 
neighbours in general, due to its anti-Turkish policy legacy, the BSP was cautious in 
relations with Turkey. Videnov’s choice o f Greece for his first visit to a Balkan 
country as Prime M inister was a sign o f Bulgaria’s foreign policy orientation. 
Favourable to this development was the fact that the government in Greece was the 
Panhellenic Socialist Movement Party (PASOK), trusted partners o f the former 
Bulgarian Communists. During the period Greece tried to influence Bulgarian 
statesmen to isolate Turkey, and to form an Orthodox fi"ont in the Balkans by 
building the Athens-Tiran-Belgrade-Sofia a highway,^'^ and constructing Burgas- 
Alexandroupolis petroleum transport pipe line^’’ in order to create an alternative to 
the Turkish project o f Baku -  Tbilisi - Ceyhan (BTC) line.
Typically the BSP favoured closer links with Serbiai, maintaining good 
relations with the Serbian Socialist Party. It openly sympathized with their nationalist 
tendencies, though President Zhelev never visited either o f those ch itáis during his
Luan Troxel, “Bulgaria and the Balkans,” p. 206.
Nurcan Özgür, Etnik Sorunların Çözümünde Hak ve Özgürlükler Hareketi. p.371.
Kyriakos D. Kentrotis, “Greece and Bulgaria: From the Experiences of the Past to the Challoiges 
of the Future,” pp. 38-39.
Both projects were applied, and BTC line is q)0‘ational by June 2005
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tenii in office but went to Croatia and Bosnia. In addition, Bulgaria did not recognize
♦ a  1 Q
rump Yugoslavia, nor appoint an ambassador to Belgrade until 1996.
Although the BSP government shared the UDF’s views on EU, it also saw the 
NATO issue as a question o f Bulgarian relations with Russia and advanced the Slav- 
axis option as a guarantee for regional security. It supported the theory with realities 
such as the coimtry’s dependence on Russian energy supplies, need for preservation 
o f military equipment, and Russophile tradition o f the population. The BSP 
considered that no European security formula was possible without Russia.
Consequently, up until the national elections o f April 1997, the short-lived 
governments’ inconsistent pohcies created a foreign pohcy approach characterized 
by inertia, uncertainty, lack o f direction, and a cautious defensive posture designed to 
carry the country through the transition phase without making any compromises that 
might endanger domestic vulnerability or imdermine Bulgarian aspirations in the 
long run.^^* However, the efforts o f integrating with the West, achieving economic 
transformation, and maintaining domestic and international stability were common 
aims o f all govemments.^^^
4.5.Proactive Policy and Multilateralism: The Post 1997 Period
In the early elections o f April 1997, at a time in which the Balkan Peninsula 
was characterized by increasing destabilization, the UDF came to power with a 
52% sweeping majority which created conditions for greater institutional balance, 
coherence and synchronization o f poUcy-making at the central level. The pohtical
Ekaterina Nikova, “Bulgaria in the Balkans,” p.284, 296.
Emil Giatzidis, An Introduction To Post-Communist Bulgaria: Political. Economic and Social 
Transformations, dd.134-135.
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situation resulted in a better coordination o f foreign policy activity, reducing 
institutional competition between the presidency and cabinet.
The government began with economic stability problem, which it saw as a 
decisive impediment in accomplishing national security, and EU integration 
objectives.^^^ At the time, the softening o f the UN embargo foUowing the Dayton peace 
accord had reduced the negative impact on Bulgarian trade, yet it had not provided strong 
encouragement to private investors in the regioa Unfortunately, this development was 
followed by two regional crises consecutively; the collapse o f the Albanian state 
authority in 1997, and the Kosovo crisis in 1998. The image o f the Balkans as a 
“conflict-generating” region strengthened further while transborder infiastructure and 
energy projects in South-eastern Europe plans were delayed for several years.
However, this time Bulgaria abandoned its non-involvement principle, which 
it had followed in the former period, and drove towards more active engagement in 
regional crisis management efforts. The new policy stance was revealed in reactions to 
the crises in Albania and Kosovo On 4 March 1997, the Bulgarian Foreign Ministry (FM) 
called for an international effort to resolve the crisis in Albania, warning that the entire 
Balkan region could suffer if action was not taken. On 3 April 1997, the caretaker 
cabinet made an unprecedented decision to contribute troops to an international 
peacekeeping effort in the Balkans, by participating in multinational security and 
humanitarian force under UN auspices. This commitment signalled a relaxation o f the 
previously strict policy o f non-participation in missions in the Balkans, and on 2 June 
1997, the new cabinet and parliament approved sending o f an engineering platoon to the
Bulgarian Government, “Bulgaria 2001; Program of the Government of the Republic of Bulgaria 
(1997-2001),” see in the official website of Ministry of Economy of the Republic of Bulgaria, 
<www.mi.govemment.l:^>.
Bulgarian Telegraph Agency (BTA), (5 March 1997)
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NATO Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia.^^^ In July 1997, it sent a 35-man 
engineering platoon to SFOR followed by a 28-man transport platoon in June 
1998.^ ^^ In July 1998, a year after the Albanian disturbances, the government sent 
peacekeepers to the OSCE (Organization o f mission in Albania as an expression o f 
Bulgaria’s support for the initiatives o f the international community for a peacefiil 
settlement o f the crises in the BaDcans.^ ^^
More dynamic diplomatic relations on bilateral and multilateral levels, as 
well as in efforts at a more vigorous representation o f Bulgarian regional concerns 
through diplomatic, political, economic, and NGO signified the increasing assertiveness 
of Bulgarian regional policy. Consequently, the new policy character gradually 
repositioned Bulgaria fi“om an object to a subject o f European policies in the Balkans.
The Kosovo crisis became the strongest regional catalyst, stimulating the 
assertiveness o f Bulgaria’s evolving foreign policy in the Balkans. It also clearly 
demonstrated the profound need for an integrated regional vision, both on the part o f 
external (EU, NATO) and regional actors. Thus, Bulgaria perceived regional institutions 
as a means o f filling the political and security vacuum in South-eastern Europe as the 
accession to EU and NATO paced slowly, despite its fears that sub-regionalism may 
inpede integration with the West. This approach was also fostered by the 
expanding links among Balkan candidates for NATO membership imder the 
Partnership for Peace (PfP) initiative and the trilateral top and lower level policy-
RFE/RL Newsline. Vol. 1, No. 44, (3 June 1997).
Plamen Bonchev, “Civil-Military Relations in the Process of Security and Defence Policy 
Formulation: A Case Study of Bulgaria’s Participation in PfP,” Research ftoject: North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization Democratic Institutions Individual Fellowships Programme 1997/99, 
<http://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/97-99/f97-99.htm>.
BBC-WM, “Cabinet Approves Sending Peacekeepers to Albania,” (8 July 1998).
Andrew Cottey, et. al., “Emerging Subregioial Coq)erati«i Processes: South-Eastern Europe, the 
Newly Independent States and the Mediterranean,” in Andrew Cottey (ed.), SufaegiCTial Cooperation in 
the New Europe: Building Security. Prosperity and Solidarity from the Baraits to the Blade Sea. (Ixmdcm, 
Macmillan Press, 1999), p.220.
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coordinating meetings were held mostly to support Bulgarian and Romanian aspirations 
to join the EU and NATO.^^’
After the Kosovo crisis Bulgaria began to see the results o f its ten-year 
struggle and upon the presentation o f the second regular report o f the European 
Commission in 1999, the European Council recommended that formal negotiations 
begin. Negotiations started on 15 February 2000 and Bulgaria, along with Romania, 
Slovakia, Lithuania, Latvia and Malta became candidates o f the Helsinki Group.^ ^®
One year later, the 9/11 events highlighted the importance o f stability in the 
Balkans. U.S. began to see “the new crop o f seven members,” which includes 
Bulgaria, Romania, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia and Slovakia, as a way to 
secure US interests in the Black Sea,^^' and took the steps to engage the countries in 
the region as it began to prepare for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Bulgaria did 
not hesitate on the way as it neared its NATO membership objective and sometimes 
made attempts which might have obstructed its way towards the EU membership.^^^ 
Nevertheless, its policy succeeded, since Bulgaria was admitted to the NATO in 
March 2004.
On the other hand, Bulgaria did not give up on its relations with the EU and 
in December 2004, the EU concluded accession talks with Sofia.^^^ The European 
Parliament voted on 13 April 2005, for Bulgaria and Romania’s accession to the
These meetings take place between Bulgaria, Romania and Greece, and Bulgaria, Romania and 
Turkey on an annual basis, occasionally supplemented by Bulgarian-Macedonian-Albanian fora.
Emil Giatzidis, An Introduction To Post-Communist Bulgaria: Political. Economic and Social 
Transformations, pp. 140.
“Bulgaria, Black Sea Countries Will be Key to NATO's Future,” Mediterranean Agenda. 
<www.meditagenda.com>, October 14,2003.
For example, it gave support to Afghanistan and Iraq wars of USA. France and Germany accused 
Bulgaria of being particularly irresponsible being a non-permanent member of the Security Council at 
the time Konstantin Vulkov, “Bulgaria: America’s Good New Friend,” Transitions Online February 
25-March 3,2003, <http://www.ciaonet.org/pbei/sites/tol.html>.
Kristin Archick, “CRS Report for Cmgress: European Union Enlargement” December 22, 2004, 
<http://www.usembassy.it/pdfi'other/RS21344.pdf>.
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European Union on 1 January 2007,^ '^* and accession treaties were signed on 25 
April 2005.
Radikal Daily Newspaper (22 April 2005), p. 13.
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CONCLUSION
Being o f Slavic and Turkic origin people in one o f the worlds’ most 
conflictual regions, Bulgarians survived in the Balkans for almost 13 centuries, and 
they have suffered much until a few years ago. Now they are getting over the former 
traumas created by the great powers and the imending problems o f the region, which 
led to the term “Balkanisation.”
When Bulgarians began their nationalist struggle they first had to fight 
against the “Greek yoke” in chmch affairs. Later, great powers and Russians caused 
the coimtry to begin with a ready-made programme for territorial expansion and a 
burning sense o f the injustice with the signature o f the treaty o f Berlin in 1878. Then, 
the national question has never been far fi-om the surface o f Bulgarian politics, the 
loss o f much o f Ayestafanos Bulgaria, and above all o f Macedonia, ran deep into the 
Bulgarian national psyche.
Bulgarians had to continue their struggle against the Serbs and Russians in 
Slivnitsa and later against its former allies, Serbs and Greeks, in the Second Balkan 
war. The nationalist aims led to the dethroning o f leaders who followed realistic 
policies, and the nationalists could not help but get involved in both world wars. 
Consequently, many people lost their lives, as the cormtry fell deep into poverty. 
M ost western historians without making any reference to these wars, tried to explain 
Bulgaria’s plight in the so-called repressive and assimilationist policies o f the 
Ottoman governance.
Until the end o f the Second World War, Russian and German influence were 
evident, and the coimtry, to a large extent agrarian, gained fi*om its relations with
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Germany in the 1930s. However, after the Soviet invasion in 1944 the picture 
changed dramatically and the coimtry began to follow the Soviet model o f leadership 
and economic development. Sofia became the most loyal satellite o f Moscow, as it 
needed credits and raw materials fi’om Moscow.
The communist regime was a period o f total collectivisation, industrialisation, 
and domestic migration, more importantly the years o f assimilation o f the minorities 
to realise the dream o f the regime, “one country-one nation”. However, these policies 
caused the awakening o f national consciousness among the minorities and brought 
the end o f the regime.
Despite revolutions o f the communist regime, the country was stiU the 
poorest country in the region with almost nine billion dollars o f debt, when the world 
saw the demise o f the Soviet Union. The period was marked by the total collapse o f 
the economy, while the decrease in exports combined with the embargo on 
Yugoslavia and Iraq, and the political instability in the country. It lost all its chances 
o f re-payment o f its foreign debt and declared a moratorium. Naturally, these years 
were that o f introspection and the country had no chance o f applying active regional 
policies. In the period it looked neither to the east or west, but fortunately showed no 
tendency to opportunism aiming at territorial expansion, either.
The fall o f Communism was arguably an elite-centred transition, and a 
negotiated change between elements o f the previous regime and a weak dissident 
group, not the result o f the awakening o f civil society. At that point, the covmtry 
faced the severe task o f creating new political and economic foundations. The 
political leadership soon after the events o f 1989, based on the rovmd-table 
agreements and on a broad procedural consensus, managed quite successfully to 
create the necessary political institutions and political framework. Consequently,
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despite the fact that Bulgaria had established all democratic institutions, they had not 
yet formed a smooth operating system.
Later came the events o f 1997, which led to the resignation o f the socialist 
government, and ignited new openings in the regional pohcies o f the country 
resulting in NATO, and prospective EU membership. Concomitantly the country also 
achieved economic recovery, becoming the number one charm centre for foreign 
direct investment. Moreover, it solved the problems with its minorities, and 
neighbouring countries.
Today, there still remain some problems, but it has solved a great percentage 
o f them. It is no more among those that create problems in the ‘powder keg’, but part 
o f the solution that generates solutions to innate problems o f the region. While social 
and ideological tension has tended to decrease, democratic institutions have steadily 
become more firmly rooted. Certainly the development o f a democratic culture is a 
lengthy process that requires a great deal o f time. Bulgaria constantly fights and aims 
to avoid the rebirth and manifestation o f the legacy o f prejudices and hostilities left 
over fi’om complicated Balkan and European history. Crampton points out that the 
land transportation projects and the oil pipeline fi’om Burgas to Alexandropoulis will 
bring the end o f Bulgaria’s isolation and instability. Then Bulgaria will not need 
Europe; on the contrary, Europe will need Bulgaria.^^^
335 R.J. Crampton, A Concise History of Bulgaria, e.237.
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APPENDIX
CHRONOLOGY
681 Bulgaria’s 1 ** kingdom was established.
864 Prinee B oris eonverted B ulgaria to  E astern O rthodox Christianity.
886 The Slav alphabet, created by the Byzantine monks Cyril and Methodius, 
spread to Bulgaria.
1018 The conquest o f the first Bulgarian state by the Byzantine Empire.
1185 The creation o f the second Bulgarian state after a successful revolt led by 
Asen and Petur.
1396 The conquest o f the second Bulgarian state by the Ottoman State.
1762 Paisii, a monk in the Chilendar monastery on M ount Athos, wrote the first 
modem history o f the Bulgarians, traditionally taken to signify the start o f the 
Bulgarian national revival.
1804 Serbia was the first Slavic land to take arms against Ottoman Empire.
1844 First periodical printed in Bulgaria.
1860 Bishop Ilarion M akariopolski declared Bulgarian diocese o f Istanbul 
independent o f Greek Orthodox patriarchate.
1861 Feb 26, Ferdinand I, 1®* tsar o f modem Bulgaria (1908-18), was bom  in 
Vienna.
1868 Vasil Levski created a network o f revolutionary committees throughout the 
country.
1870 Bulgarian Orthodox Church declared a separate exarchate by Ottoman 
Empire.
1876 Apr, The largest uprising against the Ottoman Empire;
1887 Stefan Stambolov began seven years as prime minister, accelerating 
economic development; Ferdinand o f Saxe-Coburg- Gotha accepted Bulgarian 
throne.
1878 Mar 3, The signature o f the treaty o f Ayestefanos after Russia’s war against 
the Ottoman Empire. Traditionally taken as the foundation date o f the third Bulgarian 
state.
1878 Jul 13, The Congress o f Berlin created an autonomous Bulgarian principality in 
northern Bulgaria, an autonomous province o f Eastern Rumelia in southern Bulgaria, 
and returned Macedonia and Thrace to the Ottoman Empire. The Constitutive 
Assembly in Tumovo adopted the first Bulgarian constitution. The first Grand National 
Assembly chose Alexander o f Battenberg as the first Bulgarian prince.
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1885 Sep 18, The Balkan peace settlement established by the 1878 Treaty o f Berlin 
was imdone when a coup d ’etat in the disputed province o f Eastern Rumelia resulted 
in Eastern Rumelia (separated from Bulgaria in 1878) announcing its re-unification 
with Bulgaria. Serbian prince Milan responded by demanding Bulgaria cede some o f 
its territory to Serbia. An international conference convened and became deadlocked 
in November and Serbia declared war.
1885 Nov 17, The Serbian Army, with Russian support, invaded Bulgaria.
1885 Nov 19, Bulgarians, led by Stefan Stambolov, repulsed a larger Serbian 
invasion force at Slivinitsa.
1885 Nov 26, Bulgaria moved into Serbia.
1886 M ar 3, The Treaty o f Bucharest concluded the Serb-Bulgarian war, re­
establishing pre-war Serbo-Bulgarian borders but leaving Eastern Rumelia and 
Bulgaria united. Prince Alexander o f Battenberg was brought down in a coup 
organised by pro-Russian army ofiBcers. He restored to power by a counter-coup, but 
gave up the throne.
1887 Ferdinand o f Saxe-Coburg-Gotha was elected as the second prince of Bulgaria.
1894 Stefan Stambolov, a dominant prime minister, was dismissed. Prince Ferdinand 
created his “personal regime”.
1895 Jul 15, Ex-prime minister o f Bulgaria Stefan Stambulov was murdered by 
Macedonian rebels.
1899 Bulgarian Agrarian Union was foimded to represent peasant interests.
1908 Sep 22, Bulgaria declared independence from Ottoman Empire and changed its 
status from a principality to a kingdom
1912 Oct 17, Bulgaria, Greece and Serbia declared war on Ottoman Empire.
1912 Oct 18, The First Balkan War broke out between the members o f the Balkan 
League (Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece and Montenegro), and the Ottoman Empire.
1913 Mar 26, Bulgaria captured Edime.
1913 Jun 24, Greece and Serbia annulled their alliance with Bulgaria following 
border disputes over Macedonia and Thrace.
1913 Jul 1, Serbia and Greece declared war on Bulgaria.
1913 Aug 10, The Treaty o f Bucharest ended the Second Balkan War. The first 
“national catastrophe.”
1914 NoV 20, Bulgaria proclaimed its neutrality in the First World War.
1915 Sep 24, Bulgaria mobilized troops on the Serbian border.
1915 Oct 11, A Bulgarian anti-Serbian offensive began.
1915 Oct 16, Great Britain declared war on Brfigaria.
1915 Oct 19, Russia and Italy declared war on Bulgaria.
1916 Sep 1, Bulgaria declared war on Rumania as the First World War expanded. 
1916 Sep 27, Constance o f Greece declared war on Bulgaria.
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1917 Jan 5, Bulgarian and German troops occupied the Port o f Braila in East 
Romania.
1918 Sep 30, Bulgaria pulled out o f World War I. The second "national 
catastrophe".
1919 Nov 27, Bulgaria signed peace treaty with Allies at Neuilly, France, fixing 
war reparations and recognizing Yugoslavian independence.
1923 Jun 9, Bulgaria’s radical agrarian government led by Alexander StamboUiski 
was overthrown by the military.
1931 Last fi"ee parliam entary elections before the Second W orld W ar bring to 
pow er a left-of-centre People’s Bloc government.
1935 Apr 21, King Boris o f Bulgaria forbade all political parties.
1935 Georgi Dimitrov, a Bulgarian communist was selected by Stalin to lead the 
Comintern.
1941 M ar 1, Bulgaria joined the Axis as the Nazis occupy Sofia.
1943 King Boris III died shortly after he yielded to pressure fi*om Adolph Hitler to 
ally with Nazi Germany. Prince Simeon (6) acceded to the thrown and reigned under 
regencies until 1946 when the monarchy was abolished.
1944 Aug 26, In World War II, Bulgaria announced that it had withdrawn fi"om the 
war and that German troops in the country were to be disarmed. Third “national 
catastrophe.”
1946 Sep 15, The referendum on the future form o f government. Georgi Dimitrov 
became the 1  ^premier o f communist Bulgaria.
1947 Feb 10, Paris Peace Treaties were signed between the Big Four and the 
defeated Axis -Italy, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, and Finland.
1947 Sep 23, Nikola Petkov, leader o f leader o f the opposition agrarian party, was 
hanged.
1947 Dec, The new Constitution passed by the Grand National Assembly. Bulgaria 
was proclaimed a People’s Republic.
1948 Dec, The Fifth Congress o f the Communist Party, which imposed a Soviet 
model on the country’s future development.
1949 Jan 1, Bulgaria inaugurated the First Five-year Plan.
1949 Jul 2, Premier Georgi Dimitrov, the founding leader o f Bulgarian 
communism, died. Todor Zhivkov is appointed General Secretary o f the BCP.
1950 Vulko Chervenkov became Prime M inister and leader o f the Communist 
Party. The United States formally broke relations with Bulgaria in the sane month.
1952 Vincentius Bossilkov, the Bishop o f Nikopolis, weis convicted at a Stalinist- 
era show trial for refusing to accept a law aimed at removing the local Catholic 
Church fi-om Vatican jurisdiction.
1954 Todor Zhivkov became First Secretary o f the Central Committee o f BCP. 
Vulko Chervenkov was forced to give up his position as a party leader and to act 
only as a Prime Minister. Todor Zhivkov remained at the top as a ruler for thirty-five 
years.
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1955 May 14, Representatives from eight Communist bloc countries: Soviet Union, 
Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland and Romania, 
signed the Warsaw Pact in Poland. In the same year Bulgaria also became a member 
o f the United National Organization (UN).
1971 May 18, After a referendum, the National Assembly promulgated the new 
Constitution o f the People’s Republic o f Bulgaria. The new constitution consolidated 
‘the leader role o f the Communist Party’.
1985 Apr, Mikhail Gorbachev became General Secretary o f the Central Committee 
o f the Soviet Union.
1987 So-called informal organizations and movements (Podkrepa, Ekoglasnost, the 
Club in Support o f Glasnost and Restructuring, etc.) appeared.
1989 Nov 10, Peter Mladenov replaced Zhivkov as a party leader and President o f 
the State Council. The new government apologized for “crimes o f the past”.
1989 Nov 18, Sixteen opposition organizations set up the Union o f Democratic 
Forces (UDF)
1990 Jan 16, Launching o f the Round Table with the participation o f BCP and 
representatives.
1990 Feb 3, The parliament o f Bulgaria elected economist Andrei Lukanov to 
replace a hard-line Communist as premier. Lukanov became the prime minister after 
rising to the number 2 spot o f the Communist hierarchy imder Zhivkov. He oversaw 
the party’s formal break with Stalinism and victory in the first free elections.
1990 Apr 3, Following an amendment to the Constitution o f 1971, Petar Mladenov 
was elected President.
1990 May 8, Signing o f Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement between 
Bulgaria and EC.
1990 June 10-17, Elections for Great National Assembly. Majority won by BSP.
1990 Jul, President Petar Mladenov resigned under pressvae from the anti­
communist opposition.
1990 Aug 29, Bulgaria established diplomatic relations with NATO.
1990 Sep 17, Bulgaria joined the PHARE Programme.
1990 Nov, Andrei Lukanov fell from power under a wave o f protests and strikes.
1990 Dec 19, Dimitar Popov was designated Prime M inister and formed a coalition 
government.
1990 Dec 22, Great National Assembly adopted a resolution expressing Bulgaria’s 
wish to become member o f EC.
1991 Oct 13, Parliamentary and local elections. UDF obtained relative majority. 
The first UDF Government was formed with Fillip Dimitrov as Prime Minister (as o f 
November 5,1991).
1992 May 07, Bulgaria became member o f the Council o f Europe.
1992 M ayl3, Association negotiations launched between Bulgaria and EC.
1992 Oct 28, Following a vote o f no confidence. Fillip Dimitrov’s cabinet 
resigned.
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1992 Dec28, After the failure o f UDF and BSP to form a government, MRF 
formed a cabinet o f experts with Prof. Lyuben Berov as Prime Minister.
1993 May 08, Signing o f the Europe Agreement for Bulgaria’s association (in 
force as o f 2 February 1995).
1993 Dec 21, Declaration o f the National Assembly in support o f Bulgaria’s 
accession to NATO and WEU.
1993 Dec 31, Interim Trade Agreement between EU and Bulgaria entered in force.
1994 Jan 12, Bulgaria decided to join the NATO initiative Partnership for Peace.
1994 Feb 14, Bulgaria officially joined Partnership for Peace.
1994 May 9, Bulgaria became associated member o f WEU (in force as o f 6 March 
1995).
1994 Dec 18, Early parliamentary elections. BSP won majority in coalition with 
agrarians and ecologists.
1994 Dec 29, Ivan Rostov was elected chairman o f UDF after the resignation o f 
Fillip Dimitrov.
1995 Jan 26, Zhan Videnov designated Prime M inister (BSP).
1995 Dec 1, National Assembly endorsed Bulgaria’s official EU membership 
application.
1996 May, Beginning o f the series o f bank failures. Prime Minister Zhan Videnov 
was struggling to keep the country’s economy intact. The local crurency, the lev, 
slumped to 116 leva to the dollar. King Simeon returned to his homeland.
1996 Jun, The currency was plummeting and crime was rampant. The official 
economy was still 90% state-owned and under management by former Communists. 
The average monthly wages fell to about $65 from $122.
1996 Jul, An agreement with the IMF was reached and $582 million was pumped 
in with another $200 million promised by the World Bank.
1996 Oct 2, Bulgaria became member o f WTO.
1996 Nov 3, In presidential elections Petar Stoyanov, won with 61.9% o f the vote.
1996 Dec 4, General strike by the Bulgarian National Union Confederation.
1996 Dec 28, Zhan Videnov resigned from the post o f Prime Minister.
1997 Jan 10-11, Demonstrations around the parliament building escalating into 
rampage and clashes with the police. Protestors trapped legislators o f the ruling 
Socialist Party inside parliament.
1997 Jan 19, President Peter Stoyanov was sworn into office and he immediately 
called for new parliamentary elections.
1997 Feb 3, Prime minister designate Nikolai Dobrev was selected by the ruling 
Socialists to lead a new government. Thousands hit the streets with students and 
transport workers in protest. Next day, the ex-Communists backed down and agreed 
to new elections in April.
1997 Feb 15-16, At a National Conference UDF was transformed into an integrated 
party.
I l l
1997 Apr 19, The United Democratic Forces (UDF) under Ivan Kostov won 
elections with 52% o f the vote. The Socialist Party won 19%.
1997 May 21, Ivan Kostov was elected the new premier by the parliament. He 
planned reforms for the economy, cleanup o f corruption, and gaining admission to 
the EU and NATO.
1997 Jul 10, The Bulgarian Government created a new mechanism to coordinate 
Bulgaria’s preparation for accession to EU.
1997 Jul 23, The National Assembly adopted a Declaration for Simultaneous 
Laimch o f EU Accession Negotiations with the Associated Member States.
1998 Mar 23, The Government adopted a National Strategy for EU Accession and 
National Program for Adoption o f the Acquis Communautaire.
1999 Apr 18, NATO requested from Bulgaria the use o f its airspace.
1999 Apr 20, Bulgaria and Romania offered to let NATO use their airspace to 
bomb Yugoslavia.
1998 Apr 27, Bulgaria began a process o f screening the legislation with a view to 
its alignment with that o f EU.
1999 Dec 10, The EU granted preliminary consideration for membership to 
Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Malta.
2001 Jun 17, In Bulgaria voters in parliamentary elections supported the national 
Movement o f Czar Simeon II (64). PM Ivan Kostov conceded. Simeon’s party won 
120 o f 240 seats.
2001 Jul 12, In Bulgaria Simeon Saxe-Coburgotski, the former King Simeon II, 
was chosen as Prime Minister. He promised to solve the coimtry’s problems in 800 
days.
2001 In Bulgaria Socialist Georgi Parvanov (44) won 53% o f the presidential vote 
against incumbent Petar Stoyanov. This signalled discontent with the pace o f reforms 
o f PM Simeon Saxcoburggotski.
2002 May 31, Bulgaria signed an agreement with the US to destroy its Cold War- 
era missiles. The US planned to pay the costs o f destruction.
2002 Oct 9, The European Union’s executive Commission declared Bulgaria, the 
Czech Republic, Cyprus, Estonia, Himgary, Latvia, Lithuania, M alta, Poland, 
Romania, Slovenia, and Slovakia nearly ready for EU membership and 
recommended they be invited to join in 2004. Romania and Bulgaria would be 
delayed until 2007 because o f weak economies.
2002 Nov 21, The Baltic nations o f Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania joined former 
communist states Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia as the next wave o f 
NATO states.
2004 Apr 2, In Brussel an official ceremony welcomed Bulgaria, Estonia, 
Lithuania, Latvia, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia into the NATO alliance.
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